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Abstract 
	  
The end of World War II, decolonization, and the emerging Cold War made forming an 
antiracist foreign and domestic policy an imperative for the United States. This context meant 
that segregation at home tarnished the American image to potential allies in the Third World 
because the nation claimed to be the defender of freedom and equality against Soviet 
totalitarianism. This dissertation explores the development of a southern internationalism in 
response to the antiracist liberal international policies following World War II. I define southern 
internationalism as a belief in racial citizenship that defined efforts to maintain white 
supremacist global racial hierarchies, which manifested itself in support for segregation at home 
and neocolonial relationships abroad. The result of this global vision led to southern 
internationalist support of nationalistic, unilateral, and militaristic foreign policy and attached 
racial significance and motives to those foreign policy methods.  
This dissertation uses foreign aid as an entry point into understanding how the liberal 
internationalist programs of the Cold War faced opposition from representatives in the American 
South. It argues that southern politicians, such as Otto E. Passman, Allen J. Ellender, and George 
C. Wallace, opposed foreign aid not only for fiscal reasons, but also because they had an 
alternative vision for national security and controlling the decolonizing world. Their vision, 
southern internationalism, attempted to combat the connection between the American civil rights 
movement and nationalist movements throughout the Third World and gradually gained strength 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Segregationists refined their message against foreign aid and 
eliminated direct mention of race during the 1960s so that their objectives were more palatable to 
a national audience. Therefore, they crafted foreign aid into a symbol for both domestic and 
international racial disorder. The result was a political rhetoric that attached racial meaning and 
	   iv	  
symbolism to foreign aid. Imbuing foreign aid with racial meaning allowed segregationists to 
take their regionalist international vision to a national audience while maintaining appeal to their 
southern base. Southern internationalism became one of many political traditions that formed a 
conservative internationalism in the 1960s and 1970s around shared interests and objectives.  
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Introduction: 
 
Nationalizing Southern Internationalism 
 
In 1967, Bill Jones, a George Wallace for President campaign staffer, drafted an article 
with the intent that it would be published under George Wallace’s name in the Saturday Evening 
Post. He sent his finished draft in a memo to Cecil C. Jackson, Wallace’s executive secretary. In 
the wake of the major civil rights bills of the mid-1960s and the growing tide of black militancy 
that coincided with the civil rights movement’s renewed focus on socio-economic justice and 
equality and the dawn of Black Power, Jones’ article sought to rallying the growing white, 
middle-class resentment and backlash over the Democratic Party’s domestic and international 
policies that had dominated American politics since the New Deal. As he sat down to pen the 
article, Jones channeled Wallace’s fiery and dramatic political rhetoric. Throughout the draft, he 
emphasized themes of anti-intellectualism, American exceptionalism, local control of schools, 
overreach of the federal government, patriotism, and American sovereignty, all of which Wallace 
had built his political identity around. Jones therefore sought to tie all of these themes together, 
and he found his common denominator in the anti-liberal rhetoric aimed at the policymakers in 
the Lyndon B. Johnson administration.1  
 Jones’ draft revolved mostly around deriding the direction domestic policies had taken 
under the liberal presidencies of the post-World War II era. Significantly though, in the 
completed draft that reached the desk of Jackson, Jones choose to draw readers in by opening 
with a discussion on the connection between international aid programs and the size and 
“overreach” of the American federal government. In doing so, Jones’ words for Wallace both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bill Jones to Cecil C. Jackson, Memorandum on proposed article by Governor Wallace for The Saturday Evening 
Post, 1 August 1967, Box 10, Folder 3, George Wallace Collection, George C. Wallace Papers, Alabama 
Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, AL. 
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echoed and contributed to a longer tradition in American political thought regarding the role of 
the United States in the world. Specifically, the draft articulated a particular vision of what the 
parameters of the United States’ interactions with the rest of the world should be. Jones argued 
that the United States had extended itself too far in the world. Yet, he still saw the United States 
deeply imbedded in the world, and made no calls to disentangle itself from it. He instead took 
issue with the way the United States engaged with the rest of the world, and hinted at what an 
alternative vision to that engagement would look like under a Wallace administration. 
Underlying this alternative vision and helping it resonate with the general public was Jones’ use 
of international fears as well as domestic ones concerning changing racial hierarchies.  
Alluding to an alternative foreign policy, Jones focused much of his attention on 
dismissing the current administration. To do so he established Wallace as a political outsider, in 
spite of Wallace’s reputation as being politically conniving and a master manipulator. Jones 
dismissed then-current political leaders as “genteel, polished and educated cowards,” which 
served to paint Wallace’s political opponents as out-of-touch, snobbish elites. He then proceeded 
to suggest that the over-intellectual “cowards” running the nation were to blame for the loss of 
the very thing that, in Wallace’s opinion, defined America to the rest of the world, namely, its 
“rugged individualism and sheer intestinal fortitude.”2 Key among Jones’ statement for Wallace 
was that the current policies had not only surrendered the American character, but that they had 
sold the United States out to the whims of lesser nations and peoples. In terms of foreign policy, 
Jones made it very clear that Wallace believed that the United States should not allow any other 
nation or peoples to dictate how the nation conducted itself abroad. The question of who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Bill Jones to Cecil C. Jackson, Memorandum on proposed article by Governor Wallace for The Saturday Evening 
Post, 1 August 1967, Box 10, Folder 3, George Wallace Collection, George C. Wallace Papers, Alabama 
Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, AL. 
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benefitted from American policies abroad therefore was a key concern for Wallace because he 
feared giving aid represented the United States being at the whim and demands of other nations. 
Foreign aid played an important role in Jones’ ability to convey to readers the damage 
done by what he labeled as oversized and over-intellectual government programs, especially to 
American prestige abroad. With regards to foreign aid, Jones was able to use it as a symbol for 
the entirety of American foreign policy under the presidencies following the Cold War. Jones 
declared, “Today we allow every pipsqueak hottentot in the world to kick us in the teeth and then 
hold out his hand for some more foreign aid. Furthermore, in the name of freedom and the 
protection of the human welfare we have strait-jacketed ourselves with guidelines, guideposts, 
regulations, laws, opinions, ukases and executive orders. We have put on kid gloves when we 
should be talking softly and carrying a big stick.”3 In this statement Jones was able to connect the 
size of the government and its bureaucracy to his dismissal of aid recipients while evoking racial 
images in an effort to discredit aid recipients as ungrateful and twofaced “pipsqueak hottentots.”4 
Jones believed that the nation had gone too far and given up its prestige and very identity 
by allowing aid to be given to nations that did not prescribe to and support American goals. As 
seen in Jones’ concern over the size of the government and its conduct towards peoples abroad, 
Jones also demonstrated that his vision for Wallace’s engagement abroad was deeply shaped by 
domestic perceptions and politics. In connecting the erosion of American character and 
individualism to the size of the government, the imagery of foreign aid recipients as treacherous 
to American international interests while simultaneously primitive with outstretched hands, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Bill Jones to Cecil C. Jackson, Memorandum on proposed article by Governor Wallace for The Saturday Evening 
Post, 1 August 1967, Box 10, Folder 3, George Wallace Collection, George C. Wallace Papers, Alabama 
Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, AL. 
4 Bill Jones to Cecil C. Jackson, Memorandum on proposed article by Governor Wallace for The Saturday Evening 
Post, 1 August 1967, Box 10, Folder 3, George Wallace Collection, George C. Wallace Papers, Alabama 
Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, AL.	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Jones created a critique of policy and aid recipients that would have reminded American readers 
of domestic policies and racial tensions. The result of this rhetoric was that Jones’ was 
participating in an important step in the development of an alternative vision of American 
foreign policy. This was a vision that had regional roots in the history of segregation in the 
American South, but with the likes of Wallace and his contemporaries that vision had taken on 
national resonance. For opponents of liberal internationalism, dismissing foreign aid became 
steeped in symbolism and racial meaning in both international and domestic contexts. For 
example, Jones had moved beyond simply reiterating southern opinions regarding federal 
interference in segregation, to referencing a distrust and resentment of government size and its 
“human welfare” programs.5 These “human welfare” programs not only cited foreign aid abroad, 
but also alluded to foreign aid being in the same vein as Johnson’s Great Society social welfare 
programs. Therefore, Jones used the size of the federal government and its “human welfare” 
programs as key topics to attack Johnson while moving beyond outright racist declarations, 
which carried appeal among the American people beyond the American South. The national 
appeal of Wallace revolved around shared langue of resentment, nationalism, anti-liberalism, and 
unilateralism.  
 Importantly, Jones’ drafted article for Wallace was never published. However, the 
reasons that the Wallace campaign shelved the article did not have to do with any sort of 
disagreement in the message the article conveyed. Wallace had used the same type of language 
and ideas Jones presented in his drafted article many times before in his local and national 
campaigns. Furthermore, the line regarding sending money to “Hottentots” actually draws from a 
longer history of critiques against liberal internationalism, specifically the New Deal liberalism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Bill Jones to Cecil C. Jackson, Memorandum on proposed article by Governor Wallace for The Saturday Evening 
Post, 1 August 1967, Box 10, Folder 3, George Wallace Collection, George C. Wallace Papers, Alabama 
Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, AL. 
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of the Franklin D. Roosevelt era.  For example, in response to Henry A. Wallace’s 1942 
“Common Man Speech,” the National Association of Manufacturers declared that its members 
make guns and tanks to “help our boys save America,” not “for a quart of milk for every 
Hottentot, or for a TVA on the Danube.” The image of the United States providing “a quarter of 
milk for every Hottentot” became pervasive in the isolationist opposition to FDR’s policies and 
internationalism. Robert A. Taft argued against any sort of international control of sovereign 
states’ resources, dismissing such programs as the foolhardy attempts of “do gooders” to “confer 
the benefits of the New Deal on every Hottentot.”6 Jones and Wallace recognized the ability of 
this imagery to speak to both international and domestic issues and carry resonance with a large 
portion of the American public.  
 Wallace, although using the rhetoric of the isolationists of the pre-World War II era, did 
not endorse their isolationist stance and adopted the language for his own purposes. These 
purposes were in line with his efforts to export his southern appeal that revolved around his fiery 
stage persona and bombastic speeches against integration to shore up national appeal. During his 
wife’s 1966 gubernatorial campaign, Wallace reminded the crowd that supporting his wife’s 
election also meant supporting his national political ambitions. He affirmed, “Why should we 
change our image to suit some communist Hottentot ten thousand miles away from here?” 
Wallace continued by reminding the crowd that those ideals were not unique to Alabama, and 
that they had national support.7 The fact that Wallace was able to adapt a familiar political troupe 
for his own purposes begins to demonstrate the way that he was able to take his regional, 
southern-based ideals to a national audience. Not only were his chosen words familiar in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 159, 338.  
7 Stephan Lesher, George Wallace: American Populist (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1994), 
363-364.  
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American political history, but also when Wallace posed them the implied racist meaning were 
brought to the forefront of his message.  
Jones had lifted those crucial racially charged lines in his article almost verbatim from 
Wallace’s own words earlier on the campaign trail. If anything, Jones’ article toned down the 
racial meanings in Wallace’s message about foreign aid. In a February 1967 campaign stop 
Wallace highlighted the connection he saw between domestic policies and foreign aid, 
suggesting that the same underlining liberal policies were threatening American identity and 
prestige. He insinuated that the United States was funding communists and their allies with aid. 
He continued by alluding to the international influence on the passage of key civil rights 
legislation. Reaching his crescendo, Wallace declared “Every hottentot in the world kicks us in 
the teeth and we smile and send them a few more billion. They stone and burn our embassies and 
tear down our flag and burn it and we send them more aid. But let a law-abiding school board 
fail to sign an illegal and vague ‘loyalty oath’ and immediately funds are deferred or 
terminated.”8 In connecting aid to foreign countries with an image of a government that 
disregards its own people (significantly, with regards to local control over schools), Wallace 
foreshawdowed the same rhetoric and imagery as Jones to suggest that both at home and abroad 
the American government was yielding to very “un-American” pressure.  
Importantly, Wallace, and later Jones, never explicitly stated that maintaining America 
prestige abroad entailed a very specific vision of the United States and how citizenship was 
defined. Still, by connecting racial imagery of aid recipients to the same policies that had 
domestically yielded civil rights legislation and social-economic programs aimed at benefiting 
the impoverished, Wallace and Jones presented a vision of America and its prestige that was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 George C. Wallace, “Citizens Councils of America Leadership Conference,” New Orleans, LA, 17 February 1967, 
Box SG034328, Folder Citizens Councils of America Leadership Conference, Administrative Files, 1958-1968 
1967, George C. Wallace Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, AL.	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firmly rooted in a “racial nationalism” in which American citizenship was defined by Anglo-
Saxon lineage. The Anglo-Saxon lineage held an “inherited fitness for self-government” that 
could not be transplanted.9 Foreign aid therefore was a target for Wallace during his national 
campaigns and was in direct response to the modernization efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, because he believed that it allowed inferior peoples to assert their influence on 
American domestic and international policies. Furthermore, not only did such influence threaten 
white control in the United States, but foreign aid, with its inherent ideal of economic uplift via 
development, also threatened white control around the world.  
The result of Wallace’s calculated word choice allowed for critiques of domestic policies 
to be grafted onto discussions of international matters. This was part of a longer process in the 
development of a conservative international alternative foreign vision during the Cold War. This 
alternative vision was in part rooted in the American South and segregationists’ efforts to 
maintain white control of social, political, and economic systems within the United States and 
later around the world. The southern vision was one that saw American engagement with the rest 
of the world as defined by American control, unilateral actions, force, and nationalism and 
sovereignty. The southern internationalism that was one of the varied ideological foundations of 
a conservative international coalition and it emphasized a white supremacist facet to those 
interactions with the rest of the world. Segregationists therefore often exalted the importance of 
unilateral actions and nationalism in their effort to control the changing dynamics of racial 
hierarchies around the world due to the threat that they saw decolonization and the civil rights 
movement posing to their own positions of power. Jones’ draft is an example of how 
segregationists frequently connected their attacks on liberal domestic and foreign policies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), 4.  
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because they saw them as eroding national, and more to the point, white sovereignty. This 
allowed southern internationalists to share common ground and language with other conservative 
political traditions, such as Barry Goldwater and his sunbelt conservatives.  
Foreign aid proved to be an especially useful topic in segregationists’ efforts to discredit 
liberal policies at home and abroad due to its imagery and parallels to domestic programs of 
socio-economic uplift in the 1960s. For Wallace and others, foreign aid therefore became a 
political symbol for what they defined as government overreach and interference at home and 
abroad. In the context of his late 1960’s national presidential campaigns, Wallace was able to us 
foreign aid as a way to discredit civil rights and federal efforts at socio-economic justice. He did 
so by eliminating direct use of the racially charged rhetoric that had defined his earlier regional 
political career. Instead, as Jones’ article demonstrates, he discredited aid recipients and 
suggested that the “intellectuals” in the federal government were undermining American 
sovereignty and prestige. In eliminating direct racial references, and using foreign aid as a 
symbolic whipping boy for the policies that allowed for the deterioration of white supremacist 
domestic and international control, Wallace was participating in a process of nationalizing 
southern internationalism.  
Wallace’s national presidential campaigns were a key moment in the creation of a 
conservative internationalism that was an alternative to the prevailing liberal international 
political traditions. Despite Wallace’s legacy as a demagogue and political outlier, his efforts to 
rely on foreign aid and other racially coded political symbols to convey his domestic and 
international vision represented an effort to take his southern vision to a national level. 
Following the landmark civil rights bills of the mid-1960s, in the general public and political 
circles outright racist declarations were increasingly harmful to political clout and legitimacy. 
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Therefore, for segregationists, finding ways to talk about race without mentioning race became a 
key strategy. Furthermore, this strategy had broad appeal due to growing resentment among 
white, middle class families during the 1960s and 1970s.   
The strategy that Wallace exemplified with his use of foreign aid as a symbol for other 
policies as presented to a national audience represents the basis for common foreign policy 
objectives of conservative internationalism. Much like the conservative coalition that emerged in 
the United States during the 1960s and 1970s, conservative internationalism found diverging 
political interests working towards shared goals and interests. Wallace’s campaigns represent the 
segregationist internationalist base for that larger political coalition. Significantly, his national 
presidential campaigns and the coded racial language he used, especially surrounding foreign aid 
represents how that conservative international coalition was able to form and find common 
ground around the underlining issue of controlling shifting global racial hierarchies. With 
outright racist declarations like the ones that marked Wallace’s early career, it would have been 
difficult for the alternative international vision that segregationists proposed to gain much 
traction outside of their southern base. Thus, the racial symbolism that Wallace and others were 
able to attach to foreign aid (and domestically, busing, welfare, and other socio-economic 
policies aimed to help those in poverty and ease inequities) allowed for shared interests over the 
size of the government, anti-intellectualism, fiscal conservatism and nationalism to come 
together.  
This dissertation therefore explores the process by which segregationists like Wallace 
presented an alternative vision to managing the postcolonial world, and how they gradually, used 
those methods to move beyond the confines of the American South. Foreign aid provides a 
window into this process and serves as an example for the larger political process that was 
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occurring amongst southern segregationists. This longer process cumulated with Wallace’s 
presidential campaigns and the shift in foreign aid policy to human rights based initiatives in 
1973 with the New Direction policies and Basic Human Needs (BHN) mandate during the Carter 
administration. In large part because of the Vietnam War the reorientation of foreign aid under 
the New Direction policies represented a larger shift in foreign policy and the role of Congress in 
shaping foreign policy. This shift meant that there was increasing opposition to foreign aid from 
both the political left and the political right.10 The result was that the rhetoric and discourse 
surrounding the debate over foreign aid changed as well, but the language and meanings of the 
earlier debates remained embedded in the way politicians discussed foreign aid.  
This dissertation investigates the origins of a conservative internationalism in the post-
World War II era. It uses foreign aid as an entry point into understanding how the liberal 
internationalist programs of the Cold War, such as development aid faced opposition from 
representatives in the American South. It argues that southern representatives, such as Otto E. 
Passman and Allen J. Ellender both of Louisiana, opposed foreign aid not just for fiscal reasons, 
but also because they had an alternative vision for national security and controlling the 
decolonizing world. That vision, southern internationalism, was connected to their efforts to 
maintain southern socio-economic racial hierarchies at home. I define southern internationalism 
as a belief in racial citizenship that defined efforts to maintain white supremacist global racial 
hierarchies, which manifested itself in support for segregation at home and neocolonial 
relationships abroad. The result of this global vision led to southern internationalist support of 
nationalistic, unilateral, and militaristic foreign policy and attached racial significance and 
motives to those foreign policy methods.  
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Southern internationalism attempted to combat the connection between the American 
civil rights movement and nationalist movements throughout the Third World and gradually 
coalesced through the 1950s and 1960s. Segregationists refined their message against foreign aid 
and eliminated direct mention of race during the 1960s. Segregationists, therefore, crafted 
foreign aid into a symbol for both domestic and international racial disorder. Imbuing foreign aid 
with racial meaning allowed segregationists to take their regionalist international agenda to a 
national audience. It was one of the many ways that they could talk about race without directly 
mentioning it. The result was a political rhetoric that attached racial meaning and symbolism to 
foreign aid. George C. Wallace’s presidential campaigns especially highlighted the role of 
southern internationalism in using common motives and objectives surrounding foreign affairs to 
help build a New Right coalition.  
Significantly, this project sheds new light on the rise of American conservatism in the 
postwar period. By linking the histories of foreign aid with civil rights opposition, it counters the 
assumption that southerners were parochial and isolationists who were only focused on their 
“own backyard.” Instead, it reveals that they had their own agenda and methods to control what 
they saw to be the disorder of decolonization, and that vision was firmly rooted in their domestic 
view of how the world should be ordered, in this case, racially. People like George Wallace, 
Senator Ellender, and Representative Passman therefore fought foreign aid and ideas of global 
uplift by presenting a unilateral and nationalistic alternative to world engagement. They achieved 
this end by constructing a political fiction surrounding American foreign aid and turning it into a 
symbol of the excesses of liberal internationalism at home and abroad. I define political fiction to 
mean the manner in which opponents of foreign aid and civil rights frequently spoke of the non-
	   12	  
white recipients of aid in the Global South as corrupt beggars. The political fiction about the 
Third World was a symbol that political ideologues employed to connect foreign aid with the 
civil rights movement. This southern internationalism--in which segregationists presented 
foreign aid as an international version of welfare--aligned with the later conservative 
internationalism with regards to methods and the rhetoric used to discuss foreign affairs. The 
inherent racial meanings in southern critiques of liberal spending at home and abroad contributed 
an important political tradition in the political paradigm shift towards new conservatism in the 
early 1970s.  
Aid represented contested political ground to politicians during the Cold War. For 
segregationists, the connection between domestic and international policies meant that the Cold 
War potentially threatened domestic racial hierarchies as it gave Third World nationalists and 
domestic civil rights leaders a platform to argue for the Cold War imperative of civil rights 
legislation. The international pressure for the United States to live up to its own ideals and win 
allies against the Soviet Union during the Cold War provided civil rights leaders and anti-
colonialists leverage in their struggle for social justice and equality.11 At the same time, 
segregationists were adamantly anti-communist and dedicated to winning the Cold War. They 
therefore had to counter international calls from the former colonial world to end segregationist 
practices in the United States. The result was that segregationists wove their critiques of civil 
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rights activists and global pressure as nothing more than communist agitators.12 In terms of an 
international vision, their dismissal of international influence fit seamlessly with their 
nationalistic, unilateral approach to foreign policy.  
For liberals, the paternalistic nature of the language surrounding development aid was 
rooted in a liberal development model that was not intentionally designed to be racist. Instead, it 
functioned on the idea of collaboration and self-help, which in itself implied that people in the 
Global South were capable of reaching “modernity” as modeled by the United States.13 In 
President Harry S. Truman’s technical assistance plan he saw not only an opportunity for the 
United States to benefit in geopolitics, but also an opportunity to replicate the “progress” of the 
West around the world.14 For liberal internationalists, Western progress did not result from the 
efforts of its citizens, but from political ideology, capitalism, and technology, which could be 
replicated through development aid around the world.15 This liberal internationalist belief in the 
potential for modernity regardless of race stood directly against the segregationist belief in racial 
citizenship and white supremacy.  
At the center of the debate between conservatives and liberals stood the question of 
meaning and symbolism of development. It was important to Truman that advances made around 
the world via development symbolically reflected the same ideals that the United States claimed 
to represent in the context of an ideological battle against communism during the Cold War. 
Included among these were “democratic values, property rights, and alignment with the United 
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States and its allies.”16 In the context of decolonization, liberal internationalists used foreign aid 
in line with the democratic impulses of the changing global racial hierarchies. Segregationists 
countered by trying to entrench the old racial hierarchies, often dismissing foreign aid as 
supporting communism in the Third World as opposed to democratic ideals.  
Liberal development was a way to try to reshape the world in a democratic, anti-
imperialist, and capitalist image. The introduction of development into the Cold War expanded 
the parameters of the Cold War beyond capitalism and communism. Instead, the Cold War 
became a battle for the Third World between two anti-imperialist and distinctive development 
models.17 For liberals, development entailed progress that could effectively bring “civilization” 
to other parts of the world.18 Liberals thought that they could create appropriate economic and 
political conditions to lead to the “culmination of modernity,” an industrial society, with the 
United States being the epitome of modernity.19 Development projects were designed to not only 
produce growth, but also to guide growth to a desired outcome imbued with specific meaning.20 
Indeed, officials and theorists defined political development as “democracy, stability, anti-
Communism, peace, world community, and pro-Americanism.”21 With western aid and an 
infusion of technology, liberal development promised that material gains could be made in the 
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Third World, but at the same time the material gains would also lead to new habits of 
modernity.22 The proposed programs ultimately sought to bring modernity to all corners of the 
earth.  
One of the key features of liberal development was its antiracist ideology. The connection 
liberals made to antiracism in foreign policy was strongly connected to domestic antiracism as 
well. Segregationists and white supremacists saw their own position at home slipping away 
under the influence of liberals and their development scheme. Historian Michael Krenn argues 
that race was never far from development, and later “modernization theory,” despite the 
progressive rhetoric associated with it. He notes, “When the idea of race began to lose its 
biological foothold in the post-World War II year, it simply rebounded by attaching itself quite 
easily and seamless to cultural explanations of the unique progress of the Anglo-Saxon world 
and the continuing backwardness and lack of civilization in the nonwhite world. The amazing 
resiliency of racism, however, allowed it to stave off challenges during the Cold War.”23 Indeed, 
liberals also tried to remake racial hierarchies in an image that they wanted, and of course theory 
and practice did not always intersect into workable solutions. However, liberal development did 
ideally practice antiracism in which the West’s superiority was based on a historical process that 
could be replicated rather than race or cultural explanations.24 Historian David Engerman points 
out liberal intellectuals, in the 1920s, overcame the prevailing belief in distinctive national 
characters by taking up the cause of universal progress in which national character did not shape 
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destiny, but was merely an obstacle to modernity.25 What Krenn describes--the continued 
prevalence of race in shaping United State foreign policy and enforcing Western superiority--was 
the result of opposition to liberal development from segregationists.  
Southern internationalism, at first glance, might appear to be nothing more than the old 
isolationism of the pre-World War II era, but the South presented an alternative vision of 
internationalism that rested on maintaining white supremacist racial hierarchies, not withdrawing 
from the world. The isolationist/internationalist binary, therefore, is a bit misleading since few 
political figures in the mid-20th century would have actually seriously considered completely 
withdrawing from international affairs, as the prototypical definition of isolationism would 
suggest.26 Still given the popularity of the terminology the dichotomy is useful for classification 
of politics during the Cold War. Charles Lerche argues that the distinction between the two terms 
is not quantitative, “but rather a matter of the terms and conditions under which these contacts 
were to be initiated and carried on.” Lerche continues, “The isolation of the Untied States, 
therefore, is conceived of as being conceptual and intellectual rather than crudely physical. 
Americans are admitted to be unquestionably in the world but emphatically not of it.”27 
Isolationism therefore was inherently unilateralist in foreign affairs. Comparatively, the 
internationalist philosophy of American foreign affairs thought American destiny was “tied up 
with the whole of mankind.”28 Lerche suggests a unilateralism/multilateralism dichotomy as a 
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more effective alternative. For variation and to use familiar vocabulary, I will use the terms 
interchangeably (e.g. unilateralism/isolationism and multilateralism/internationalism).  
Contextually speaking, sociologist and racial theorist Howard Winant argues that during 
the post-World War II years there was a global shift, or “break,” in “the worldwide racial system 
that had endured for centuries.” According to Winant, this break occurred because challenges 
such as anticolonialism, antiapartheid, the U.S. civil rights movement, and the Cold War, 
converged against the old racial hierarchy.29 Thus, in the post-war years, the United States stood 
at a moment when government leaders and social activists disputed domestic and international 
racial hierarchies. The result was “a worldwide, antiracist, democratizing tendency.”30 State and 
non-state actors, who participated in the post-war development network, therefore operated 
within the context of global challenges to old racial hierarchies.31 However, the outcome of the 
global confrontations did not eliminate the entrenched system of racial inequality. Instead the old 
racial hierarchies adapted to changing conditions, revealing the fluid and contradictory nature of 
racial hegemony development.32  
The process in which opponents of foreign aid adapted old racial hierarchies to the 
increasingly antiracial political movements of the post-war era speaks to a larger trend in post-
civil rights American politics in which politicians use coded racial language. The use of coded 
language became even more pronounced in the late 1960s once blatant displays of racism 
became socially unacceptable. This was one way segregationists adapted to changing race 
relations. Adapting here means a repackaging where racial hierarchies, in theory, no longer 
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existed but white supremacists and segregationists did. In their fight against the global and 
domestic shifts in white racial hegemony, segregationists utilized methods that reinforced 
“traditional” racial orders. In doing so, they worked within the liberal system and ultimately 
adjusted to it, creating a new way of discussing race in the United States and how the nation 
approached race on a global scale. Nikhil Pal Singh describes this historical process as the 
“discourse of civil rights liberalism” that has been co-opted by conservatism where politicians 
equate “ending racism with eliminating racial reference within juridical discourse and public 
policy.”33 In this sense, the political discussions surrounding issues such as welfare and busing, 
and in this case foreign aid, became coded with the racial implication masked under so-called 
color-blind policies. 
Unlike segregationists, who thought development threatened white supremacy, for 
liberals, race and development were linked during the early Cold War years as part of the same 
agenda that sought to reorient the world away from racist hierarchies. Specifically, the 
convergence of several historical moments made civil rights and development important to 
forming an antiracist platform for liberals. These moments were the end of World War II, 
decolonization, and the emerging Cold War. After World War II, the world had seen the horrors 
of racism in Hitler’s concentration camps, which placed civil rights reform in the United States 
in the context of the new concept of human rights.34 The emergence of the Soviet Union as an 
expansionist power at the same time new nations were forming in Africa and Asia due to 
decolonization further entrenched the importance of antiracist policies for American liberals. 
Indeed these events meant that segregation at home was a black mark for the United States as it 
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simultaneously claimed to be the defender of freedom and equality against totalitarianism while 
failing at achieving its own ideals. Liberals like Harry Truman, therefore, saw civil rights reform 
at home as integral to containing the advance of the Soviet Union into the former colonies, who 
watched closely the racial situation in the United States.35 
Regionalism in foreign policy necessarily plays a key role in understanding opposition to 
foreign aid. Historian Joseph Fry argues, “Place matters in how Americans have responded to 
and influenced the formation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy; therefore, systematic, 
but necessarily selective, assessment of the scholarship addressing the intersection of domestic 
regionalism and U.S. foreign policy significantly enhances our understanding of both regional 
and national American history.”36 Although Fry presents a convincing case for the inclusion of 
regionalism in the history of American foreign relations, the task of integrating it into historical 
interpretations is not without its pitfalls. First and foremost is the job of defining geographic 
borders versus the idea of a region, as historians of the American West are already well aware of. 
For my purposes, I define the South as both a geographical location outlined by the former 
Confederate states and also a more ambiguous area defined by prevailing ideas held in the 
region. It is also significant to note when collectively referring to the South as a region I am 
characterizing those that held political, economic, and social power, namely the “white South.” 
This is not to discount that African Americans and other minorities did live or influence the 
Southern perspective, but rather to follow where the prevailing political perspective came from. 
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Recognizing that the ideas that characterized the South, such as segregation, existed beyond the 
borders of the former Confederacy, I use the South as an example and window into the larger 
themes of race in U.S. foreign policy, while at the same not denying its distinctive history.  
Before the late 1950s southern congresspersons largely voted in consensus on foreign aid 
and most other foreign policy decisions.37 However, this began to change after the immediate 
Cold War years (1945-1953). Foreign aid and Southern ambivalence toward it provides an early 
indicator of changing southern attitudes towards international relations.38 Indeed, an early study 
by Charles Lerche reaches the same conclusion Fry did through detailed analysis of southern 
voting patterns. Lerche argues, “The change in the international outlook of the South is nowhere 
more clearly documented than in the record its congressmen have made on the question of that 
hardy perennial of recent American foreign policy, foreign aid.”39 Although Fry and Lerche both 
suggest the importance of domestic events in changing the Southern outlook, they spend 
significantly more time on fiscal conservative attitudes and outlooks and international events 
than they do on the way such attitudes had domestic connections. Given the importance of 
foreign aid in assessing southern international attitudes it provides an equally significant bridge 
between international and domestic issues due to the centrality of race in both topics.  	  
Due to the significance of the southern region in understanding American foreign policy 
and the illuminating role that foreign aid serves in gauging the region’s vision of international 
engagement, this dissertation focuses on key southern political figures. These political figures 
not only serve as examples of a larger group of officials, but they also themselves were 
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influential in their opposition to foreign aid. The first of these historical figures is Allen J. 
Ellender, a senator from Louisiana. Allen Joseph Ellender was born in 1890 in the Terrebonne 
Parish. He was proud of his Acadian heritage and worked on his father’s farm, but at the same 
time aspired to rise above it. Even at a young age his family members began to call him “Sous-
Sous,” which roughly translates to “Little Pennies.” One explanation for this nickname was that 
Ellender hustled family members and passersby for pennies when he was young. Another was 
that as a child Ellender had a dream of finding pennies under his bed, but upon awaking and 
realizing it was just a dream he cried mournfully.40 Either way, from a young age Ellender 
showed a propensity towards money and how it was spent. Applying his work and economic 
values to his ambitions, Ellender was admitted to the bar in 1913 after attending Tulane 
University Law School. In 1937, having served in various local and state political positions he 
achieved his national political ambitions and was elected as a Democrat to the Senate, where 
served until his death in 1972. 
 Like his early proclivity towards fiscal conservatism was a common southern principle, 
Ellender also accepted the racial order of things in the South. He readily adopted the paternalistic 
impression of blacks as lazy and inferior to whites despite having only occasionally come in 
contact with African Americans during his childhood.41 During his time as a Senator he would 
often reflect on his association with African Americans when writing to constituents concerned 
over civil rights, “The Lord only knows I am not against the Negro. I was raised among them and 
I understand them very well.”42 According to Ellender’s biographer, Thomas Becnel,  “Young 
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Allen learned of race relations during his formative years, when segregation and discrimination 
were ever present and violence was not unusual.”43 Later, when serving on the Senate Committee 
on Appropriations, his fiscal conservative and segregationist worldview shaped Ellender’s 
opinions and decisions regarding domestic and international affairs and made him a key figure in 
understanding how race intertwined domestic and international politics.  
 Ellender’s colleague in the House of Representatives also serves as a key figure and 
example in the development of a southern internationalism. Otto E. Passman from Louisiana also 
had a reputation as a fiscal conservative, and his favorite whipping boy was foreign aid. In 1958 
he famously told a representative of the State Department, “Son, I don’t smoke and I don’t drink. 
My only pleasure in life is kicking the shit out of the foreign aid program of the United States of 
America.”44 Like Ellender, Passman was also a segregationist, who tied his domestic racial views 
together with his vision for what American foreign policy should look like. Passman placed a 
premium on preserving American sovereignty over all else and he saw all attempts by 
“something called ‘liberalism’” to promote integration as sacrificing American liberty at home 
and sovereignty abroad on the altar of “compassion for racial minorities.”45 
 Alabama Governor and perennial presidential candidate, George C. Wallace is perhaps 
the most recognizable figure in this dissertation. He is also the outlier among the congressmen. 
However, both because of his national political profile and because of his extremism, Wallace’s 
opposition to foreign aid is a useful and necessary study to include when analyzing how 
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segregationists connected foreign aid to domestic civil rights to help form a racial basis for their 
alternative internationalist vision. Known for his racist diatribes, his biographers frequently 
describe Wallace as a true politician, one who would say whatever he had to win votes. 
Furthermore, he was well aware of the political act that he was putting on.46 Despite being 
skilled at telling people what they wanted to hear, Wallace believed in segregation and state over 
federal control. His success in the South and beyond rested on his ability to weave his attacks 
against integration into a larger assault against liberals and the federal government. This helped 
him in taking his message to a national audience.  
Although a historian’s periodization always runs the risk of appearing arbitrary and 
obscuring just as much as it reveals, framing this project from 1949-1973 effectively 
encapsulates the development of an alternative foreign vision surrounding foreign aid in the 
context of the civil rights movement and Cold War. In development and foreign aid history, 
traditionally, the Cold War led to the establishment of the modern foreign aid system due to its 
purpose as a diplomatic tool.47 David Ekbladh however, argues that the roots of development 
ideology that informed the creation of a liberal consensus surrounding foreign aid during the 
Cold War were in the Depression era, an outgrowth of New Deal policies on a global scale.48 
Thus, in 1949 when President Truman announced his Point Four program, Ekbladh argues 
against the notion that the origin of American development ideology was rooted in the 
requirements of Cold War diplomacy. Instead, Ekbladh maintains Point Four, “was not a 
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beginning but an acknowledgment that development had a prominent and permanent position in 
the global strategy of the American state.”49 
I acknowledge that the ideology underlying American foreign assistance had other 
origins outside the Cold War, but at the same time, the Cold War did change--or at least 
complicate and expedite--the practice and importance of foreign assistance. Concerning Point 
Four, Nick Cullather argues,  
It was at this moment of modernist optimism that Truman's Point IV speech proposed a 
complicated merger between development and the Cold War. Foreign aid was never 
simply a weapon against Soviet influence; even without a superpower confrontation the 
United States would have needed some means to manage the transition to a postcolonial 
world. The Cold War skewed aid priorities, certainly, but development shifted the Cold 
War onto entirely new ground. In just a few paragraphs the principles axes of global 
opposition--communist/noncommunist, colonial/anti-colonial--were enfolded within the 
overspreading categories of development and underdevelopment.50  
 
Modernization theories and the Cold War affected each other due to the larger context of 
decolonization, and American development policies adjusted in a manner that made the Cold 
War about development. Beginning with the Marshall Plan and Point Four, therefore, serves as a 
useful starting point to examine the connection between civil rights at home and foreign aid 
practices abroad due to their significance as a turning point in the Cold War and development.  
To show the progression of the southern internationalism heralded by the likes of 
Ellender, Wallace, and Passman and its connection to a more nationally based conservative 
internationalism, in chapter one I begin by demonstrating how race began to enter the discussion 
of development aid. Using the Marshall Plan and Truman’s Point Four program to compare how 
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southern politicians changed their rhetoric and support surrounding the key early foreign aid 
policies, I argue that the response to liberal domestic and international policies by southern 
members of congress moved away from their initial support of Wilsonian internationalism. 
Instead, they increasingly argued for a more unilateral approach to foreign aid. Importantly, their 
move away from the Democratic consensus around Wilsonian internationalism was spurred on 
by their efforts to discredit the convergence of antiracist domestic and international politics that 
liberals championed through their internationalist approach to foreign affairs, specifically in the 
early development aid programs to the Third World. The United Nations introduced a 
multilateral approach to development aid, and when paired with the gradual civil rights reforms 
indicated an effort by the federal government in the post-World War II era to rectify America’s 
image with its claims of equality for all, segregationists began to see the international impulse 
and efforts to guide decolonization as harmful to a white dominated socio-economic hierarchy 
around the world. Their efforts to move towards a unilateral and nationalistic national security 
policy therefore represented the foundation for their southern internationalism.   
Following the beginnings of the southern international impulse, chapter two poses the 
question of what happens to southern support for foreign aid during the Eisenhower 
administration. The Eisenhower administration is a key moment in both the history of foreign aid 
and civil rights. In foreign aid policy, Eisenhower attempted to reduce development aid and also 
orientate it towards a more militaristic stance. This direction in foreign aid policy, based on the 
opposition expressed by Ellender and his congressional colleagues over the Point Four technical 
assistance program, should have appealed to the segregationists’ nationalistic and anticommunist 
calls to foreign aid. Instead, the 1950s witnessed the continued decline of southern support for 
Democratic liberal internationalism. This continued decline of southern support for liberal 
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internationalism was due to the beginnings of a more organized civil rights movement, and the 
increased international pressure due to Cold War foreign policy imperatives that came with it. To 
show how a southern internationalism began to coalesce in response to the growing American 
civil rights movement, this chapter examines the southern reaction to the 1954 Supreme Court 
Brown decision. It also looks at the way segregationists combatted the platform that foreign aid 
and propaganda campaigns provided to foreigners. In response to the growing influence on 
domestic racial hierarchies that liberal internationalism allowed, this chapter addresses how 
segregationists began to build their own white supremacist international network with white-rule 
colonies and nations.  
 Chapter three then explores the beginnings of a nationalizing trend in southern 
internationalism. It argues that southern Democrats, in fear of the entrenchment of foreign aid 
under President Kennedy and his modernization theory of liberal development, began to insert 
domestic racial ideologies into their demands for fiscal conservatism. Southern politicians such 
as Ellender, Wallace, and Passman began to directly attack liberal internationalism via their use 
of foreign aid as a symbol of the same political philosophy that promoted civil rights at home: 
unchecked liberalism. Segregationists felt their desire to maintain a white dominated racial 
global hierarchy increasingly threatened by liberal international political philosophies. To 
segregationists, the civil rights movement and Third World nationalism came from the same 
dangerous political philosophy, and that philosophy threatened white American hegemony at 
home and abroad. Segregationists responded by entrenching their internationalist vision under 
the disguise of nationalistic, unilateral rhetoric regarding foreign policy, imbuing foreign aid 
with a proxy racial symbolism.  
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The efforts of people like Ellender, Passman, and Wallace solidified the southern 
internationalism alternative to liberal internationalism, which became the foundation for a 
conservative internationalism that rested on segregationist efforts. Chapter four explores this key 
moment in the creation of a conservative internationalism around southern internationalism. It 
shows how domestic civil rights debates influenced the opposition to American foreign aid 
policy by tracing the ways in which segregationists contributed to a national conservative 
coalition around the issue of foreign aid. It tells the story of how segregationists were able to take 
their southern internationalism and to fit with a conservative alternative to liberal 
internationalism that presented an approach to foreign affairs that sought to maintain traditional 
racial hierarchies at home and abroad. This chapter shows that increasingly in the 1960s the 
rhetoric surrounding race in the United States changed to one where out-right racist declarations 
and support of segregation became less acceptable in political discourse.51 Therefore, when on 
the national campaign trail, due to the racial symbolism foreign aid carried, segregationists, like 
Wallace, were able to use foreign aid as a way to attack liberal policies without directly 
mentioning segregation and racial hierarchies. The result was that foreign aid was a key element 
in segregationist’s efforts to create a conservative coalition. Taken together, these four chapters 
trace the story of how segregationists used foreign aid in their efforts to adapt old racial 
hierarchies to the changing ones of the decolonization age, illuminating a key element in the 
conservative ascendency that had roots beyond domestic concerns.  
The significance of this project is threefold. First, on a disciplinary level it contributes to 
several historiographical topics both expanding and challenging their assertions. It subsidizes to 
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the idea of “cold war civil rights” as coined by Mary Dudziak and Thomas Borstelmann by 
exploring how and why domestic civil rights and foreign policy influenced each other in often 
contradicting ways.52 Furthermore, following a similar vein of inquiry as David Ekbladh it 
expands the discussion of modernization and development policies, by looking domestically to 
understand foreign aid policies.53 In its broadest sense though, my project offers a narrative that 
puts segregationists into a global context by highlighting connections they made between race at 
home and abroad.  
Historians have explored the development of liberalism within a global context, but little 
work has been done on the origins of a counter or alternative “conservative internationalism.”54 
The dissertation argues that one of the political traditions in conservative internationalist 
coalition can be traced back to the American South and its vision for post-World War II foreign 
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policy. It follows southern anxieties over domestic race relations into attacks on foreign aid 
policy in the 1960s and 1970s, analyzing a connection between domestic and international 
politics, which shows that segregationists were not solely concerned with “their own backyard.” 
Rather they saw the maintenance of a segregated society as integral to how they defined 
American politics, culture, and society. Moreover, they linked their own struggle to resist the 
growing tide of civil rights to controlling international decolonization efforts. Whereas their 
liberal counterparts sought to manage the rapidly changing international dynamics of the post-
war years through modernization and uplift, segregationists sought to maintain their position of 
socio-political superiority at home and abroad by maintaining a system of racial hierarchies 
through Jim Crow and neocolonial world engagement.   
Second, and most broadly, my project speaks to the question of characterizing 
conservative political rhetoric in the post-civil rights era. Matthew Lassiter argued in The Silent 
Majority that the rise of conservatism did not happen because of outright white reactionary 
racism in the South, instead it grew out of “color-blind” suburban politics.55 In this sense, the 
political discussion of issues such as busing became coded and the racial implication masked 
under so-called color-blind policies. My project internationalizes this argument, by looking at 
how a similar process occurred in debates over foreign aid. The implied racialized meanings and 
symbolism in that prevalent rhetoric describing foreign aid is imbedded in how Americans 
discuss and understand foreign aid, despite it being detached from the reality of its practice.  
Third, this project has important implications for understanding foreign aid and racism in 
America today. Public opinion polls as recent as 2010 have pointed out, the American public has 
a tradition of ignorance on aid giving practices, often grossly overestimating the amount sent 
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abroad. Recognizing misunderstandings on aid policy as a persistent theme in American foreign 
aid, I aim to historicize this phenomenon and illustrate the power that the segregationist political 
fiction surrounding aid and underlying racial attitudes coded in that fiction has on public support 
for policy decisions. Presently, the United States Congress is debating the amounts, merits, and 
methods of foreign aid projects under concerns over the federal budget. In doing so, politicians 
continue to publicly perpetuate stories on ineffective, bloated aid programs. Understanding how 
and why similar processes occurred in the past explains today’s interplay between domestic and 
international politics inherent in the discourse on foreign aid and the way political debates over it 
have and continue to maintain certain perceptions about foreign aid. 
Thus, my project looks at the development of this covert racism in American 
conservative politics and how it relates to international politics of the Cold War, specifically the 
institutionalization of foreign aid in American foreign policy. It traces it back to segregationist 
alternative vision for managing the post-World War II antiracial and anticolonial impulses on a 
global scale. This vision rested on racialized nationalism, anticommunism, and unilateral actions 
to guide the United States in its global interactions. The segregationists’ efforts to maintain 
global white supremacy via Jim Crow in the United States and neocolonial global structures were 
a key contributing factor in the New Right coalition that formed in the 1970s and has dominated 
American politics since. As Howard Winant rightfully has observed, this “’New Right’ 
discourse” is “hegemonic today, and in these terms racism is rendered invisible and 
marginalized. It is treated as largely an artifact of the past.”56 According to Winant, the result is 
that, “the neoconservative project now extends beyond strictly racial issue to a quasi-imperial 
defense of the political and cultural canons of Western culture tout court.” The result is that this 
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neoconservative project argues for a “color-blind” racial politics while at the same time co-
opting former antiracist perspectives, including those of modernization ideology, to deny the 
validity of perceptions of racial difference, and thus, racism.57 In its broadest sense then, the 
story of the introduction of southern internationalism into a conservative internationalist 
coalition seeks to the explain how the prevailing “color-blind” and “quasi-imperial” American 
domestic and international politics came to dominance, which in turn illuminates how the United 
States exercises power and how its citizens continue to understand those global interactions 
through the lens of racialized symbolism. 	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Chapter I:  
 
“Our White Man’s Partiality for Our European Cousins”:  
The Intersection of International and Domestic Racial Tensions in the Marshall Plan and 
Point Four 
 
 In 1963 Frank M. Coffin, the deputy director of the Agency for International 
Development (AID) from 1961 to 1964, compiled an AID pamphlet in an effort to dispel some 
of the fallacies circulating around foreign aid. Serving under President Kennedy, Coffin reasoned 
that to allow oppositional foreign aid myths to go unchecked threatened the efforts the 
administration was making to restructure and bolster the American foreign aid program. A key 
part of Coffin’s argument was that the opposition to foreign aid remained the same and had been 
proven wrong time and time again. To demonstrate this point he cited two examples from the 
pages of the Congressional Record. Having presented an excerpt from the Senate and the House 
of Representatives, Coffin revealed that the two examples were not from 1963. Instead the 
example from the Senate came from a 1948 debate over the Marshall Plan, while the House 
quotes came from the 1950 debate on Point Four.58 This information was intended to shock the 
reader.   
 Despite his argument to the contrary, the examples that Coffin used demonstrated just 
how much foreign aid opposition had actually changed over time. Additionally the change 
became apparent over a relatively short duration. The sample Coffin cited from the 1948 debate 
on the Marshall Plan was from a speech by Senator George W. Malone, a Republican from 
Nevada. Malone’s argument focused on economic concerns surrounding the Marshall Plan. He 
also introduced military and national security issues into his speech, articulating his larger 
critique that the Truman administration lacked a coherent foreign policy in the midst of the 
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threating Soviet Union. When discussing the people who would receive Marshall Plan aid, 
Malone did not present them as beggars, corrupt, or somehow incompetent. When he did 
mention the recipients of the Marshall Plan he blamed American fiscal irresponsibility for 
problems in the program rather than the recipients. He was also occupied with American 
acquisition of minerals for repayment. Finally, European political matters entered Malone’s 
speech, because he feared propping up what he viewed as socialistic governments in Great 
Britain and elsewhere.59 Overall, Malone’s speech echoed his contemporary allies in the debates 
over foreign aid by focusing on fiscal and foreign policy matters.  
 Coffin’s second example, from the House of Representatives, took on a much sharper 
tone and demonstrated that among some members of congress the move from the Marshall Plan 
to Point Four in foreign aid policy was not just a matter of fiscal or national security 
responsibilities. Instead, Coffin’s citation of Representative William’s Lemke’s (Republican-
North Dakota) attack against Point Four’s technical assistance to the Third World demonstrated a 
subtle shift in the language of foreign aid opposition. Lemke’s speech employed the Uncle Sam 
and Lady Columbia metaphor to present the United States government as a lecherous uncle being 
lured abroad by immoral temptations. Lemke warned, “There is danger ahead. Our Uncle in his 
flirtations has become the easy prey of foreign and domestic grafters, vampires, and gold 
diggers. He is no longer competent to take care of the wealth that Miss Columbia and her sons 
and daughters have created and accumulated.”60 Lemke blamed both the internationalist 
Democratic administration in the White House and those requesting and receiving aid. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 George W. Malone, 94 Cong. Rec. S 2188-2190 (5 March 1948); Frank M. Coffin, “Foreign Aid…Controversy 
and Reality,” Folder Agency For International Development, 1961-1963 (4 of 4), Box 2, Edwin R. Bayley Personal 
Papers, Subject Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.	  
60 William Lemke, 96 Cong. Rec. HR 4142 (27 March 1950); Frank M. Coffin, “Foreign Aid…Controversy and 
Reality,” Folder Agency For International Development, 1961-1963 (4 of 4), Box 2, Edwin R. Bayley Personal 
Papers, Subject Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. 
	   34	  
degraded both groups using infidelity as a metaphor. Equally important, he not only suggested 
aid recipients in the Third World were gold diggers, but he also included “domestic grafters” 
amongst those who tempted the integrity of the United States. Lemke connected recipients of aid 
to those benefiting at home from government international involvement.  Coffin’s suggestion 
that Malone and Lemke’s arguments against foreign aid were the same as any heard in 1963 thus 
oversimplified the history of foreign aid opposition. Rather, the examples allude to the domestic 
significance that foreign aid took on, as well as the importance of how politicians viewed the 
recipients of aid, as foreign aid shifted from Europe to the Third World.  
 Another key change that Coffin ignored was the regional shift in opposition. Coffin, as a 
Democrat, reasonably used Republican opposition to demonstrate the continued follies of the 
foreign aid opposition. However, a comparison of voting in the Senate on the Marshall Plan and 
Point Four demonstrates a growing opposition that divided as much along regional lines as it did 
on party lines. Very few Senators voted against the Marshall Plan, but the majority of those who 
did were Republicans.61 In comparison, there was a much larger number of Senators who voted 
against the Point Four technical assistance program. Of course the majority were Republicans, 
but there was also a much larger number of Democrats who voted against the Truman 
administration’s key foreign policy initiative. Although a couple of those Democratic nays came 
from the historically isolationist Midwest, the majority of Democrats that broke ranks from 
Truman by voting against Point Four hailed from southern states like Virginia, Arkansas, and 
Georgia. The question then becomes what accounts for the shift in both language and partisan 
support for foreign aid between the Marshall Plan and Point Four programs. The answer, in part, 
lays in the way that the lines between foreign and domestic politics became intertwined during 
the early Cold War.  
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This chapter studies how the language of race entered the political debates over early 
Cold War foreign aid programs, specifically the Marshall Plan and Point Four.62 Comparing the 
political discussions surrounding Point Four and the Marshall Plan, it begins to historicize the 
process of the adaptation of old racial hierarchies to the changing global context.63 Particularly it 
focuses on liberal development models found in parts of the Marshall Plan and Point Four that 
called into question old racial hierarchies and how defenders of those hierarchies responded. The 
comparison of Malone and Lemke’s opposition to the two different foreign aid programs 
demonstrates the manner in which where and to whom aid was going mattered not only for 
foreign policy, but also domestic politics.  
Exploring how individuals in the American development enterprise discussed foreign aid 
policy establishes the foundation of an emerging political fiction surrounding foreign aid during 
the Cold War. In the decades following the end of World War II, as both American development 
programs and the civil rights movement gained momentum, this political fiction coalesced. I 
define political fiction to mean the manner in which opponents of foreign aid and civil rights 
spoke of the non-white recipients of aid in the Third World as corrupt beggars. The political 
fiction about the Third World was a symbol that political ideologues employed to obscure 
foreign aid policies to the public. Opponents of foreign aid drew connections between race 
relations at home and US foreign policy. They saw advances for civil rights as a threat to the 
political power of their white supporters, equating black demands at home and abroad. They 
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therefore sought to discredit liberalism’s foreign development projects and their civil rights 
plank. The political fiction began during these early years of foreign aid programs as Malone and 
Lemke’s speeches in Congress suggest.  
This chapter argues that in response to liberal domestic and international policies, 
Southern members of congress moved progressively towards unilateralist and nationalistic 
policies. Their response was an effort to avoid the convergence of antiracist domestic and 
international politics that liberals championed through their internationalist approach to foreign 
affairs, specifically emerging foreign aid policies. Whereas, the introduction of technical 
assistance with Truman’s Point Four program, alongside gradual civil rights reforms indicated an 
effort by the federal government in the post-World War II era to control decolonization via 
development and modernization, segregationists began to see the international impulse and 
efforts to guide decolonization as harmful to American prestige abroad and white socio-
economic superiority at home. Their efforts to move towards a unilateral and nationalistic 
national security policy therefore represented the beginnings of their own attempts to control the 
postcolonial world in their vision.  
Key to the segregationists’ strategy to assert their own alternative foreign policy vision 
was their effort to discredit international influence in domestic affairs, which undermined the 
federal government’s Cold War-influenced impulse to address domestic racial concerns in an 
effort to shore up America’s position abroad. Historians have detailed the ways American 
officials viewed the practices of racial segregation and discrimination as a problem for 
America’s image overseas, often spurring on modest legal reforms in domestic civil rights.64 In 
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addition, to driving change at home, the Cold War could also limit the level of acceptable 
discussion, as segregationists often suggested that civil rights reform was perpetrated by 
communist instigators. Carol Anderson argues that the result was that African American activists 
modified their objectives from demanding human rights to settling for civil rights and legal 
reforms.65 The Cold War context therefore had a paradoxical affect on the beginning of the civil 
rights movement, both enabling reform while at the same time limiting the parameters of that 
reform.  
Segregationists adamantly rejected any linkage between civil rights and foreign policy 
that threatened global white supremacy. Interference in domestic race relations from both 
international and domestic sources alarmed segregationists.66 In rejecting the liberal 
internationalists’ antiracist universalism, southern segregationists clung to what historian Gary 
Gerstle characterized as “racial nationalism” in which American citizenship, defined by Anglo-
Saxon lineage held an “inherited fitness for self-government” that could not be transplanted.67 
The idea that America’s greatness was intrinsically linked to race and could not be replicated 
stood ideologically at odds with the justifications that liberals used for development and later 
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modernization policies.68 Furthermore, in adhering to the idea of white American superiority and 
fitness, segregationists also rejected the idea that the United States should cater to the whims and 
perceptions of the former colonial world, especially in terms of Third World nationalists and 
their calls for racial equality in the United States. Foreign aid not only represented what 
segregationists saw to be the United States attempting to court former colonies, but also a 
symbolic diplomatic tool that despite any practical concerns over winning allies in the Cold War, 
provided a platform for outside influence on American domestic policy. Starting in the late 
1940s, segregationists therefore began to slowly break from the ranks of the Democratic Party, 
rejecting foreign aid and civil rights as part of their effort to maintain an Anglo-Saxon dominated 
world.  
Segregationist attempts to maintain an Anglo-Saxon dominated world were complicated 
by not only the rapidly growing tide of civil rights in the United States, but also internationally 
by the wave of decolonization that overtook much of Africa and Asia following World War II. 
As noted, in the context of the Cold War, this meant that the United States was fighting to win 
the hearts and minds of the newly independent nations and peoples throughout the Global South. 
The domestic racial situation in the United States therefore reflected poorly on the United States, 
who faced competition from the Soviet Union, which claimed to be egalitarian and anti-imperial. 
In contrast, in light of the United States’ internal issues harming their international standing, 
newly independent nations throughout the Third World also associated the United States and 
capitalism with western imperialism.69 Therefore, in both domestic and international policy, the 
United States government risked losing ground to the Soviet Union over racial issues. Under 
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President Truman, as the Cold War began, the United States framed the struggle against 
communism as a struggle between freedom and slavery. The result was that in an effort to bolster 
its anti-imperial standing, the Truman administration and its political allies emphasized 
American goals of “self-determination, democracy, and human rights.”70  
Anti-imperialist rhetoric did not always align with practice though, and Truman 
administration had to balance its obligations to its European allies with its attempts to control 
decolonization with universal declarations of self-determination and human rights. One of the 
key points that historian Thomas Borstelmann makes is that for the majority of the people in the 
world colonialism, and not the Cold War, was their main foreign policy concern in the 1950s and 
1960s. Therefore, the Truman administration had to navigate the growing calls for independence 
in colonial areas while at the same time trying to balance their diplomatic ties with the European 
colonizers, building a coalition of the “free world” to contain the Soviet Union.71 In addition, 
American foreign policy experts feared that rapid decolonization in Africa and Asia would harm 
European economic recovery and therefore their ability to resist communist expansion.72  
The Truman administration therefore attempted to support a policy of gradual 
decolonization in their attempt to build a multiracial alliance.73 However, the growing racial 
polarization in southern Africa created a dilemma for the Truman administration, especially 
amidst the continued segregation and discrimination African Americans suffered. Borstelmann 
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points out that the administration had hoped to distance themselves from the South African racial 
policies, but their Cold War commitments to Europe as well as access to resources needed to 
wage the Cold War present in South Africa (uranium), led the Truman administration to continue 
to develop a relationship with South Africa even though it could also have hurt their position in 
the global struggle by calling into question its proclaimed ideologies due to its actions at home 
and abroad. Foreign aid through technical assistant programs like Point Four therefore became a 
way for the United States to control the pace and shape of decolonization and by extension the 
shifting global racial hierarchies that accompanied the end of Western imperialism, while still 
holding to ideals of human rights and self-determination.74 Despite its gradualism, during these 
early years of the Cold War, segregationists began to associate technical assistance to the Third 
World represented a liberal attempt to control decolonization that ultimately was antiracist in 
ideology and threatened global white political, social, and economic power.  
Indeed, in these early years, segregationists began to associate foreign aid with the 
excesses of liberal internationalism. While liberal internationalists promoted antiracist 
development policies, conservatives retreated to isolationist, nationalistic, and separatist defenses 
against development aid in an effort to maintain racial hierarchies at home and abroad.75 
Examining the way in which racial language entered the political discussion over the Marshall 
Plan and Point Four, this chapter reveals that politicians and prominent officials involved in the 
early development enterprises made direct connections between domestic and international racial 
perceptions, attaching symbolic significance to foreign aid, and undermining political support 
among segregationists. The result was an increasing support among segregationists for a 
unilateralist and nationalistic foreign policy. Support for the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan 
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built a largely bipartisan consensus around foreign aid, but with the introduction of Point Four 
racial perceptions began to enter the debate more frequently.  
To illustrate the shift in foreign aid opposition this chapter begins with a brief overview 
of the internationalist political-orientation of southern segregationists at the end of the Cold War 
and the way the intersection between race and development lead to early cracks in the 
Democratic Party cohesion. Next, it looks at the creation of a consensus around foreign aid 
during in the Cold War with regards to the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. Finally, Point 
Four is examined, exploring how it was presented to the American public, concluding with 
discussion on the connection between early civil rights and development, which demonstrates the 
struggle liberal internationalists had in rectifying their claims of anti-racist ideology to the 
realities of domestic and global racism and the segregationist response. 
 
“Permanent World Peace”: Segregationists, Internationalism, and the Democratic Party  
The gradual southern defection from the Democratic Party is an important part of 
understanding the influence of race on the foreign aid opposition, because it demonstrates how 
domestic racial issues intersected with the internationalist foreign policy push within the party. 
Traditionally, the historical narrative identifies the 1968 election and Nixon’s southern strategy 
as the moment when the South defected en masse from the Democratic Party in large part due to 
the civil rights plank of the party.76 However, this was just the manifestation of a long process 
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that had roots not only in domestic politics but also in international politics. It was the manner in 
which domestic racial politics quickly became intertwined with Cold War foreign policy that 
nudged the South away from the Democratic Party. The South had steadily moved away from the 
internationalism that they initially supported following World War II due, in part, to the liberal 
development impulse in the party and its domestic and global racial implications. The shift in 
southern politics away from supporting the Democratic Party’s foreign policy after World War II 
resulted in segregationists’ laying their the foundation for their own plan to control 
decolonization.  
At the end of World War II white southern segregationists supported increased American 
involvement in the world. The ratification of the United Nations represented the height of 
southern support of Wilsonian internationalism.77 When delegates descended upon San Francisco 
in April 1945 to draft the United Nations Charter and establish the parameters of the new 
international institution for cooperation, members of congress from the American South saw the 
creation of an international institution as the rallying cry for a southern lost cause, Wilsonian 
internationalism. The drafting and ratification of the United Nations Charter represented the 
realization of what many politicians in the South held to be a southern idea from a southern 
president. They believed that they finally were witnessing the realization of one of the “lost 
causes” of the post-civil war American South with the installation of a southern political ideal.78 
However, the limits of the South’s support of internationalism began to show quickly during the 
early years of the Cold War.   
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The transformation of the South into the region of the United States that overwhelmingly 
supported militaristic, unilateral, and nationalistic foreign policy was a somewhat sudden shift 
during the years immediately following World War II. Historian Joseph Fry identifies several 
key themes that tempered the American southern foreign policy outlook prior to World War II. 
Among these was the ideology of republicanism, a colonial-scheme economy based on 
agriculture, fear for liberties, states’ rights, the threat of “foreigners,” and partisan politics. 
Assertive national defense spending and militarism added to the southern foreign policy 
perspective in 1898 with the introduction of a formal American empire into foreign affairs. 
Racial assumptions and southern history connected all these themes.79 Specifically, the idea of 
the “lost cause” stemming from the Civil War linked economic concerns, racial assumptions, and 
ideas of states’ rights and liberties to foreign policy into “the region’s heightened sensitivity to 
matters of personal, sectional, and national honor.”80  
Senator Allen Ellender’s (Louisiana-Democrat) 1946 Senate speech against loans to 
Great Britain demonstrates the manner in which these white Southern political themes entered 
foreign policy discussions. Ellender was a Democrat from Terrebonne Parish in Louisiana, first 
elected to the Senate in 1937. He was a fiscal conservative, and like many of his southern 
contemporaries accepted the racial social order of the South. He readily adopted the paternalistic 
impression of blacks as lazy and inferior to whites, and despite having only occasionally come in 
contact with African Americans during his childhood claimed to “know” them well due to 
“growing up” with them.81 Throughout his career—especially during the early Cold War years—
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Ellender was obsessed with the distribution of natural resources. Namely, he evoked the memory 
of the Civil War and the economic system it created in the South, comparing it to that of the 
British colonies. Ellender’s fiscal conservatism paired with his belief in the southern historical 
memory of Reconstruction, dictated his understanding of the 1946 proposal for loans to Great 
Britain. Ellender argued that British reconstruction was the equivalent of trying to “revive a dead 
horse.” He said the British were selfish, and on the topic of providing long-term financial aid to 
the British he argued, “It will be necessary to keep on pouring money into London, just like 
pouring water into a rat hole, and expecting it to reach the rats.”82 His proposal for a solution to 
Great Britain’s post-war economic and industrial situation highlighted his domestic perspective, 
resulting in a paradoxical view regarding colonialism and the restructuring of global politics in 
the looming postcolonial world.  
Ellender’s indignation over the British colonial economics was more rooted in his own 
regional perspective than in concern over the colonies. He continued his speech against the 
proposed loans by offering his alternative to loaning money to Great Britain, which reinforced 
exploitive colonial relationships of the British Empire while simultaneously claiming to reject 
imperialism. He told the Senate that the only way to avoid propping up Great Britain in the long 
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term would be to finically support Great Britain as an empire. He reasoned that since Great 
Britain had few natural resources and relied on an economic system where manufacturers in 
Great Britain got their raw materials from the colonies and then turned around and “forced” 
colonial subjects to buy the finished goods, maintaining that system was the only way to 
continue. He then equated the economic plight of the colonies to the American South, stating, “I 
do not wish to bring into the picture any reference to the War Between the States, but what I 
have stated happened also in our own country. It was the same practice that kept the South so 
poor. After the Civil War the South furnished, to a large extent, raw materials to the northeastern 
section of the United States, and in the meantime that section grew rich.”83  
Comparing the British economy with the American South after the Civil War implies that 
initially Ellender sympathized with the British colonies. His solution demonstrated the opposite. 
Not only did he imply that the only way to support Great Britain was through continued support 
of its colonial possessions, he essentially suggested that the British export its population to more 
resource rich parts of their Empire.84 Otherwise, Ellender reasoned, that with the British colonies 
becoming independent nations and Great Britain thus losing its access to vital resources, it would 
be necessary for the United States to keep giving money to London. Ellender’s solution therefore 
was simultaneously anti-colonial, while also suggesting an increase in settler-colonial activities 
was the solution to rebuilding the British economy after World War II concluded. Still, despite 
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his hesitation to approve support to Great Britain due to his southern anti-imperial prospective 
and fiscal conservatism, Ellender voted yay for the British loans. Much like many in the 
Democratic Party, regardless of their region, Ellender yielded his concerns for to adhere to Party 
cohesion and unity. For the South, its overarching political devotion to the Democratic Party, 
much like its paradoxical anticolonial stance, was rooted in their regional perspective and 
history.  
“The Lost Cause” and its associated themes helped to orientate the South towards 
internationalism before World War II due to the Democratic Party’s power in the region. Fry 
points to deep partisan devotion to the southerner Woodrow Wilson to explain the South’s 
internationalist political leanings from 1913 through the mid-1950s.85 The Southern bloc played 
a central role in the formation and ratification of the United Nations, and its backing of the 
international organization represented the high point of its support of Wilsonian internationalism. 
Southern members of congress believed they were fulfilling the goals of Wilson when they 
rallied behind the United Nations. Still, southern support of the UN was not an abstract devotion 
to internationalism, rather it “embodied another ‘lost cause’—this time to enact the ‘southern 
idea’ of the first southern president since the 1860s.”86 Devotion to one historical figure though 
does not fully address why the South embraced internationalism between the World Wars.  
Historian Edward Chester suggests that the Jeffersonian wing of the Democratic Party had long 
been concerned with fiscal conservatism. Therefore, members of congress from the Democrat-
dominated South that adhered to Jeffersonian politics opposed large expenditures, especially 
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those sent overseas.87 Chester’s interpretation means that Wilsonian internationalism, under the 
direction set forth by Wilson, was not necessarily the norm for southern foreign policy, but rather 
the exception.  
The question, then, is what changed to steer southerners away from Wilson’s 
international vision—whether it was an exception or prevailing outlook—during the early Cold 
War when they had just wholeheartedly endorsed with their support of United Nations. 
Regarding foreign aid specifically, Chester argues that the shift in ideas about aid, from support 
under the Marshall Plan to subsequent growing opposition, was economically driven. In the shift 
in aid from Europe to the Third World the South saw potential competitors in the former 
colonies. For example, American development projects promoting irrigation had the potential to 
create competition for the American South in cotton production.88 Chester’s identification of the 
Jeffersonian economic conservatism is part of the story, but it does not explain the South’s 
continued support of military and defense expenditures throughout the Cold War.89  
In the midst of the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, with the 
ratification of the United Nations, the United States’ foreign policy agenda continued to shift to 
internationalism and the inherent self-determination attached to the Wilsonian international 
legacy. At a moment when the United States’ government was facing a changing global order 
due to decolonization, the realization of Wilsonian internationalism suggested a course of action 
that would allow for managing decolonization on the principal of self-determination. As 
mentioned, perspectives on race were key to the themes that directed southern foreign policy 
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with regards to controlling decolonization. Ellender’s obsession in 1946 with the lack of 
resources in Great Britain and his solution demonstrates how for segregationist politicians, their 
global racial perspective often found common ground with their fiscal conservatism, steering 
them away from the self-determinism and anti-imperialist impulses of the “lost cause” of 
Wilsonian internationalism.90 Ellender’s desire to avoid large overseas expenditures by 
maintaining a postcolonial economic system by suggesting the maintenance of the British 
imperial holdings and increased British settler activity reinforced patterns of racial exploitation 
inherent in Western imperialism. At the same time, his proposal rested on fiscal conservatism by 
ensuring that potential economic competitors in the resource rich colonies would remain under 
the control of an American ally. At a moment when decolonization seemed an inevitable 
outcome of the war, segregationists started to break from their Wilsonian international tradition 
and create their own international vision for controlling the shifting global dynamics.  
Southern support for internationalism had stood on shaky ground as soon as race entered 
the conversation. For example, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed African American 
consultants to the United Nations San Francisco charter convention, including Walter White, W. 
E. B. DuBois, and Mary McLeod Bethune. However, when the African American consultants 
unsuccessfully tried to convince the formal delegation to address the issues of racial justice, 
labor rights, full employment and colonialism, Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, Edward R. 
Stettinius Jr., a Virginian, stated that the job of the UN conference in 1945 was to create a 
charter, not take up topics like the “negro’s question.” In addition, Senator Tom Connally from 
Texas in the American delegation at the conference made it clear that the South would reject any 
attempts to interfere with race and labor relations in the South, or U.S. sovereignty. The result 
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was that the discussion of human rights was absent from the conference and the Charter that 
Congress would approve. Many African American in the public sphere saw human rights as an 
international platform and extension for their calls for justice in the United States.91 The absence 
of human rights therefore represented a rejection of social equality at home and abroad. The role 
of race in the United Nations and its development policies would increasingly erode the faith the 
South had in its internationalism due to the region’s efforts to maintain its domestic racial 
politics.  
One of the first orders of business when the United Nations convened was to create a 
body within the organization to take up the task of defining human rights and the specific role 
these rights would play in the world organization in an attempt to remedy what the Charter 
sidestepped. At their first meeting on December 10, 1946 the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC), under Article 68 of the Charter, created the Commission on Human 
Rights and began its task of drafting an international bill of rights. As with so many other issues 
that came before the United Nations in its early years, American and Soviet leaders integrated 
human rights into the context of their growing animosity towards each other.92  
 Although President Truman and others publicly expressed the view that the United 
Nations needed to help attain freedom and security for all people regardless of “race, language or 
religion,” in private they realized the dilemma such ideals created for their own imperfect 
practice of freedom and equality.  For example, in 1946, Eleanor Roosevelt (the chairperson of 
the Commission on Human Rights) supported an attempt to prevent a complaint to the United 
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Nations charging South Africa with human rights violations from being addressed. Roosevelt 
was worried about the precedence such a complaint could set in the United Nations toward 
American race problems.93 Historian Carol Anderson went so far as to conclude that, “Although 
the United States was willing to use the rhetoric of human rights to bludgeon the Soviet Union 
and play the politics of moral outrage that the Holocaust engendered, the federal government, 
even the liberals, steadfastly refused to make human rights a viable force in the United States or 
in international practice.”94 
In spite of the Cold War-fueled debate and restrictions over the issue of human rights, the 
Commission on Human Rights passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 
10, 1948. Although the Declaration incorporated strong language in support of basic rights, it 
also contained points of contention that detracted from its meaning. The Declaration was 
unanimously accepted. However, there were four abstentions from communist countries. Within 
the United States minorities and the general public greeted the Declaration with praise. 
Americans were quick to connect the international human rights to domestic civil rights, which 
in turn was seen as a black mark on America’s image abroad. Just days after the Declaration 
adopted, a letter to Truman expressed the connection between the domestic and international 
human rights and the manner in which the government had to rectify the two. Its author, Bishop 
John Stamm, said, “The adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations last 
Friday affords hope that the world community is developing a conscience about the unalienable 
rights and freedoms of every man. But we cannot expect any significant advance in the actual 
practice of the world unless our own country which has borne an historic witness to human rights 
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and freedoms, demonstrates our sincere determination to square our practice with our 
profession.”95 This letter captured all the implications of the Cold War, human rights, and civil 
rights that met on the international stage in the United Nations. America’s perverse arrangement 
regarding race relations hindered its ability to fight the Cold War and protect human rights, and 
therefore world peace. These associations were not lost on African American leaders, and they 
saw the international stage of the United Nations as an opportunity to further their own quest for 
human rights. 
As African Americans sought to use the international stage of the United Nations to force 
equality within the United States, the question of who internationalist policies benefited also 
began to change southern foreign policy based on their domestic racial perspective.96 
Southerners often equated independence movements in the former colonies to the civil rights 
movement in the United States.97 Therefore, it was not surprising that segregationists in the 
southern states were not enthusiastic regarding foreign aid due to the intertwining of domestic 
and international policies in relation to race.98 The result was a shift in southern foreign policy 
away from internationalism driven by domestic racial tensions, which accelerated with the civil 
rights movement. The simultaneous desertion of southern members of congress from support of 
internationalism and foreign aid and the growth of civil rights at home was not a sole matter of 
racism, although it was a motivator. It is true that some southern congressmen found themselves 
retracting support for the United Nations, the symbol of internationalism, due to the very fact 
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that a “black” nation had the same voting power as the United States in the organization.99 But, 
racism is only the most obvious part of the story. In addition, they connected domestic events to 
international events, crafting an international response to changing racial dynamics around the 
world defined by nationalism and anticommunism. Southern segregationists who defected from 
the ranks of internationalism therefore packaged their critiques against both foreign aid and civil 
rights in the language of states’ rights, sovereignty, and national power to create their own vision 
of what international engagement should look like for the United States. In the immediate years 
following World War II these critiques were muted, but growing.  
	   An early example of domestic racial tensions eroding southern support for 
internationalism was the breakdown of the internal cohesion of the Democratic Party. Partisan 
devotion to the Democratic Party was a key characteristic that had orientated the South towards 
internationalism, therefore, the gradual loss of the Solid South played a significant role in not 
only domestic politics, but had inherent international implications as well.100 The New Deal 
coalition that held the Democratic Party together consisted of urban labor, progressives, farmers, 
and southerners. Increasingly, it became difficult to hold the individual interests of the voting 
blocs together. For the South, the breakdown of the region’s support for the New Deal and the 
liberal democracy it heralded began especially began its erosion during World War II as their 
racial order became increasingly threatened. The result was that southern representatives were 
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increasingly willing to work with Republicans, laying the foundation for what would become the 
“conservatives coalition.”101 
The 1948 Dixiecrat revolt at the Democratic Convention highlights an early key moment 
in the redefinition of the Democratic Party and direction of southern foreign policy. The majority 
of southerners were able to easily endorse the foreign policy of Harry Truman due to their 
support of Wilsonian internationalism and the fact that Truman came from a border state.102 Still, 
as the 1948 Democratic Convention approached, Truman faced waning political support as he 
tried to win the presidency for the first time. In particular he found himself embattled over his 
stance on civil rights.103 In 1946, using an executive order, Truman established the President’s 
Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR). The PCCR’s report, “To Secure These Rights,” 
recommended a number of measures to improve legal equality for all in the United States, 
including a permanent Civil Right Commission, abolishing poll taxes, and creating a Fair 
Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), among others. Along with his actions taken in 
recommending the suggestions of the PCCR, Truman became the first president to address the 
NAACP in late June 1947. In this speech he not only endorsed civil rights, but explicitly 
connected the necessity of legal equality to fighting the Cold War, presenting the case that 
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undermined the “superiority of democracy” to provide freedom in comparison to “totalitarian 
regions.”104 
 Truman’s support of civil rights and the 1947 speech challenged the segregationists 
within the Democratic Party and their conception of racial order and citizenship heading into the 
1948 election year. In the fourth draft of Truman’s speech to the NAACP, revised the day before 
he delivered it, Truman emphasized the significance of the need to expand equal citizenship in 
the United States in light of world events. Truman’s draft read, “Recent events in the United 
States and abroad have made us realize that it is more important today than ever before to insure 
that all American enjoy these [civil] rights.” After which he added by hand, “When I say all 
Americans, I mean all Americans.”105 Just a few paragraphs later, Truman once again scrawled a 
note emphasizing that he again, meant “all Americans.”106 Both of Truman’s edits made the final 
speech and undermined the idea that democracy and full citizenship in the United States was an 
Anglo-Saxon feature based on an inherited fitness for self-government, creating a “racial 
nationalism.”107 The fact that Truman had tied the need of recognizing the rights of “all 
Americans” to the Cold War imperative of appealing to Third World nations made 
segregationists question the intended outcome of the Democratic Party’s internationalism due to 
the increasing domestic implications it held for their racial order. A small number of southerner 
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politicians therefore began to respond in 1948, by breaking their partisanship devotion at the 
Democratic Party Convention.  
 Just over a year after Truman’s speech in front of the NAACP, the Democratic Party 
convened in Philadelphia for their nominating convention and competing goals pulled at the 
party’s unity. Prior to the convention Strom Thurmond of South Carolina had already threatened 
to form his own political party. Meanwhile, liberals and progressives in the party gravitated 
towards figures such as Hubert H. Humphrey and Henry Wallace, respectively.108 On the last day 
of the convention, as the Party debated the inclusion of a civil rights plank in the platform, 
Hubert Humphrey, a rising star in the Party from Minnesota, gave a rousing speech supporting 
such a plank. Humphrey began his address by assuring the conference delegates that he was not 
attacking a single region, class, racial, or religious group. Humphrey then reiterated the 
connection that Truman had been cultivating between civil rights reform at home and waging the 
Cold War abroad. Humphrey rallied supporters, declaring, “Every citizen has a stake in the 
emergence of the United States as the leader of the free world. That world is being challenged by 
the world of slavery. For us to play our part effectively, we must be in a morally sound position. 
We cannot use a double standard for measuring our own and other people’s policies.”109 He 
concluded that although he wanted uniformity on the platform, civil rights was a nonnegotiable 
point.110  
 Despite his claim that he was not singling out one region in the Party, Humphrey then 
directly called out southerners while at the same time making it clear that civil rights and global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), 91.  
109 Hubert Horatio Humphrey, “1948 Speech on Civil Rights,” 14 July 1948, 
http://www.mnhs.org/library/tips/history_topics/42humphreyspeech/transcript.htm (accessed 25 August 2013).  
110 Hubert Horatio Humphrey, “1948 Speech on Civil Rights,” 14 July 1948, 
http://www.mnhs.org/library/tips/history_topics/42humphreyspeech/transcript.htm (accessed 25 August 2013).  
	   56	  
human rights should be one and the same in the platform. He attacked southerners who had stood 
behind the banner of states’ rights, declaring, “The time has arrived for the Democratic Party to 
get out of the shadow of state’s rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human 
rights.”111 By dismissing states’ rights in the name of human rights, Humphrey pushed for a 
liberal internationalism that southern, white politicians could not reconcile with their domestic 
and international racial perspectives. Humphrey used human rights and civil rights 
interchangeably in his speech, joining civil rights in the United States to the goals of 
international human rights. Significantly, the United Nations was drafting the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights at the same time, adding international political symbolism to 
Humphrey’s words. Humphrey’s speech thus reinforced the foundation that Truman had laid out 
regarding the international necessity of racial reform, and endorsed the idea that civil rights and 
global human rights and equality were intrinsically linked.  
African Americans in key civil rights organizations similarly connected their struggle to 
that of the emerging colonial independence movements. The result was that African American 
activists had an international platform in the United Nations under the auspices of human rights 
claims.112 It was in this context that Humphrey gave his convention speech, which, when 
combined with the passage of the civil rights plank of the Party’s platform, resulted in some 
southern delegates walking out. Two days after Truman’s formal nomination, the Dixiecrat 
defectors met in Birmingham, Alabama and nominated Strom Thurmond as the presidential 
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candidate of the States Rights Party.113 In forming a party around states’ rights over the civil 
rights plank of the Democratic Party, the Dixiecrats were not just rejecting civil rights, but the 
internationalism of liberals that incorporated global racial equality into a multilateral approach to 
global affairs. Southern politicians opposed to federal government interference in racial 
questions did not support political initiatives that also allowed international pressure from the 
Third World and United Nations to influence domestic racial order.  
 Despite the Dixiecrat revolt at the 1948 convention, the defectors of the States Rights 
Party were not in the majority of southern delegates, the more moderate southerners still held 
onto the partisan devotion to the Democratic Party, although their faith in the Party was shaken. 
Senator Allen Ellender opposed the civil rights plank, but he did not join his Louisianan 
colleague from the House of Representatives, Otto E. Passman, in the States’ Right Party. He 
thought that the civil rights plank was, more than anything, a measure to keep Henry A. Wallace 
from running against Truman and to keep African Americans in the party, a political maneuver 
by the party leadership to win the election.114 Still, Ellender did not support the civil rights plank 
and also simultaneously grew increasingly skeptical of the Truman administration’s foreign 
policies.  
Like many of his political contemporaries, Ellender thought civil rights was a communist 
conspiracy led by a small group of “liberal and intellectual” African Americans.115 Behind 
Ellender’s fear of civil rights was the his conviction that the United States was the product of 
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Anglo-Saxon tradition and that integration would lead to a “mongrelization” of the races. Indeed, 
he used global examples of what he interpreted to be blacks’ inability to govern themselves to 
justify segregation at home. Ellender argued that places like Egypt, Brazil, and India had 
successful white civilizations before “mongrelization” destroyed them.116 Ellender would 
continue to use what he saw as the inability of non-white peoples to self-govern as evidence for 
the necessity of domestic segregation throughout his political career.117 The increasing 
importance of foreign aid to former colonies in predominantly non-white areas of the world 
meant funding global racial fluidity, which Ellender feared. Although Ellender had chosen to 
stay with the Democratic Party, his views on civil rights and foreign aid slowly aligned more 
with the southerners who had walked out of the convention as they redefined the terms of the 
internationalism they were willing to support.  
 Despite the Dixiecrats’ walkout, Truman won the Democratic Party’s nomination and 
reemphasized the Party’s commitment to international leadership via nonpartisan support of his 
foreign policy, including foreign aid. He proclaimed in his acceptance of the nomination, “The 
United States has to accept its full responsibility for leadership in international affairs. We have 
been the people who organized and started the United Nations, first started under the great 
Democratic President, Woodrow Wilson, as the League of Nations. The League was sabotaged 
by the Republicans in 1920.” He continued, “We have started the foreign aid program…and I 
will say to you that all these things were done in a cooperative and bipartisan 
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manner…Partisanship should stop at the water’s edge; and I shall continue to preach that through 
this whole campaign.”118  
Truman’s acceptance speech should have appealed to southern support of 
internationalism, emphasizing nonpartisanship, while at the same time attacking Republicans for 
both undermining the internationalism of Wilson and later in the speech critiquing their domestic 
political direction. Still, while he urged the Democratic Party to allow partisanship to “stop at the 
water’s edge,” Truman and his liberal Democratic allies had already begun connecting domestic 
reforms to foreign policy decisions and vice versa, and when race entered the conversation 
southern Democrats clung desperately to their segregationist racial order model. Although 
Truman was able to maintain a largely nonpartisan support base for foreign policy in his second 
term, the beginnings of a southern revolt within his own political party marked a steady decline 
in support of foreign aid by segregationists that coincided with the growth of the civil rights 
movement.  
Disillusionment in the American South over internationalism did not occur in one fatal 
blow. It was a gradual process through the 1950s and 1960s that was directly linked to the 
changing racial dynamics at home. Allen Ellender in 1948, while lamenting foreign aid to Great 
Britain, made it very clear that he hoped and wished the United Nations would still be able to 
fulfill its goals of peace.119 However, by 1962 he worried that the United Nations was essentially 
open to corruption and ineffectiveness due to the inability and failures of the growing number of 
African and Asian nations, who he believed were selling their votes to the highest bidder.120 
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Ellender’s changing attitude towards the United Nations—the symbol of internationalism and 
development—demonstrates the importance of race and the political fiction of corruption and 
inefficiency regarding foreign aid in shifting the foreign policy approach in the southern states 
and their efforts to craft an alternative international vision. 
Ellender’s lost faith in the UN grew directly out of his belief in American racial 
nationalism that asserted that African Americans and other minorities were incapable of self-
government, a critique that he transferred to his critique of foreign aid in Africa. The insertion of 
corruption into his rhetoric represented how far he and his segregationist contemporaries had 
moved away from internationalism due to the racial implications of it and their efforts to create a 
political fiction around foreign aid. Chester asserts that regarding foreign aid, “Even before the 
mid-1950’s the South was more favorable to the white nations of Europe than to the black 
countries of Africa, while it was also more favorably inclined towards military adventures such 
as NATO than towards foreign aid.”121 The story of foreign aid during the Truman years 
demonstrates this shift well and offers an explanation as to why it occurred.  
 
“Our European Cousins”: Containment and the Marshall Plan 
 The debates over aid associated with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were 
rooted in foreign policy and economic concerns. Rarely did opponents interrogate the character 
of the recipients, and when opponents of aid did question the abilities and character of the 
recipients it was largely connected to political systems and economic concerns rooted in Cold 
War fears of communist expansion. When foreign aid opponents made ridiculing remarks about 
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European recipients of foreign aid, they lacked a domestic reference point to attach significance 
to beyond international affairs. Despite many opponents of aid beginning to express concerns 
over internationalist approaches to foreign affairs, their calls for unilateralist and nationalistic 
alternatives were muted during the implementation of early foreign aid policies. It would take 
global racial order being thrown into limbo via the rapid decolonization impulse after World War 
II entering the foreign aid debate to expand the meaning of foreign aid into the domestic sphere. 
Once foreign aid shifted from Europe to the Third World, the meaning of it gained domestic 
importance, something that the South had already found itself at odds in the Democratic Party 
during the New Deal and World War II.122 The Marshall Plan aid had not reordered social racial 
hierarchies, but development aid suggested that anyone could achieve “Western progress,” which 
threatened white supremacist political power in the United States.123 
During the early years of the Cold War foreign aid was linked to national security 
objectives and supported by the majority of Congress.124 The Truman Doctrine speech, delivered 
on March 12, 1947, was the first public statement that clearly introduced containment to the Cold 
War foreign policy repertoire. Foreign aid and development played a key part in how 
containment was carried out. Initially Truman and his administration concerned themselves with 
Western Europe and rebuilding the post-war economies of the allies via economic support. 
Historian Robert Packenham explains that the simple logic behind the economic approach to the 
European Recovery Program was that political and economic development were connected and 
could safeguard against the spread of communism. Packenham clarifies, “The United States 
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provided aid; the economies revived; Communist parties did not come to power; stability and 
democracy were the political results, by and large in Western European political systems.”125 
Southern members of Congress could easily align themselves with Truman’s containment policy 
as introduced in the Truman Doctrine because of its anticommunist implications.126 Although 
doing so often required that they set aside their fiscal conservatism in favor of anticommunism 
and international economic and political development. However, given that southerners were still 
holding on to their devotion to Wilsonian internationalism during the early Cold War, it was not 
necessarily a departure for the southern Democrats to support the Democratic president’s 
policies.  
The Truman Doctrine laid the foundation for aid that went beyond simple anticommunist-
driven national security, which began to amplify preexisting southern unease with 
internationalism and development. Following World War II, the economic and political situation 
in Greece had been unstable, and the Truman administration feared that if Greece fell to 
communism, Turkey would not be far behind. In addition, the British economy was in ruins after 
World War II and they could no longer support the Greek government against the Greek 
Communist Party. In light of these circumstances, the United States began to fear that the Soviet 
Union would begin moving in on the oil-rich Middle East. Heavily influenced by George 
Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” Truman and his advisors acted by formulating a plan to aid Greece 
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and Turkey.127 On March 12, 1947 Truman appeared before Congress and delivered a speech 
requesting aid for Greece and Turkey. The speech became known as the Truman Doctrine.  
The Truman Doctrine was a combination of humanitarian and national interest politics. 
Packenham argues that what makes the Truman Doctrine unique was not necessarily the 
combination of national and humanitarian interests, but rather how Truman defined those 
interests. Treading lightly due to the precarious nature of the early Cold War, Truman kept his 
language ambiguous. Packenham concludes, “He [Truman] defined the American interests in 
both relatively narrow security terms and in broader developmental terms.”128 Truman achieved 
this by avoiding any specific attacks on the Soviet Union while at the same time proclaiming 
support for other “free peoples” as a feature of American interest.129 Connecting the situation in 
Greece and Turkey to broader development goals situated the Truman Doctrine both within the 
Cold War and beyond it. Packenham concludes, “The ambiguity was in some measure 
intentional in order to warn the Soviet Union. But another consequence was to pave the way for 
other aid programs to other areas for broader development purposes according to uncertain 
criteria.”130   
As a result of this ambiguity, Truman was able to successfully wrangle bipartisan support 
for the aid bill to Greece and Turkey, producing a tenuous consensus in Congress around aid. 
86% of southern House members voted for the bill, demonstrating their willingness to go along 
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with the internationalist turn in American foreign policy despite their tendency for fiscal 
conservatism.131 There was hesitation among southerners though. Both Senator J. William 
Fulbright of Arkansas and Senator Claude Pepper of Florida worried that the plan was too 
antagonistic towards the Soviet Union. Pepper even suggested that the Truman Doctrine was not 
internationalist enough, and he urged that the nation redirect foreign policy through the United 
Nations to “maintain international peace and security.”132 On the other side of the southern 
Democratic opposition to the Truman Doctrine was Senator Larry Byrd’s nationalistic 
perspective that foreshadowed the long-term development aid implications of the Truman 
Doctrine. Specifically Byrd was opposed to the open-endedness of the policy.133 Byrd, who 
unlike many southerners held little devotion to Wilsonian internationalism feared that the 
Truman Doctrine would lead to the entrenchment of foreign aid in American policy. The 
introduction of the Marshall Plan in 1947 proved Byrd correct.  
From its inception, the European Recovery Program of 1947 (the Marshall Plan) was 
conceived as a measure to protect U.S. Security and economic interests in terms of growing 
animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Secretary of State George Marshall, 
the namesake of the recovery program, expressed the political conviction behind the plan stating 
that there could be no political stability and peace if Europe’s economy continued to limp along 
following World War II’s destruction.134 Due to its success in helping restore economic 
production in Western Europe, the Marshall Plan set the idealized standard for foreign aid in 
both the public’s and government officials’ eyes during the second-half of the twentieth century. 
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Comparing the Marshall Plan to later foreign aid programs, however, can obscure the ways in 
which they fundamentally differed from each other—while the Marshall Plan sent large amounts 
of capital to European countries to rebuild infrastructures, Point Four sought to share American 
expertise with little accompanying capital influx in regions that had few industrial structures in 
place. Like later aid programs though, administration officials made sure to attach symbolic 
meaning to the plan beyond its economic and security motivations.  
Although Congress demonstrated bipartisan support of the Marshall Plan by passing the 
European Recovery Act with a 4 to 1 margin in 1948, the plan initially met measurable political 
opposition. To fight claims that the program was extravagant, bureaucratic and socialist, the 
Truman administration embarked on a coordinated public relations campaign. Truman appointed 
Paul Hoffman, the president of Studebaker and a Republican, as the director of the European 
Cooperation Administration, and incorporated business groups in the planning of European 
recovery to shore up bipartisan support for the plan. Although in private discussions the 
administration acknowledged that the Marshall Plan was partly designed to stop Soviet 
expansion, their public relations strategies made it clear that government officials should not 
present it to the American people in such a manner because they did not want to appear 
antagonistic towards the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Cold War was not yet set in stone, and 
Truman and Stalin still grasped tenuously at the weak bonds that continued to hold the Grand 
Alliance together.135 Instead, the Truman administration sold the European Recovery Act as a 
peace measure rather than an aggressive overture against the Soviets.136 In his announcement of 
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the Plan Marshall, Truman explained, “Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine 
but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.”137 His words allowed the administration to 
dodge attacks from isolationists that the Marshall Plan was hostile towards the Soviet Union 
while maintaining the moral high ground.  
 Opposition surrounding the Marshall Plan largely revolved around economic and political 
concerns. The majority of it also came from Republicans. Senator George Malone’s (Republican-
Nevada) aforementioned 1948 speech demonstrated these issues, highlighting what he viewed as 
extravagant government spending and mismanagement in the Marshall Plan. Malone also 
discussed the need for a more military aid to accompany any economic aid. He cited General 
MacArthur and argued that money alone would not stop communism. At the root of Malone’s 
opposition was his self-declared fear over the direction, or rather lack of direction, in American 
foreign policy. Here Malone placed the blame directly at the feet of President Truman and 
accused him of steering the United States into bankruptcy.138 Senator Charles Wayland Brooks, a 
Republican from Illinois held similar views as Malone regarding the American government 
overspending. He also insisted that European people did not even know that the United States 
was sending them food, so the Marshall Plan was failing at one of its main goals. Brooks 
suggested the most effective aid was based on volunteerism. He recommended individual 
Americans sending what amounted to care packages worked better than economic aid.139 Malone 
and Brooks both demonstrated that opposition to foreign aid often rested in partisanship and 
economic arguments. 
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 One of the key points that opponents of aid frequently made against the Marshall Plan 
was that it was funding socialist governments, but that the people receiving aid were not corrupt 
and incapable of governing themselves. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (Massachusetts-
Republican) made this clear when he suggested that the Marshall Plan paid for “political 
schemes” in foreign countries that the United States would certainly not support at home. Lodge 
clarified that he did not necessarily mean that funds for the Marshall Plan should be withdrawn, 
but rather that the United States should be increasingly in control over how recipients spent the 
money.140 Importantly, Lodge did not necessarily accuse the peoples of western of Europe of 
being politically corrupt or weak-willed and predisposed to communism. Rather, he believed 
opportunist individuals were taking advantage of the situation World War II had created. If a 
socialist came to power in a European nation, Lodge stated he thought the people would rise up 
against such regimes.141 This image of aid recipients ran counter to the later political fiction that 
implied recipients were corrupt beggars that were not capable of self-governing.  
 The debates over the Marshall Plan in Congress were not limited to Republicans. From 
the other side of the aisle, progressive Democrats thought the Marshall Plan did not go far 
enough in promoting internationalism and world peace. During a debate on the extension of the 
Marshall Plan, Representative Adolph J. Sabath (Illinois-Democrat) asserted that he would vote 
for the bill and encouraged everyone else to do the same, but he voiced his reservations against 
the program itself. He referred to it as the “greatest propaganda” in the nation’s history. He then 
lamented that he thought the program was weakening the United Nations because the United 
States was only paying it “lip-service.”142 The same level of unilateralism in the Marshall Plan 
that eased the minds of conservatives, created some dissent among liberal internationalists who 
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wanted development to support the larger vision of internationalism. At the other end of the 
political spectrum were the fiscal conservatives within the Democratic Party, who tended to hail 
from southern states. These southern Democrats expressed skepticism over the Marshall Plan, 
but frequently fell in line with the party’s internationalist direction. 
Although fiscal conservatives tried repeatedly to reduce appropriations for the Marshall 
Plan, they failed time and time again. The Marshall Plan allowed the United States to participate 
in global development on a unilateral platform, which limited the level of international influence 
reflected back at the United States. Democratic politics, economic calculations, and Cold War 
fears prompted the South to set aside their fiscal conservatism and default to Party loyalty.143 A 
look into Senator Allen Ellender’s thought process surrounding the Marshall Plan and his vote on 
it provides a window into how southern segregationists in Congress viewed the Marshall Plan. 
As Ellender’s reactions demonstrate, many characteristics of the Marshall Plan allowed the 
southern members of congress to maintain support of the liberal internationalist direction that the 
Democratic Party was increasingly turning towards unilateral and militaristic foreign policies.  
Despite his hesitation, Senator Ellender voted to approve the Marshall Plan. While 
making it clear that he was a reluctant supporter, he reasoned, “I fear that the countries of 
Western Europe will take it for granted that Congress will enact the Marshall plan, since we are 
following the President as to a portion of his recommendations to the Congress regarding 
assistance to Europe.” He also worried that providing “food and clothing” to “our friends” would 
create scarcities at home.144 With these concerns, Ellender began to paint foreign aid recipients 
as ungrateful, but his objections still revolved around fiscal conservatism. He made it abundantly 
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clear that if it were not for humanitarian purposes, he would have rejected foreign aid to Britain 
due to its economic and political shortcomings.145 In addition, he elucidated that he and the 
Senate were largely supporting President Truman’s foreign policy objectives. Ellender and his 
like-minded southern colleagues would soon start rejecting the policies, especially foreign aid, 
proposed by the liberals within their own party. Globally and domestically, racial dynamics 
began to shift and the fundamental antiracism rhetoric of liberal policies seemed to be chartering 
a course to speed up those changes.  
Senator Ellender saw strength in a “traditional,” white America to guard against 
Communist encroachment at home and Soviet expansion internationally. In 1951 a constituent 
wrote to Ellender observing, “I am of the opinion that the world is too much impressed by the 
population totals of that country [the Soviet Union] and her satellites…We should remember, 
however, that only a small portion of the Russians are comparable to the American individual in 
peace or war. Further, the American nation is a homogeneous nation with a common background 
of Western civilization, and speaking a common language while in Russia, there are 49 racial 
stocks and languages.”146 Ellender sent a simple response, stating that he agreed about not being 
“overly impressed by the population totals of Russia and her satellites.”147 Ellender did not 
directly address the letter-writer’s praise of the United States as a “homogeneous nation with a 
common background of Western civilization.” However in agreeing that the Russian population 
was not a concern he implied that he also agreed with the writer’s assessment of the American 
population’s homogeneous superiority. Whether this was Ellender’s intent is not relevant in the 
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sense that his words and actions reinforced the interpretation of American citizenship and 
participation in democratic government that was tied to race.  
Ellender’s foreign policy stance indicates that there was more to his agenda than just 
stopping communism due to the Cold War threat. Unlike other southern Democrats, Ellender 
was not a “hawk.”148 Ellender did not want communism to spread, and he was especially 
concerned about internal threats, but he did not think a full-scale national security foreign policy 
that committed a large amount of American resources was the best direction for the nation. He 
frequently urged open communication with the Soviet Union and helped to facilitate 
Khrushchev’s 1959 visit to the United States despite dissent from his constituents.149 The fact 
that Ellender did not overly concern himself with communism abroad highlights that he had 
other reasons for supporting foreign aid under the Marshall Plan, and then later opposing it. 
Despite his uneasiness due to fiscal concerns, he was only emboldened to reject foreign aid when 
domestic racial situations became entangled in the liberal development project to override his 
support for the Democratic Party. Whom aid went to changed the domestic significance of 
foreign aid.  
Ellender did begin to show early signs of suspicion regarding aid recipients and the Cold 
War context, but it circulated around American economic and political concerns. “I am 
beginning to feel that many of the countries of Europe are using the bugaboo of Communism as 
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a goad in seeking assistance from us,” he reasoned.150 A skeptic of aid to begin with, Ellender 
believed that those receiving aid were taking advantage of the tensions between the United States 
and Soviet Union, and that the result was that the United States could be taken advantage of by 
“socialist” governments with out-stretched hands.151 Ellender would echo these comments 
regarding recipients in the Third World just a few years later. During a 1949 trip to ERP 
countries to observe the ways in which Marshall Plan recipients had used the funds, Ellender also 
accused various European nationalities of being unworthy of “hard earned dollars” from the 
United States. For example, he alleged that the Austrians were ungrateful, the Dutch and French 
were entitled, and the British lacked incentive.152 Although Ellender was suspicious of aid 
recipients in Europe, he did not connect any of his critiques to domestic events. Instead, he 
constantly returned to his fear that the United States was going to get economically entrenched in 
Europe at the cost of fiscal necessity at home.153 
Although Ellender began to hint that aid recipients were ungrateful, he never seemed to 
question their abilities as he later would with aid recipients in the Third World. He reasoned that 
the people aid went to were inherently “freedom-loving people” who were not prone to 
communism.154 Here, Ellender projected his belief in an Anglo-Saxon America back to its 
European ancestors. He implied that western Europeans were too much like the democratically 
inclined white American to actually give into to totalitarian political schemes. Ellender’s gradual 
move away from supporting the President’s foreign policy agenda, specifically regarding foreign 
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aid policy after the Marshall Plan, indicates that Ellender had alternative reasons for abandoning 
his albeit hesitant support of Truman’s liberal internationalist policies. His prevailing fiscal 
conservatism only partly explains his views.  
In the context of rapid decolonization, the importance of the internationalist direction of 
American foreign policy in the containment strategy took on domestic significance as well, 
especially regarding race. Historian Thomas Borstelmann observes, “The major American Cold 
War initiatives of the late 1940s and early 1950s…emerged against a background of mounting 
demands for racial equality and national autonomy. People of color at home and abroad were 
particularly sensitive to these policies’ racial meanings…The Marshall Plan (1948) and NATO 
(1949) bolstered anti-Communist governments west of the Elbe River, but they also indirectly 
funded those governments’ efforts to preserve white rule against indigenous independence 
movements in Asia and Africa.”155 The fact that the Marshall Plan did not challenge this social 
order, and in fact allowed colonial exploitive relationships to remain in place, made it more 
palatable to segregationists.  
Ellender’s solution to postwar British reconstruction even attempted to institute a 
postcolonial system where political and economic power still rested in the West. He said that the 
United Kingdom should decentralize and move a large portion of its population to Canada, 
Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand for the “purpose of developing natural resources in 
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those countries, and to carry on manufacturing within close range of raw materials.”156 This was 
a concept he would further refine in the 1950s after visiting Africa, suggesting that the 
distribution of the British population not only expand to the Commonwealth, but to colonial 
areas in general.157 In addition, after he had reluctantly cast his vote for the Marshall Plan, he 
continued to peddle this idea, but revised his original suggestion by instead saying that the 
British population should move strictly to South Africa because it was a “nucleus for the 
development of a strong and powerful nation.”158 In Ellender’s view, the colonies had rapidly 
developed industrial capacity and he feared that they would become the chief competitors of 
Great Britain (and the American South) and without control over them the British economy 
would be doomed.159 His solution would reassert Western dominance in the Third World, 
especially when he amended it to strictly South Africa. In doing so, he made sure that Western 
powers would continue to dominate global markets and political power by essentially creating 
settler colonies that would maintain a quasi-imperial system. In South Africa, this would have 
the added effect of propping up white minority rule.  
Controlling the direction that decolonization would take became paramount for all 
political parties in the United States after World War II. Even Republican opponents who 
opposed the Marshall Plan on partisan grounds and isolationist foreign policy viewpoints voiced 
their desire to gain control over the former wealth of the European Empires through the Marshall 
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Plan. For example, in Senator Malone’s speech against Marshall Plan funding, he expressed his 
hope that the United States could gain something from Europe via the Marshall Plan. Resting on 
militaristic and national security motives Malone argued that the United States should get some 
sort of strategic return for aid. Specifically he wanted “critical minerals and materials” from the 
Empires of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.160 Malone suggested that with 
aid, the United States had essentially bought access to the resource rich imperial holdings of 
Europe. The way that some opponents of aid envisioned the Marshall Plan working was more of 
a strategy for the United States to gain control over the global economic market and maintain it 
western dominance of it. Malone’s desire was somewhat realized in the way the Marshall Plan 
was carried out. 
Not only did the Marshall Plan not challenge the colonial economic scheme, but it also 
gave the United States a way to control it, via the technical assistance aspect of the Marshall 
Plan. The technical assistance attached to the Marshall Plan was different than that attached to 
Point Four and other aid programs in the Global South and was not truly thought of as technical 
assistance like the programs that came after. First, in the Marshall Plan, technical assistance was 
an afterthought, attached more as a condition than the centerpiece of the program. The fact that it 
was a condition for aid money appealed to opponents of liberal development because it allowed 
for internationalism on American terms, which incorporated unilateral demands. Marshall and 
others saw technical assistance as a key measure to helping Europe regain its confidence, but 
they did not publicize it to the same degree as the cash influx to Marshall Plan countries.161 
Making technical assistance a minor part of the publicity of the Marshall Plan implied that the 
development aspect of the plan did not carry much domestic currency. The image Marshall and 
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Truman presented was that Western Europe just needed American capitalistic systems 
introduced to them to reach American levels of success. The result of this approach to technical 
assistance in Europe granted the Truman administration control and access to colonial resources.  
The United States was participating in technical assistance programs in the Global South 
via the channels of the Marshall Plan and imperial networks under the banner of technical 
assistance. For partly strategic reasons, technical assistance under the Marshall Plan also aided in 
the European colonial project. Merle Gulick of the Wall Street Journal reported, $1,500,000 in 
ECA funds for Great Britain had been approved “to hire about 55 American technicians to help 
in mapping surveys and searches for valuable minerals in British colonies in Africa, South 
America, and Southeast Asia.”162 This project allowed the United States to gain access and 
control of minerals in colonial areas by laying the groundwork for a post-independence 
diplomatic and economic relationship. The consequence of such a relationship placed the 
American government in a position in the Third World where its development model could 
replace that of British imperial domination. This American imperialism through development ran 
the risk of further entrenching existing old, global racial hierarchies inherent to the imperialist 
enterprise under the banner of “civilizing missions,” which helps to illustrate why segregationist 
opponents of foreign aid could readily accept the internationalist approach to foreign aid 
presented in the Marshall Plan.163 
 The possible imperialist implications of the Marshall Plan’s technical assistance program 
proved vexing for the Truman administration as it tried to promote democracies through foreign 
aid and liberal development models. In addition, this was not the only aspect of the plan that left 
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it vulnerable to attacks of maintaining old hierarchies. The very success of rebuilding Western 
Europe via the Marshall Plan required continued exploitation of colonies’ resources. For 
example, rebuilding the economies and industries of war-devastated European nations required 
the “continued importation of rubber, cotton, and other planation crops from Java and 
Malaya.”164 Maintaining imperial trade relationships undermined the anti-imperialist and anti-
racist ideals of liberal internationalism. Following in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s support of 
“trusteeship” programs, the Truman administration did not necessarily disapprove of “guiding 
colonies” to modern nationhood.165 However, in the context of the Cold War, the appearance of 
colonial ambitions harmed the American image and contradicted the democratic agenda of 
liberal internationalism. And yet, it also begins to explain how segregationists supported foreign 
aid to Europe, but just a short period later scoffed at sending technical assistance to the former 
colonial regions. The Marshall Plan’s technical assistance did not threaten domestic or 
international racial order, but provided the opportunity to reinforce it.  
The anti-racist and democratizing philosophy of liberal foreign aid proved successful in 
limiting perceived differences across cultures. The Marshall Plan’s success proved to Americans 
that foreign aid could work, even bringing the “aggressive” Germans back into the folds of 
“civilization” and democracy. But, as Dean Acheson, the chief internationalist designer of the 
economic aid program to Europe, stated later in his life, policymakers did not intend to make the 
Marshall Plan a model for global development. The United States government believed that in 
order to fuel social change, the situation in Asia and the Global South required technical 
assistance similar to the development models of the New Deal. Conversely, although WWII had 
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destroyed the industrial infrastructures of Europe, government officials believed in the 
technological and human infrastructure still in place.166 To implement foreign aid as a tool of 
liberal internationalism, industrialization had to occur first. One means of developing the Third 
World was foreign aid through technical assistance.  
The debates over the Marshall Plan laid the groundwork for a southern move towards 
nationalistic, unilateral approach to national security and foreign policy. This groundwork 
included not only fiscal conservatism and southern nationalistic political ideology, but also a 
burgeoning political fiction where aid recipients were lazy and ungrateful. Such hesitation, 
though, did not trigger a full-scale revolt from liberal internationalism during the Marshall Plan 
years. In part, this was because the Marshall Plan did not challenge the domestic and 
international racial order wrapped up in segregation and colonial economic systems, repectively. 
The Marshall Plan, at times, even reinforced such colonial relationships and allowed the United 
States to control those relationships on its own terms. It would take the Truman administration’s 
shift from European aid to the Third World to bring race into the debate over foreign aid. The 
result was an aid policy that suggested that anyone could achieve “Western progress” regardless 
of race or citizenship. 167 
Racial domestic implications of aid prompted Ellender and his segregationist colleagues 
to move towards unilateralist and nationalist stances on foreign aid policy in an effort to combat 
the convergence of international and domestic political. Ellender and his colleagues found it 
increasingly more necessary to reject liberalism and its version of internationalism because it 
also supported domestic civil rights events that challenged white economic and political 
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dominance at home. To segregationists, the same policies that promoted legal equality at home 
were promoting antiracist development abroad, thus it was necessary to reaffirm “traditional” 
global and domestic racial hierarchies with a nationalistic political approach.  
 
“Colonial Swag:” Racial Hierarchies and Isolationist Critiques of Point Four  
Although economic aid to Europe had been successful, in the Third World the same 
strategies did not have the result of rapid development and it occurred slower than most 
expected.168 Material and political conditions in former colonies meant that a simple influx in 
capital would not lead to the desired end of modernization. The Truman administration’s 
proposal of an institutionalized aid program to the Third World in 1949 came in the midst of the 
highly successful (in terms of accomplishing its objectives) Marshall Plan. However, as 
Packenham observed, Americans did not really understand the different conditions in the Third 
World compared to Europe, and how much more difficult foreign aid and development in 
African, Asia, and Latin America would be.169 Therefore, disillusionment over what many in the 
general public viewed as a departure from previous American foreign policy practices quickly 
set in when foreign aid to the Global South did not produce as fast and as effective results as the 
Marshall Plan had. Based on their domestic point of view, those opposed to foreign aid could 
readily place their disillusionment at what they perceived to be deficiencies in those who were 
receiving the aid, a process that their representatives helped to cultivate as foreign aid turned to 
the Third World. 
The elements of the debate over foreign aid found in the Marshall Plan did not disappear 
from the conversation, but the geographic focus and sturdier liberal internationalist foundation 
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introduced a new aspect to the debate. Specifically, American foreign policy quickly took on 
domestic and international symbolism.170 Debates over Truman’s foreign aid program, Point 
Four, did tackle technical and practical questions, but the debates were also framed in ideological 
questions. According to Packenham, the ideological aspects of the debates did not call into 
question the foundation of development, as established by liberals. Rather, the ideological 
debates over Point Four legislation featured dichotomies such as free enterprise versus socialism 
in the American government and national sovereignty versus world government.171 These 
ideological debates reflected not only the geopolitics of the time, but also how foreign aid had 
symbolic significance. For example, southern segregationists increasingly abandoned the 
Wilsonian internationalism they had clung to in favor of unilateral, nationalistic approaches to 
foreign aid in their effort to combat federal involvement in their states regarding race as well as 
discredit international criticism of the racial situation in the United States. They did not withdraw 
from the world in a true isolationist sense, but rather increasingly pushed for American 
involvement on its own terms.  
From the beginning the institutionalization of foreign aid as a permanent fixture of 
American foreign policy took on ideological importance. Aided in part by the vagueness of 
Truman’s framing of the Marshall Plan, those ideological debates provided the scaffolding that 
segregationists could affix domestic meaning to. The introduction of Point Four as development 
aid to the Third World marked a growing effort by southerners in Congress to maintain a global 
and domestic racial order. Segregation in the United States and imperialism abroad marked this 
existing white supremacist racial hierarchy, which both were increasingly threatened by liberal 
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policies and the political imperatives brought on by the early Cold War years. Southerners 
therefore sought a solution to maintain existing racial hierarchies, and started to craft their own 
alternative to liberal internationalism. By looking at the role of race in liberal development, the 
function of the United Nations in Point Four, and the congressional and public debates 
surrounding Point Four we can gage the growing level of discomfort among segregationists 
regarding foreign aid due to its domestic implications. Importantly, from their response we also 
can glean key characteristics, such as nationalism, militarism, and unilateralism, which would 
help define southern internationalism as an alternative to liberal internationalism.  
Named, “Point Four,” because the technical aid program was the fourth major policy 
issue Truman proposed in his 1949 Inaugural Address, Truman referred to it as a “bold new 
program” to aid in the growth and development of so-called “under-developed” regions of the 
world.172 The underlying premise was that America would share its “know-how” with the rest of 
the world, aiming to teach the purported Third World to help themselves. Truman’s inaugural 
address itself focused on foreign policy, with the other three major policy initiatives including 
continued support of the United Nations, continued support of the European Recovery Program, 
and strengthening the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, the 
Point Four program was an integral part of Truman’s foreign policy agenda. Given the 
international context of the early Cold War--when diplomatic tensions between the United States 
and the Soviet Union were especially high--the Truman administration’s declaration of 
development aid as an essential part of American foreign policy conferred upon the program 
global and domestic significance that became more important than the actual functions and 
projects associated with Point Four. The open-ended nature of Point Four contributed to its 
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popularity.173 Its announcement represented a version of development, mirroring and cooperating 
with the existing United Nations programs of the time that sought to address the 
“underdeveloped” areas of the world based on the idea that development was an international 
obligation.174  
During the early years of the Cold War, American foreign policy focused on 
reconstructing Europe and keeping the Soviet Union from expanding westward. Leaders in Asian 
nations increasingly complained that their own reconstruction needs were not being met.175 In 
order to combat the threat of totalitarianism in the region, planners in the State Department put 
forth the idea of technical assistance as a means to bring social and political change to Asia and 
the other “undeveloped” regions of the world.176 Thus, with the introduction of the Point Four 
technical assistance program, development aid became an important foreign aid tool in fighting 
the Cold War. Still, the meaning of what liberal development that the Truman administration 
sought to employ was up for debate. Historian Nick Cullather concludes, “Rather than a 
contingent process unfolding in history by its own rules and on its own schedule ‘development’ 
by 1948 had acquired a transitive meaning, as a procedure performed by one country upon 
another. In the emerging context of imperial disintegration and U.S. economic and technological 
predominance, it made sense…to prescribe a developmental regimen for all of Asia and for State 
Department officials to weigh plans for managing the historical transition of a continent.”177 
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Foreign aid in the form of technical assistance during the Truman administration therefore, 
sought to manage decay of the old racial hierarchy that imperialism reinforced around the world 
with hopes of replacing it with antiracism and democratic regimes that could guide former 
colonies into political and economic modernity. Thus, Truman’s vision for the Third World was 
deeply rooted in liberal development’s goals established in the post-World War II years.  
Point Four’s focus on changing the attitudes and politics throughout the Third World via 
“know-how” aligned with the administration’s definition of liberal development as one in which 
“backwards” peoples in the Third World could reach modernity. The administration’s 
introduction of development in Point Four represented their articulation of a model to counter the 
Soviet development model. Antiracist development goals were a key part in countering the 
Soviet model, because they took steps against the prevailing image in the former colonies that 
capitalism was just another form of Western imperialism.178 By adopting liberal development as 
part of American foreign policy, Truman had actively tried to disassociate American foreign 
policy from an older political and economic order that was wrapped in western imperialism and 
exploitation that fueled a racial political and economic world order.  
 The administration’s effort to disassociate itself from western imperialism was ultimately 
one of the key features of Point Four. Truman’s administrative assistant, David Lloyd wrote 
Joseph L. Rauh of the Americans for Democratic Action and stated, “The most far-reaching 
domestic influence to be hoped for from Point IV is its effect upon international tensions, which 
condition the whole environment in which our economy operates.” Lloyd acknowledged that 
Point Four had domestic importance as well as international. Although he only mentioned 
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economic significance, he elaborated on how Point Four would ease international tensions. “It 
will show the under-developed countries that instead of disregarding or positively exploiting 
them, we mean to use our great ability to help them in pursuit of their economic aspirations, 
thereby removing the attraction of the Soviet Union’s only basic appeal to them.”179 The goal 
was to reshape the politics and economy of the recipient nations, but also win their hearts and 
minds by discrediting the ideas of the United States reinstating imperialism.  
Liberal development was a way to try to reshape the world in a democratic, anti-
imperialist, and capitalist image. The introduction of development into the Cold War expanded 
the parameters of the Cold War beyond capitalism and communism. Instead, the Cold War 
became a battle for the Third World between two anti-imperialist and distinctive development 
models.180 For liberals, development entailed progress that could effectively bring “civilization” 
to other parts of the world.181 Liberals thought that they could create appropriate economic and 
political conditions to lead to the “culmination of modernity,” an industrial society, with the 
United States being the epitome of modernity.182 Development projects were designed to not only 
produce growth, but also to guide it to a desired outcome imbued with specific meaning.183 
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Indeed, officials and theorists defined political development as “democracy, stability, anti-
Communism, peace, world community, and pro-Americanism.”184 With western aid and an 
infusion of technology, liberal development promised that material gains could be made in the 
Third World, but at the same time the material gains would also lead to new habits of 
modernity.185 The proposed programs ultimately sought to bring modernity to all corners of the 
earth regardless of race.186  
In an effort to counter the American efforts of disassociating capitalism with imperialism, 
the Soviet Union emphasized the way in which Point Four and other aid programs continued 
Western domination. For example, in one media report from Moscow, as the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service to American government officials summarized a Soviet commentary on 
Point Four. This report cited an article from Moscow titled, “Point Four Plans Will Enslave 
Africa.” This article detailed the way in which the so-called “generosity of the U.S. colonizers” 
was actually an attempt to “squeeze their European partners out of Asia and Africa to gain 
control of these countries as markets and sources of raw materials, to create strategic military 
bases there, and turn the people of these countries into humble slaves.” It continued, detailing 
how “the Truman program of aid” would lead to economic and military “enslavement.”187 In the 
Cold War context the Soviet Union tried to portray American aid as imperialistic, while the 
American liberals actively worked to disentangle aid from its imperial past. 
Efforts to disassociate the United States with Western imperialism were connected to the 
American domestic landscape as well. At the time of Point Four’s inception 80% of Asians lived 
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agrarian lifestyles. Cullather notes “Americans, self-consciously affluent and urban, doubted 
their ability to identify with this alien caste.”188 This uneasiness with managing development of 
the impoverished presented a challenge to the United States during the early Cold War, who 
offered a more urban approach in comparison to the Soviet Union’s agricultural planning.189 
However, there were classes of Americans that did and could identify with the Third World and 
their economic and political struggles. First among these were African Americans who 
connected their own struggle for full citizenship in the United States to that of the independence 
movements throughout the Third World.190 This connection proved significant in that 
segregationists and civil rights leaders alike saw domestic implications and meanings in liberal 
development efforts in Africa and Asia.   
In general terms, Truman and his advisors anchored development policy via Point Four to 
a domestic context. Truman framed the Cold War as a choice between “two alternative ways of 
life,” that easily aligned with his development goals. Whereas, the Soviet Union had a clear rural 
modernization plan, the United States did not. The success of internationalism via the Marshall 
Plan could not be replicated in the unindustrialized parts of the world.191 Foreign aid in the form 
of technical assistant attempted to bridge the gap. The efforts of the American planners to reach 
out to “rural peasants” in Asia through the means of technical assistance represented an 
important step in codifying the meaning of the liberal internationalist agenda. To help sell Point 
Four and the development agenda it entailed to a skeptical public and members of congress 
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Truman and his advisers drew on domestic projects as both an ideological and technical 
touchstone.192 New Deal programs, especially the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) proved to 
offer a model for international development. As historian David Ekbladh has demonstrated, the 
TVA’s importance in shaping what international development would look like reveals the 
domestic (and liberal) origins of development aid. It was therefore not without precedence when 
opponents of foreign aid started to see development and its economic, political, and social 
implications as one and the same with domestic liberal causes, including civil rights.  
One of the key features of liberal development was its ostensibly antiracist ideology. The 
connection liberals made to antiracism in foreign policy was strongly linked to domestic 
antiracism as well. Segregationists and white supremacists saw their own position at home 
slipping away under the influence of liberals and their development scheme. Historian Michael 
Krenn argues that race was never far from development, and later “modernization theory,” 
despite the progressive rhetoric associated with it. He notes, “When the idea of race began to lose 
its biological foothold in the post-World War II year, it simply rebounded by attaching itself 
quite easily and seamless to cultural explanations of the unique progress of the Anglo-Saxon 
world and the continuing backwardness and lack of civilization in the nonwhite world. The 
amazing resiliency of racism, however, allowed it to stave off challenges during the Cold 
War.”193 Indeed, liberals also tried to remake racial hierarchies in an image that they wanted, and 
of course theory and practice did not always intersect into workable solutions.  
However, liberal development did ideally practice antiracism in which the West’s 
superiority was based on a historical process that could be replicated rather than race or cultural 
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explanations.194 Historian David Engerman points out liberal intellectuals, in the 1920s, 
overcame the prevailing belief in distinctive national characters by taking up the cause of 
universal progress in which national character did not shape destiny, but was merely an obstacle 
to modernity.195 McVety concludes that the idea behind Point Four also rejected older ideas of 
American progress originating from the identity of its citizens. Instead, the creators of Point Four 
operated under the belief that American advancement had come from “freedom, education, 
creativity, and, above all, progress.196 What Krenn describes--the continued prevalence of race in 
shaping United State foreign policy and enforcing Western superiority--was the result of 
opposition to liberal development from segregationists. Development to liberals meant economic 
capitalism and democratic political development. The implication was that it was not necessarily 
race that marked “undevelopment” and inequality, but rather economic deficiencies and political 
practices.197 Liberal internationalism could use development as a way to create a new global 
order that was antiracist. Both at home and abroad, liberals with their words and support for 
development and civil rights sought to move beyond a racial nationalism that implied a cultural 
and biological presupposition for political and economic success. To achieve these goals, liberals 
supported technical aid for development via multilateral efforts, specifically the United Nations. 
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The United Nations became a symbol of internationalism and liberal development to 
segregationists who were increasingly uncomfortable with multilateralism and where aid was 
going. When Truman announced Point Four in his inaugural address he built off of the 
connection between national security and development that he had previously articulated in the 
Truman Doctrine and his support of the Marshall Plan. In doing so, his speech also made it clear 
that Point Four would be advancing an internationalism that focused on multilateral approaches 
and antiracist goals. A key feature of this was the United Nations as a vehicle of global 
cooperation. Truman stated, “This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work 
together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies whenever practicable. It must be 
a worldwide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom.”198  
In this sense Truman rhetorically aligned himself with the tenets of international 
development as set forth in the United Nations. Historian Amy Staples argues that international 
efforts by the World Bank, the Food Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) led to the establishment of modern development. The development the 
people of these international groups advocated for was economic development in the Third 
World without political, imperial, or religious ambitions. They instead crafted an “international 
identity” based around their progressive ideals, which sought to use economic development to 
improve life in the Third World.199 Although these groups failed to carry out these ambitions, 
Truman had publically tied Point Four to the same internationalist ideals as these UN specialized 
agencies while at the same time tempering it with politics of national sovereignty. The result was 
an internationalism that denied that citizenship was tied to race and dismissed imperial systems, 
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undermining the prevailing idea of “racial nationalism” in the United States and around the 
world.200 
The multilateral approach and antiracist direction of development under Point Four began 
to erode southern support for foreign aid, especially through the means of the UN. Although the 
internationalism supported by the UN grew directly from Wilsonian internationalism, a southern 
political mainstay, it also ran against their tendency to support unilateral, anticommunist foreign 
policy. Staples observes, “Postwar internationalism sprang from a loss of faith in the ability of 
the system of nation-states and traditional diplomacy to cope with modern problems, coupled 
with a search for solutions.”201 The internationalism that Truman connected Point Four to, 
therefore, surrendered a degree of sovereignty to an international organization in the name of 
global uplift. However, Point Four was still a national program and although connected to the 
ideals of internationalism in its purest iteration, it did not reject the nation-state and traditional 
diplomacy completely. It did, however, make nationalists leery of what the implications of tying 
American foreign policy to the United Nations meant for the sovereignty and direction of the 
nation. The level of United Nations involvement therefore played a key role in the debates over 
how Point Four would be carried out and what that meant for international influence in American 
policy.  
The question of national sovereignty increasingly concerned southern members of 
congress, who laid claim to states’ rights as protection against any government interference, be it 
from federal or international sources. Joseph Fry argues that prior to the post-War period the 
South was the United States’ most interventionist region, but he attributes this to devotion to 
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partisan politics expressed in Wilsonian internationalism. However, even from the beginning the 
internationalism that Southerners sought to institutionalize in the United Nations did not 
necessarily approve of surrendering any amount of sovereignty, especially regarding labor and 
race issues as seen in debates at the San Francisco United Nations Convention in 1945.202 Even 
before Point Four became a formal American policy it carried diplomatic weight, as Washington 
did not hesitate to use international enthusiasm for “economic and social advancement” to 
further own diplomatic ends.203 Increasingly, segregationists began to resent the amount of 
influence that foreign aid allowed foreigners to have in American domestic and international 
policies, especially regarding civil rights.204  
The role of race in the United Nations and its development policies increasingly eroded 
the faith the South had in its internationalism due to their own changing domestic racial politics.  
The administration’s linking of Point Four to the same institution that allowed African American 
activists a platform to critique the United States while at the same time giving international 
critics a voice on American domestic politics caused segregationists to articulate their 
nationalistic turn away from liberal internationalism.205 On foreign aid specifically, some 
segregationist critics suggested that Africans and Asians would do anything to get more money. 
They went so far as to reason that hatred for whites led the recipients of aid to demand that the 
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United States end segregation, and that the administration agreed to promote civil rights in an 
effort to buy support against the Soviet Union. They concluded that “antiwhite” nations were 
exerting indirect over American domestic policies.206 Point Four could help win hearts and minds 
overseas, but it also opened the door to critiques of the United States own racial politics, 
segregationists recognized this and started to reject their support of liberal internationalism. 
 Segregationists’ fears were not completely misplaced, as Truman saw the significance of 
Point Four in the context of a growing civil rights movement. In 1952 he outlined a six-point 
civil rights program in a speech at Howard University, a black university. In the speech he also 
included discussion of Point Four in the context of civil rights. He highlighted that the program 
was inclusive of all Americans and internationalist in practice. He observed, “The technical skills 
and knowledge that have been brought to such perfection in our country depend upon scientific 
discoveries that have come to us from all over the world.” Acknowledging that scientific and 
technological advancement came from outside the Anglo-Saxon purview undercut the “racial 
nationalism” that had dominated American politics.207  
Truman then presented Point Four as an example of what an integrated America could 
accomplish around the global, rhetorically undermining segregated racial orders. Discussing the 
responsibility that the United States had to the rest of the world, he continued, stating that the 
United States could help former colonies improve their conditions and preserve their 
independence through Point Four. Truman noted that graduates of Howard were helping to “cure 
sickness in Burma and Lebanon, to increase output in Liberia, to improve education in Ethiopia 
and Iran.” Not only did Point Four take on significance in the black public sphere, but it also 
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served as a site where the greater promises of America could be realized. Truman said, “In these 
and other countries Americans are working together, regardless of race, creed, or ancestry to help 
the progress of mankind…We are working with the new nations of Asia and Africa as 
equals…Better than any other country, the United States can reach out through our diversity of 
race and origins, and deal as man to man with the different peoples of the globe.” 208 Point Four 
served the administration as a public relations tool at home and abroad, demonstrating support of 
civil rights. The debates over Point Four in Congress demonstrate how this connection between 
domestic and international race politics helped widen the growing rift between segregationist and 
liberal internationalists. 
 Like the Marshall Plan, much of the debate revolved around how to implement the plan 
the best and partisanship differences. Truman’s introduction of Point Four was little more than 
an idea and the State Department was tasked with working out the specifics.209 In between the 
time Truman announced Point Four, the White House submitted a sponsored bill to congress, and 
finally the passage of it under the Foreign Economic Assistance Act in June 1950, many of the 
same Marshall Plan debates regarding foreign aid were reiterated. Political and economic 
concerns did not disappear with the shift of aid to the Third World.210  
Not surprisingly, the debate over Point Four divided along party lines. Framing Point 
Four as a part of the Cold War foreign policy of the administration allowed Truman to combat 
Republican claims that he was weak on communism and utilize the historical context to try to put 
action to his words. For example, in August 1950, Truman wrote to the Speaker of the House, 
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Sam Rayburn, advocating for Point Four appropriations in terms of fighting “communist 
imperialism.” He urged the Speaker to reconsider a proposed cut to Point Four funding, stating: 
“The advance agents of the communist conspiracy loudly promise the peoples of these countries 
a better way of life…We know that the way of freedom actually can and will provide a better life 
for people everywhere…This attempt to save some ten million dollars will do more for the 
communists in their attack on the free world than hundreds of millions of dollars of their own 
propaganda.”211  
Critics in Congress used the internationalist thrust of Point Four to draw attention inward, 
pointing to isolationist separateness abroad. In doing so they transferred their earlier opposition 
to liberal domestic policies to the global setting. Whereas Senator Taft criticized Point Four for 
taking the New Deal to a global scale, some commentators suggested that programs to combat 
ignorance, disease, and poverty at home were needed, a domestic Point Four.212 These critics 
often expressed their displeasure of the internationalist preoccupation of the administration, 
citing economic and social problems at home.213 From the beginning the public discourse on 
Point Four connected the domestic to the international by suggesting that Point Four was a Fair 
Deal for the world.214 However, here the international shined a light on the domestic front. The 
idea that “development” and “technical” assistance should also be used within America was tied 
to the New Deal era roots of development aid.215 This rhetoric taps into a competing vision of 
America’s global position, wherein domestic problems were given priority over international 
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concerns. The message this line of argument articulated was clear; the United States needed to 
get its own house in order. These critics framed their argument in terms of a global perspective. 
In this sense, rather than remaking the world in America’s image, as the Fair Deal for the world 
rhetoric implied, American society should be uplifted at home to secure its position in the world.  
Related to the question of how the debate over foreign aid shifted between the Marshall 
Plan and Point Four was the change in how aid opponents discussed the recipients of aid. In the 
Marshall Plan debates members of congress rarely accused the European recipients of incapable 
of digging themselves out of using the given aid to rebuild. In the debates over Point Four 
though, the character and capabilities of the recipients became a subject of debate. The 
introduction of recipients into congressional debates to discredit foreign aid represented the 
beginning of a political fiction where Third World aid recipients were considered corrupt 
beggars who manipulated the generosity of the United States. Representative Lemke’s 
denouncement of aid recipients as “gold diggers” is one example of the way the rhetoric 
surrounding aid recipients was beginning to shift.216  
Senator Ellender, too, discussed Third World recipients differently than he had described 
European ones. Although generally Ellender supported technical assistance more so than outright 
loans and monetary assistance, his evaluation of technical programs while on one of his frequent 
“fact finding” world trips for the Senate Appropriations Committee demonstrates that he 
questioned the aims of liberal development in the program. In 1953 having observed a technical 
training school funded by Point Four, Ellender wrote that he was not impressed with the three-
year course in trigonometry that the school offered. He said he doubted that the students had the 
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capacity to learn it or the necessity to.217 In addition, he highlighted in his diary that Ethiopia had 
great natural resources and every opportunity to gain wealth from them, but it was still a 
“backward” country.  Ellender clearly thought that Ethiopians had neglected or were incapable of 
using their resources. Considering Ellender’s career-long obsession with natural resources, here 
he seemed to be suggesting that not only had Ethiopians squandered their natural wealth and had 
reason to be impoverished. The implication was that progress was tied to national citizenship and 
character, and for Ellender Ethiopians did not have the same inherent abilities that allowed 
Americans to successfully use the resources of their environment to reach modernity. Even 
though Ellender voted for Point Four and supported technical assistance he did so on the basis of 
a more nationalistic viewpoint as he shifted away from the racially progressive rhetoric of liberal 
internationalism.  
Point Four represented the beginning of institutionalized aid to the Third World. 
Increasingly segregationists withdrew their support for the liberal internationalism that Point 
Four was rooted in due to the racial implications, both domestic and international, that the 
program carried with it. Segregationists did not wish to withdraw from the world though, 
especially considering the anticommunist vein that ran deep in their political ideology. Instead 
many turned towards supporting unilateralist and nationalistic foreign policy, often favoring 
military aid over any monetary efforts to contain the spread of communism abroad. They began 
to reject the United Nations as an acceptable means to maintain global peace due to the spotlight 
it often cast on American race relations. The way southern Democrats discussed aid recipients 
also changed in comparison to those in Western Europe, indicating that domestic social orders 
based on race influenced the internationalist perspective of southern opponents of foreign aid.  
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Conclusion  
Following World War II, liberal internationalist and subsequent liberal development 
political agendas sought to be a democratizing and anti-racist force in the world, one that could 
eliminate the old racial hierarchies that had dominated international politics during the age of 
imperialism. However, early foreign aid programs (the Marshall Plan and Point Four) met 
opposition from conservative unilateralists who endeavored to be anti-imperialist, but also anti-
multilateral. In doing so they clung to a vision of Americanism and citizenship that was firmly 
rooted in Anglo-Saxonism both at home and abroad. In addition, Liberal internationalism could 
not escape the realities of its programs, which often times replicated old imperial patterns of 
exploitation, leaving it open to attack from a wide variety of people from different ends of the 
political spectrum. 
 Southern segregationists initially supported foreign aid programs due to regional political 
trends towards internationalism and loyalty to the Democratic Party. However, as liberal 
internationalism via development aid in the Point Four program increasingly blurred the line 
between international and domestic policies, especially concerning racial social orders, 
segregationists found it increasingly difficult to stand behind liberalism. Instead, they began to 
slowly break from the Democratic Party and the liberal direction it was heading. Segregationists 
wanted to maintain both the racial hierarchy at home and abroad, and as aid shifted to the Third 
World, the antiracism of development served as a mirror on the United States. Segregationists 
thus responded by voicing their discontent over foreign aid policy. They rejected an international 
pressure regarding segregation and racial inequality. Instead, segregationists increasingly turned 
towards a unilateral and nationalistic foreign policy. 
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Despite opposition from various factions, the early foreign aid projects were largely 
bipartisan efforts because of not only their importance to strategic and economic exigencies of 
the Cold War against the Soviet Union, but also because they preached a philosophy of self-help 
and improvement that did not immediately call into question racial hierarchies. Furthermore, 
from the beginning foreign aid projects spoke to the southern proclivity for internationalism in 
American foreign policy. These bipartisan efforts surrounding foreign aid began to fray at the 
edges as foreign aid became institutionalized and the civil rights movement coalesced around the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954. The result was a fringe, but growing movement 
of segregationists from southern congressional districts who began to actively resist racial reform 
at home and abroad by voting against foreign aid appropriations.218 Increasingly these southern 
members of congress resisted internationalist, multilateral policies and turned to nationalistic, 
unilateral approaches. Foreign aid was one of the earliest locations that this political shift in the 
American South’s foreign policy occurred.219 In foreign aid policy, the symbolic meaning of who 
aid was sent to became important for the opposition. Largely absent from these early debates was 
the degrading labeling of aid as “giveaways” or “handouts.” As civil rights accelerated, though, 
such rhetoric became more prevalent, indicating a connection between conservative domestic 
and international policies. The next chapter, focusing on the restricting of development aid under 
Eisenhower’s Mutual Security Administration, tells this story.  
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Chapter II: 
	  
“International Gift Shop”:  
Segregationists and Mutual Security in the Early Civil Rights Years  
 
 The 1957 school integration crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas was both a domestic and 
international crisis for the United States federal government. Domestically, integration of Little 
Rock Central High stalled with the nine African American students being barred from entering 
the high school by National Guard troops, all while President Eisenhower struggled to determine 
a course of action. The domestic standoff took on new urgency as the international press widely 
published news about the event, which added ammunition to the arsenal of Soviet propaganda 
against the United States. Civil rights episodes like Little Rock undermined the progressive 
American race story that the United States government tried to actively tell to combat 
international acts of hypocrisy during the Cold War. The goal of the federal government was 
acknowledge that the United States was not living up to its own standards of self-proclaimed 
defender of freedom and equality for all. However, if any form of government could overcome 
such deficiencies it was American democracy.220 Events like Little Rock therefore were 
problematic because they harmed the American image, which in turn discredited the liberal 
antiracist ideology driving American foreign policy.  
 Segregationists, on the other hand, used the Cold War to their advantage as well and 
easily adopted the nationalistic patriotism of the era to combat civil rights efforts. They claimed 
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that activists were subversive, communist, or outside agitators that harmed America’s image and 
sewed racial conflict, creating chaos in a once orderly social system.221 Moreover, the idea of 
state sovereignty became increasingly important in the rhetoric that segregationists used to 
combat civil rights reform. When Eisenhower did send federal troops in to enforce the 
integration of Little Rock Central High, southern senators compared it to the Soviet Union’s 
actions in Hungary, decrying that the state of Arkansas’s sovereignty was being forcefully taken 
from it.222 Senator Allen J. Ellender also made it clear that he believed that states’ rights had 
been violated, and he encouraged his constituents to actively circumvent the implementation of 
desegregation as called for by the Brown decision.223 By 1957, southerners thought their control 
over their social order was slipping away at the hands of communists and a complacent (and 
even abetting) federal government. Segregationists’ nationalism and calls for state sovereignty 
only increased when they believed that international influence was eroding their cherished racial 
order.  
 As the previous chapter demonstrates, southern segregationists were increasingly adverse 
to international influence on American domestic policy, especially concerning Jim Crow. The 
international press’ coverage of the Little Rock situation only boosted southern resistance, and 
the federal government’s efforts to ameliorate America’s image abroad was met with outrage 
from southern members of congress. For example, a display at 1958 Brussels World Fair 
depicting U.S. race relations eventually had to be withdrawn due to southern threats to cause a 
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stir on the House floor.224 The South’s aversion to international influence on American domestic 
affairs was directly connected to liberal foreign policy, which sought to win allies throughout the 
Global South. Key among policies that permitted international influence within the United 
States, southerners believed, was foreign aid. As a result, segregationists continued to distant 
themselves from the internationalism they had once reluctantly endorsed in preference for 
unilateral, nationalistic, and anti-communist foreign policy.225 
  Foreign aid under President Eisenhower seemed to align more closely with 
segregationists’ vision of foreign aid due to its focus on military aid as opposed to development 
aid. Eisenhower reorganized foreign aid under the Mutual Security Act. The result was a more 
militarized foreign aid policy. In addition Eisenhower tried unsuccessfully to reduce the amount 
of aid sent abroad.226 Indeed, in 1951 when Point Four was reorganized under the Mutual 
Security Act, supporters in the American public responded with despondence. They worried that 
Point Four now fell under the more general umbrella of “foreign aid,” which—in the 
circumstances of the Korean War and the Cold War more generally--emphasized military aid 
over economic aid.227 Point Four was formally merged with economic and military aid in the 
Foreign Operations Administration (FOA). This merger did not necessarily kill Point Four, but 
as one official reported it “cut Point Four to Point Two and a Half.”228 In 1954, a Senate 
Appropriations Committee further reported that the Technical Assistance Program (the name 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Joseph A. Fry, Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1789-1973 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2002), 249-250.  
225 Thomas Noer, “Segregationists and the World: The Foreign Policy of the White Resistance,” in Brenda Gayle 
Plummer, ed., Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003), 147-149.  
226 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 69.	  
227 State Department, “Special Report on American Opinion, 15 June 1951, Folder Foreign Relations: Point IV 
(Pamphlets and Miscellaneous), Box 62, Papers of George M. Elsey, HSTL.  
228 Paul F. Kennedy, “Point 4 Shift Seen Weakening Effort,” The New York Times, 25 September 1953. See also 
Paul F. Kennedy, “Morale Plunges in Point 4’s Shift,” The New York Times, 26 September 1953.  
	   101	  
Point Four was dropped when Eisenhower came into office) was in danger of losing even more 
funding.229 In the meantime, from the perspective of the American people, foreign aid became 
military and monetary handouts to people they considered “backwards.” Unlike Marshall Plan 
recipients, segregationists increasingly cultivated an image of these “backwards” people 
receiving “handouts,” as lacking the means to properly use American economic assistance, 
despite the fact that aid under Eisenhower aligned more closely with the South’s vision of 
militaristic aid as opposed to development aid.230  
 If Eisenhower’s policies represent a shift in both the direction of foreign aid and amount, 
why did southerners continue to retract their support for it at increasing rates? Southerners who 
were opposed to aid due to fiscal concerns should have supported Eisenhower’s efforts to cut aid. 
In addition, Southern calls for more military aid during the Marshall Plan and Point Four debates 
should have easily aligned with the militarization of aid under the Mutual Security Act. The 
answer to the question of the American South’s eroding support for foreign aid in the 1950s lies 
partly in the rapidly changing domestic racial context. It is not mere coincidence that the 
increasing opposition to aid overlapped with the growing civil rights movement at home. 
Specifically, building on the critiques that entered the foreign aid debate during the passage of 
Point Four, segregationists feared the antiracist ideology of liberal internationalism wherein 
foreign aid was seen as a tool for promoting international equality. Segregationists saw domestic 
civil rights demands and antiracist development aid to emerging independent nations in the Third 
World as stemming from the same political impulse that threatened their vision of a white 
supremacist global racial order. For example, during his world tours Senator Ellender frequently 
used the terms “native” and “negro” interchangeably, which implied that he conflated his 
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domestic and international perspectives and saw Africans as primitive and African Americans as 
the same.231  
 Still, continued opposition and calls for fiscally conservative foreign policies among 
segregationist politicians did not represent the beginning of a retreat from world affairs for 
segregationists. Rather, they began to develop a more concrete foundation for a counter-
ideology, one of southern internationalism. In response to domestic civil rights events, 
segregationists began to clarify their internationalist vision. This southern internationalism would 
become the foundation a conservative international ideology in the late 1960s. The pillars of this 
southern or Jim Crow internationalism were racial separatism, anticommunism, sovereignty, and 
nationalism that rejected international influence. In the opinion of segregationists, foreign aid 
went against these pillars, and therefore they often used it as a symbol of liberal internationalism 
that they could readily attack.   
 Historians of foreign aid and the American southern diplomatic tradition have identified 
the key turning point in the Southern break from consensus Cold War foreign policy in foreign 
aid as being in the 1950s.232 This is largely because beginning in the 1950s southern support for 
foreign aid bills steadily declined, turning the South into the most “extreme opponent” of foreign 
aid measures in the short-span of eight years.233 Most of these historians identify economic and 
fiscal concerns as being the overriding reason for the turning point. Domestic racial politics is 
not completely dismissed though. Thomas Noer has perhaps most thoroughly examined what 
race meant for southern support of internationalist programs, arguing, “The indictments of 
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independent Africa, foreign aid, and the UN were the first attempts of white supremacists to try 
to connect the domestic campaign against segregation with international affairs.”234 Still, Noer 
argues that this did not happen until the 1960s. By looking at the opposition to foreign aid not 
only can the impact of race be more fully and systematically explored, but we can also see that 
the connection between domestic and international socio-racial orders was occurring earlier than 
previously argued.  
 To demonstrate the way in which a southern internationalism began to coalesce in 
response to the growing American civil rights movement, this chapter will first examine the 
southern reaction to the 1954 Supreme Court Brown decision. Specifically, it will explore how 
ideas of anticommunism, sovereignty, and racial nationalism entered the segregationists’ case 
against integration. Secondly, it will look at the federal government’s use of foreign aid as a 
propaganda tool during the Cold War and the way segregationists responded to that strategy. 
Finally, it will explore how segregationists began to build their own white supremacist 
international network with white-rule colonies and nations in Africa in response to domestic civil 
rights events. Ideas of anticommunism, sovereignty, and racial citizenship built this international 
network.  
 
“Racial privacy and racial integrity are the spiritual aspiration of a great race of people”: 
Brown v. Board of Education, George Wallace, and Segregationist Critiques of Foreign 
Policy in Their Domestic Civil Rights Stance  
 
1954 marked an important turning point in both civil rights and foreign aid policy. 
Despite the historiographical debate over the “long movement” versus the “short movement,” in 
the history of American civil rights, 1954 is still a key moment in the black freedom struggle. 
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The hallmark of the civil rights movement was sustained direct action that developed after the 
watershed event of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, as it laid the groundwork for a more 
massive and militant movement.235 Historians who adhere to the “short movement” periodization 
of the movement herald it as the beginning of the civil rights movement.236 The Supreme Court’s 
1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision set the course for legal desegregation by nullifying 
the “separate but equal” legal doctrine the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision established. The 
resulting movement’s goals frequently revolved around achieving desegregation and equal 
access via legal action. The result was a more organized civil rights movement that focused on 
sustained legal action by civil rights groups and individuals to end legal segregation.237  
On the foreign aid front, the militarization of foreign aid under the auspices of Mutual 
Security in 1951 and 1953 should have brought the wayward southern segregationists back into 
the internationalist consensus. Militarization meant more business for southern factories and also 
represented the more nationalistic, unilateral approach to aid that segregationist opponents had 
been encouraging since the beginning.238 However, as contemporary historian Charles Lerche 
observed in his 1964 book, the hesitant southern support of internationalism in Truman’s foreign 
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aid ventures continued to crumble during the Eisenhower years. He notes, “Beginning in 1954, 
the number of Southerners in the opposition column began to increase each year as the annual 
request for a renewal of the program reached the floor of the House.”239 The explanation for this 
continued decline in southern support of internationalism, lies in the convergence of the civil 
rights moment and at the same time spending in development aid increased.  
It would be easy to dismiss the fact that a key civil rights legal decision and the 
coalescing of southern opposition to international aid occurred at the same time as a mere 
historical coincidence that does not necessarily demonstrate a relationship between the two. 
However, as the previous chapter has revealed, opponents and proponents linked foreign policy 
to racial conflicts within the United States--especially on the question of foreign aid. The 
internationalist antiracist ideology that buttressed foreign aid was therefore a key factor in 
driving segregationists and their support for foreign aid away. The fact that Eisenhower’s 
administration marked the inclusion of foreign aid into the Mutual Security program and 
attempted to reduce the amount of aid the US gave, should have appealed to the segregationists 
who had cloaked their opposition to foreign aid in calls for fiscal conservatism, nationalistic, and 
militaristic approaches to foreign policy. Instead, 1954 marked the tipping point in the story of 
southern support for international development policy, indicating that the southern opposition to 
aid was not just rooted in foreign policy and economic concerns.  
As chapter one has shown, Louisiana’s Senator Allen Ellender and like-minded members 
of Congress started to question foreign aid when its beneficiaries shifted from countries in 
Europe to those in the Global South. Ellender’s domestic racial perspective tempered his views. 
In 1954, the federal government called into question southern socio-racial hierarchies more than 
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it had since the heyday of Radical Reconstruction. Segregationists responded to the federal 
government’s attempts to end legal segregation by firmly tethering their opposition to foreign aid 
to domestic civil rights. At this time George C. Wallace was circuit court judge in Alabama, and 
he and his allies reacted to the Brown decision in ways that highlight how segregationists 
attached domestic significance to foreign aid. They wrapped their anticommunist and 
unilateralist declarations against liberal policies at home and abroad in a segregationist 
worldview that rested on maintaining racial hierarchies abroad and at home. Attacking foreign 
aid and civil rights in the same context suggested the foundations of a southern conservative 
counter to liberal internationalism.   
In his capacity as a circuit court judge, Wallace weighed in on the Supreme Court’s 
Brown decision, and deployed contempt for current American foreign policy in his critiques of 
integration. Importantly, his assessment of the Brown decision did not take the same form as the 
bombastic rhetoric he embraced in his later national political career. Instead, Wallace used 
official and procedural channels and comparatively speaking, muted rhetoric. Wallace attached 
his support to an “Application for Rehearing and for Modification of Opinion” regarding the 
Brown decision. An application for rehearing is the first step for rehearing at an appellate court 
level. After defeat in an appellate court, the almost automatic response for a lawyer is to submit 
an application for rehearing. Appellate courts are flooded with such applications, and most are 
frequently rejected. That Wallace endorsed this application therefore demonstrates the 
significance of the argument presented in it. The fact that the application used foreign to attack 
civil rights at home in an official application for rehearing of the Supreme Court case reveals that 
the connection segregationists saw between foreign policy and domestic race relations was 
moving from the periphery of American political discourse to the center, coinciding with a 
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sustained and increasingly effective civil rights movement.240 After Brown, segregationist 
support of foreign aid steadily continued to decline. The application for rehearing that Wallace 
supported highlights why southern Democrats saw foreign aid as stemming from the same 
ideology that challenged their position at home. 
 One of the key features of the intersection of foreign policy and civil rights in the Brown 
application for rehearing was the way in which it discussed citizenship. The inclusion of the 
rights of citizenship as justification for continued segregation aligned closely with the South’s 
embrace of nationalistic, unilateral policy. The application turned internationalism inward using 
the familiar southern political motif of anticolonialism. Harkening back to memories of 
Reconstruction, the application claimed that the United States federal government was treating 
the South like a conquered territory, which for southerners touched a nerve The application took 
it further though and suggested that the United States treated actual conquered territories with 
more respect. It stated, “The United States should not adopt toward thirty-five million white 
citizens a domestic policy different from the foreign policy by which it has uniformly abided in 
dealing with citizens of lands which its troops have conquered or occupied…The Southern States 
are the only conquered territory upon which the United States by armed might or otherwise has 
ever forced acceptance of mores opposed to their sincere, conscientious principles and 
fundamental traditions by which they lived.”241 The qualification of “white” citizenship implied 
a privilege of theirs that Southerners thought the federal government had trampled. This only fed 
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southern resentment and invoked the “Lost Cause” of the Civil War era. The message to the 
federal government was that the South held firmly to a “racial nationalism” in which citizenship 
was tied to Anglo-Saxon heritage.242 By suggesting that the liberalism of the federal government 
dismissed white privileged citizenship in favor of places like Africa and China, as well as 
African Americans at home, the application fueled segregationist efforts to maintain their 
position of political, economic, and social power at home and abroad in the face of changing 
global racial hierarchies.243 
 The idea that the federal courts had trampled southerners’ rights as citizens helped lay the 
foundation for an emerging alliance between religious groups and conservatives, which would 
become a key alliance in the conservative political coalition. The application equated southern 
rights to segregation as equal to protection like religious rights. As far as the supporters of the 
application were concerned the courts had as much right to order integration, as it had to force 
Catholics to practice birth control. The “integrity of race,” according to the application was 
constitutionally protected because the level of their devotion to segregation as a social order 
matched religious conviction. The application argued, “The people of the South reverently 
esteem family honor and racial integrity. The purity of their race is higher than an ethical idea 
with them. With man it is an article of religious faith, with almost all it is an important as life or 
death.” They reasoned that the South was a loyal region of the United States and as a 
“homogeneous ‘land’ within the nation” that had been signaled out and wronged by the court’s 
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decision.244 The religious fervor that segregationists attached to their cause suggests a possible 
explanation for the alliances that held together what would become the New Right. In their case 
against Brown segregationists clearly used racial definitions of American citizenship. Their 
decision to compare it to religious rights in the United States allowed them to articulate a legal, 
but fervent, argument to reject federally mandated integration based on rights endowed to 
American citizens. While facing Cold War international pressure to remedy the racial situation at 
home to win allies in the Third World, segregationists fervently clung to their racial order and 
definition of citizenship. In an effort to maintain the South’s racial order based on segregation, 
the growing alliance with religious groups and evangelicals laid the foundation for a later 
conservative coalition. In the face of the Brown decision, the coalition provided fortitude against 
liberal and international pressure.  
The application for rehearing made it very clear that the type of “southern citizenship” it 
believed had been trampled was “white citizenship,” further emphasizing that the nationalism 
segregationists in the region moved steadily towards was a racially based vision of the United 
States in the world that ran counter to the ideals of liberal internationalism. Despite suggesting 
that African Americans were also citizens, the application always qualified citizenship by 
“white” or “negro.” The application claimed that African Americans and white Americans both 
shared in the “national fortune,” while at the same time making it clear that it was the “white 
America” that had built the nation. In fact, the rehearing application attempted to argue against 
integration based on the charity Southerners had shown to African Americans. It reasoned, 
“There is no parallel in history to the magnificent generosity shown these involuntary 
newcomers. Yet, not content with equal and exact justice and with an equal share in the material 
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accumulation of centuries, they demand the right to adulterate the very race which matchless 
generosity and energy provided the vast national fortune in which they share.” Echoing Senator 
Ellender’s fear of “race mixing,” the application even suggested that wanting to maintain “racial 
privacy and racial integrity” were the characteristics of “a great race of people.”245 The 
implication was that the nation was great because of white racial purity. Integration threatened 
that greatness. This was the domestic socio-racial order that segregationists were attempting to 
maintain at home in face of calls for equality at home and abroad.  
The rehearing application reinforced the southern vision of a white supremacist racial 
order by essentially claiming that white Americans were better citizens. For segregationists, 
demonstrating the superiority of “white citizenship” was especially important to assert in the 
context of the hyper-patriotism of the early Cold War years. The application concluded that 
white Americans had “patriotic superiority.”246 This claim solidified the racial nationalism that 
was the backbone of the application for rehearing’s main argument regarding their region’s 
sovereignty being violated at the whim of the federal government. Furthermore, it served to 
counter the federal government’s efforts to use foreign relations as an argument in favor of 
integration. Segregationists had clearly connected race to national character, and what they 
deemed to be “liberal” court decisions threatened to undermine their definition of citizenship and 
the privileges that came with it. The emphasis on patriotism was in direct response to the 
growing radical black politics of the 1930s and 1940s.247 More specifically the application began 
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to touch on the anticommunism of the Cold War by highlighting the fact that one of the 
characteristics that set white Americans apart as superior citizens was that they were more 
patriotic as opposed to what they branded as communist agitators in the civil rights movement, 
who sought to create instability and upheaval domestically. When coupled with other political 
literature that discussed efforts to “reclaim” America and democracy, this racialized vision of 
citizenship implied that to go against segregation was anti-American and a likely communist 
endeavor.248 The argument that the application presented implied that segregation was an 
American institution and defined the Southern region. Segregationists therefore felt the need to 
reassert their patriotism and Americanism in the face of the federal government justifying 
integration via its importance to combatting the Cold War. They presented their counterargument 
that suggested that to work against a segregated racial order was to provoke domestic instability 
and allow communist agitators influence within the United States, which weakened the nation in 
their fight to contain global communist expansion.  
 If segregationists believed that their citizenship was under attack, they also looked for 
people to blame. It was here that they inserted foreign policy into their argument. The fact that 
racism extended beyond the shores of the United States is hardly any surprise, but, as the 
discussion surrounding Point Four previously showed, segregationists started to believe and 
publicize that these “underdeveloped” nations were exerting control over the United States, and 
dictating integration. The application for rehearing made it clear that the federal government was 
treating the region worse than conquered territories, and in the context of decolonization, many 
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of those “conquered” and otherwise involved in territories were in the Global South, adding race 
to the mix.  
Segregationists articulated their southern resentment for the changing global racial 
dynamics brought on by decolonization in their rebuttal to the Brown decision. The application 
argued that not only was “white America” being treated worse than a conquered foreign land, but 
also that black people around the world dictated that mistreatment. It claimed, “The Supreme 
Court as looking outwardly at the opinion of the colored races of the world when it wrote the 
opinion in Brown v. Topeka…It must not oppress Americans with an unthinkable denial of vital 
matters of conscience in order to purchase prestige from colored people abroad.”249 The 
application painted a picture of segregationists as a minority group under attack from the 
government at home and “inferior” races abroad.250 Harkening back to earlier debates regarding 
the United Nations and Point Four, segregationists turned increasingly towards conspiratorial 
declarations of an international communist, anti-white plot to incite racial conflict within the 
United States.251 
In combating liberal internationalism with nationalistic rationale and rejecting outside 
interference, segregationists built off of the established white resistance rhetoric introduced in 
the debates over Point Four. Specifically, the segregationist effort to connect the “nefarious 
global plot against segregation” aligned easily with using anti-communism to discredit the civil 
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rights movement.252 Foreign aid was a key target, because segregationists worried that it allowed 
foreigners a platform to exert control over American domestic policy. Along with supporting the 
application for rehearing of Brown, based on the pamphlets he kept as reference for speech 
material, Wallace also read extensive literature that laid out how foreign aid was communist in 
nature. Among this literature was a 1949 editorial from the Birmingham News by Ronald M. 
Harper on the defining features of a communist. Harper listed Point Four among communist 
“ambition-destroying” programs. He further elaborated that in the venture of helping “backward” 
countries there was no assurance that they would not “bite the hand that feeds them.”253 Thus, 
Harper suggested that foreign aid to the Third World was not only communistic in nature, but 
also that the recipients of the aid were untrustworthy. In doing so, he echoed the increasingly 
racialized discussion about foreign aid that Ellender’s and others promulgated beginning with 
Point Four. Harper specifically blamed liberals for domestic and international communist-
inclined programs and deemed support of such programs as being inherently anti-American.  
In accusing liberals of supporting communist programs, Harper categorized domestic 
liberal programs as stemming from the same anti-American ideology that endorsed foreign aid. 
According to Harper, a typical communist was a “left-winger” that wished to abolish all 
distinction of “race, sex, intelligence, and character.” He accused educators, humanitarians, and 
politicians of catering to the “underprivileged” classes, claiming that to do so was essentially 
communist. Harper argued that leaders were turning the United States into a “welfare state” as 
quickly as possible, contributing to policies that destroyed individual ambition. Like the later 
application for rehearing, though, Harper also made it clear that not all citizens were equal. 
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Regarding programs aimed at the “underprivileged classes” he wrote, “They [liberals] act as if 
they thought all that is necessary to convert depraved, diseased, ignorant and shiftless people into 
good citizens is to put them through school, build hospitals for them, cure their social diseases, 
let hem vote, pension them when unemployed or old, etc.”254 According to Harper, liberals were 
disturbing the socio-racial order at home and abroad with communist schemes that undermined a 
racial nationalism and thus were anti-American as well. Wallace kept many of Harper’s 
editorials on hand for reference, and they influenced his understanding of the purposes of foreign 
aid to the Third World.  
The racialized nationalism that underscored the steadily coalescing conservative 
international political ideology also entered Harper’s interpretation of the Brown decision. In a 
1955 editorial, Harper referenced an argument made in an earlier pamphlet by the National 
Committee on Segregation in the Nation’s Capital. The pamphlet credited the common foreign 
affairs problem that segregation in Washington D.C. created, namely, the issue of African 
diplomats being denied services because they were mistaken for African Americans.255 Harper 
reasoned, “That is indeed unfortunate, but it is no valid reason why innocent white children 
should now be embarrassed and humiliated, and subjected to moral hazards, by being forced into 
close association with negroes, in some cases under negro teachers.”256 Harper’s assessment not 
only called into question the abilities of African Americans, but more significantly, it put the 
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desire to maintain southern social order above American foreign policy interests. Like Ellender 
had done in 1949 and the application for rehearing regarding the Brown decision did, Harper 
scoffed at the idea that American domestic policy should be dictated in any way by nations in the 
Third World. After Brown, segregationists increasingly repudiated liberal calls for domestic civil 
rights reform based on international prestige in favor of a nationalistic foreign policy that 
dismissed concerns about American image abroad, especially among Third World nationalists.  
Wallace himself provides an important window into the history of conservative 
internationalism due to his extremism and the fact that he was a congressional outsider. 
Wallace’s biographers all agree that he was the very definition of a politician, saying whatever 
he thought would motivate his base and win votes. When scholars engage with Wallace as an 
historical actor, one of the key questions they ask is to what extent he believed the racist diatribes 
he publicly made.257 An oft-cited story by Wallace’s former adviser John Kohn best 
demonstrates the way Wallace approached politics. Kohn said, “If George had parachuted into 
the Albanian countryside in the spring of 1962, he would have been head of a collective farm by 
the fall, a member of the Communist Party by mid-winter, on his way to the district party 
meeting as a delegate by the following year, and a member of the Comintern in two or three 
years.” Kohn concluded, “Hell, George could believe whatever he needed to believe.”258 A 
Newsweek reporter in 1964 described Wallace as having nervous tendencies that he compensated 
for with his skills of exploiting the fears and frustrations of his constituents.259 Still, Wallace also 
clearly believed—to some degree—in the institution of segregation and was as racist as any other 
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Southern white politician of the time. What made Wallace different was the fact that he was so 
skilled at telling people what they wanted to hear. Despite his exaggerated rhetoric and 
demagogue status, this makes him an example of how the segregationist political fiction 
surrounding foreign aid resonated beyond the debates of Congress and into the American public, 
laying the foundation for a conservative internationalism. On occasion, Wallace would pull 
himself away from gatherings to give speeches, explaining, “I got to give ‘em a little nigger-
talk,” which demonstrates that he knew what kind of a show he was putting on.260 It was this 
calculated self-awareness about his message that made Wallace such an important figure in the 
rise of the Right based around racial politics, both domestic and foreign.  
 In 1954, Wallace was not yet a national political figure and focused on rallying white, 
southerners in Alabama against integration, which was not a difficult task. Wallace already had a 
fiery, rhetorical style that rested in part on his ability to not just attack integration, but weave that 
attack into a larger assault against liberals and, by extension, the federal government. This 
method would eventually take his political message beyond the South and earn him a small, but 
vocal national base.261 A key feature of this rhetoric involved evoking fears that liberal foreign 
policy (including foreign aid) was leaving the United States vulnerable to communism at home 
and abroad. The underlying message of Wallace’s attack on American foreign policy was firmly 
rooted in domestic race relations.  
Using the same critiques of foreign influence over American domestic policy as he read 
in the application for rehearing and Harper’s editorials, Wallace reiterated a nationalistic 
counterpart to liberal internationalism by placing southern racial citizenship in the context of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 8.  
261 See chapter 4 for more on how foreign aid played a role in Wallace taking the conservative rhetoric to a national 
level. 	  
	   117	  
world events. In an undated speech on the 1954 Brown decision, he all but quoted the application 
for rehearing, stating, “Let me say that the people of the South ask only that they be treated no 
differently than citizens of the lands which our troops have conquered or occupied.” However, 
unlike in the application, Wallace purposefully pointed out that these are the very people to 
whom the United States gave aid—as well as occupied.262 The result was not only to attack the 
federal government for supposedly mistreating upstanding southern citizens, but also to 
delegitimize any pressure from overseas for domestic racial reform because those international 
critics of race in the United States were dependent on aid money. This was a similar, but more 
muted technique of attacking foreign aid via civil rights that Wallace would use during his later 
presidential campaigns. It was a nationalistic declaration reflecting Wallace’s and his supporters’ 
growing southern internationalism that rested on claims that southern and American sovereignty 
should be protected from the meddling opinions of other nations.  
Wallace’s implication that Third World nations had no right to attack American socio-
racial order mirrored his treatment of African Americans in his speech. This helped to deepen the 
connection between international decolonization and American civil rights in the eyes of 
segregationists. After detailing the number of ways the South had been wronged and treated as a 
conquered territory, Wallace went on to clarify the southern stance on African Americans. He 
said that the South believed in the “onward and upward” direction of African Americans. He 
continued, “We support that destiny with our tax money and our Christian good wishes. We 
build his opportunity with a vast program of industrial development and record breaking efforts 
in the field of public education. The freedom of opportunity and liberty to develop to the limits 
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of his capabilities should not and will not be denied…The people of the South have carried the 
Negro citizen on their shoulders and have endowed him with every blessing of civilization that 
he has been able to assimilate.”263 The qualification of “negro citizenship” and their abilities 
rested on the socio-racial order that Wallace and his supporters hoped to maintain. The message 
was that only white Americans citizens had a political voice. Critiques against segregation from 
abroad or at home were invalid to people like Wallace because via foreign aid, white American 
citizens were helping domestic and international critics of segregation reap the rewards of what 
segregationists deemed white “civilization.”  
In the halls of Congress, Representative Otto Passman from Louisiana echoed the 
anticommunist and nationalist calls for southern and American sovereignty against international 
and domestic attacks on segregation following the Brown decision that the rehearing application, 
Harper, and Wallace wove together. Entering office in 1947 Passman had quickly earned a 
reputation among his constituents and colleagues in the House as a fervent fiscal conservative. 
He frequently referred to himself as “just a country boy,” but he also exulted that his hobbies 
were “decent clothes and good food.” He even kept a detailed inventory of his wardrobe. When 
the well-dressed Passman took to the House floor, often to denounce foreign aid spending, he 
recited budget figures off the top of his head and did what colleagues called the “Passman’s 
Dance,” the result of “pent-up nervous energy.” The New York Times described him as a “tense, 
fast talking businessman,” who had been, “wielding a countryman’s axe on foreign aid outlays 
since 1955 as chairman of a twelve-member House Appropriations subcommittee.”264 In 1958, 
he famously told a representative of the State Department, “Son, I don’t smoke and I don’t drink. 
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My only pleasure in life is kicking the shit out of the foreign aid program of the United States of 
America.”265 Passman thus built his political reputation based on his opposition to foreign aid. 
He also was a fervent segregationist, and his response to the Brown decision reveals how he had 
began to form a political response to domestic civil rights that rested on an alternative vision of 
what American foreign policy and the means of national security should look like. This vision 
was an attempt to combat the threat to southern racial hierarchies coming domestic and 
international sources.   
In his defense of segregation, Passman painted a picture of liberalism in which its 
political agenda ran counter to American interests, allowing him to craft an alternative 
understanding of international engagement with the world. He was able to therefore use the 
hyper-patriotic atmosphere of the Cold War to shore up a nationalist defense of segregation. He 
did so by using a definition of racial citizenship that rested on southern notions of sovereignty, 
both domestically and internationally. The result was that Passman, like Wallace and Harper, 
began to attack liberalism more directly based on domestic race issues. Thus, their attacks 
against federal government interference were based on calls for sovereignty and racial definitions 
of citizenship and the rights inherent to said citizenship. These attacks against liberalism and the 
federal government would lay the foundation for future attacks against not just domestic liberal 
programs, but also international ones like foreign aid.  
Rather than outright attacking African Americans and their demands for equality, 
Passman responded by suggesting the Brown decision represented the country sacrificing state 
sovereignty and liberties in the name of “compassion for racial minorities” by “something called 
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‘liberalism.’”266 He further refined his critique of integration during in the wake of the 
desegregation crisis in Little Rock in 1957. Passman told congressional colleagues that civil 
rights were a threat to the liberties of all Americans. He continued, “It begins to look more and 
more as though the highly emotional and inflammatory question of ‘segregation or integration’ is 
methodically being used as a ‘whipping boy’ to disguise an all-out attack upon constitutionally 
guaranteed freedoms of the American people.” Passman argued that, in the South, civil liberties 
had not yet been corrupted by calls for “social equality.” Instead, the South saw integration for 
what it was, Passman declared, a misguided attempt by liberals to subvert individual American 
freedom.267 
The Brown decision and southern reaction to it was, therefore, a key moment in building 
a conservative internationalism to counter the liberal internationalist antiracist agenda. Southern 
ideas regarding anticommunism, sovereignty, international influence, and definitions of 
citizenship all made up key points of their critiques on foreign policy. More importantly, these 
criticisms entered the public forum regarding civil rights. Therefore, the message of Wallace and 
his allies was that it was foreign aid that in part allowed international opinion to dictate domestic 
race relations. Southerners responded by trying to counter federal government claims that race 
reform, and by extension foreign aid, had influence in international affairs. They also sought to 
create their own network of allies abroad, looking towards nations that had white-rule 
governments in the Third World. In doing so, they not only attacked foreign aid as a platform for 
international criticism of United States socio-racial order, but they made it increasingly clear that 
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aid went to lesser people who were incapable of self-governance. Ellender and others often used 
their opportunity to point out what they perceived to be deficiencies in Africans for self-
government to compare those Africans to African Americans in their civic capacity. The result 
was that they utilized the foreign affairs to discreetly comment on the domestic state of affairs.  
 
“This stuff about starving people of other nations is unadulterated poppycock”: Ellender, 
Passman, Propaganda, and Foreign Aid 
 
 One of the many ways the federal government promoted foreign aid was by arguing that 
it could serve as a propaganda tool to combat the Soviet Union in key areas of the world 
enflamed by revolutionary nationalism. That meant selling the United States as an antiracist, 
multicultural society where opportunities were expanding for everyone. The official message of 
the American government to the rest of the world was that the United States was not perfect with 
regards to race, but that it was progressing because democracy allowed for social progress.268 
The federal government did not waste the opportunity to use foreign aid and other diplomatic 
ventures to further the cause of the American image abroad. Segregationists responded by 
condemning foreign aid and government information services as one and the same. Specifically, 
they used anticommunism, nationalism, and claims of defending state and national sovereignty 
as the foundation for their attacks against the “extravagances” of the “do-gooders and world 
planners.”269 Segregationists’ efforts to maintain their domestic racial order rested on 
undermining global antiracist programs and messages that allowed for international influence in 
American affairs, and more specifically, southern affairs. In the process of dismissing liberal 
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international antiracist aspirations to control decolonization, segregationists continued to form 
their own ideological counterpart.  
 The United States Information Agency (USIA) played an integral role in spreading the 
message of American democracy’s progressive racial trajectory to the world. USIA was 
established in August, 1953. Key among its purposes was to advise President Eisenhower and 
other foreign affairs officials on what the world thought about the United States, and also to 
explain and promote American policies and interests abroad. On the topic of desegregation, 
USIA praised the Brown decision in 1954, and in 1957, during the Little Rock integration crisis, 
USIA faced the task of controlling the damage done to the American image abroad, especially in 
non-white countries.270 As the agency tasked with not only telling a progressive American race 
story, but also the one responsible for gathering information on international opinion about the 
United States, USIA provided a target for segregationists attempting to protect their domestic 
racial institutions against international influence. 
 Segregationists in particular were threatened lsjdlfjsljf One way that the USIA and the 
State Department sought to correct the image of race in the United States abroad was to send 
African American jazz musicians around the world to represent the culture of the United States 
and the achievements of democracy to correct racial inequality. The idea that the United States 
could use jazz musicians as cultural ambassadors came from an alliance of musicians, civil rights 
proponents, and cultural critics. The appealed to the State Department under Eisenhower because 
it provided a means to combat the image of America as culturally inferior to the Soviet Union, 
while at the same time demonstrating American efforts to correct racial inequalities to 
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international audiences.271 African Americans traveling abroad in the context of the Cold War 
had real political significance. As W.E.B. DuBois observed in 1956, the State Department 
expected African Americans traveling internationally either not to speak about race conditions in 
the United States or say what the State Department wished the world to believe about them.272 
These jazz ambassadors were far from puppets of the State Department, though. Instead, they 
exercised agency in the political atmosphere created by the Cold War in which civil rights 
activists were often expected to adopt the liberal cold war consensus rhetoric to aid in advancing 
legal reforms.273  
 For segregationists, it was not enough that the “jazz ambassadors” were expected to fall 
in line with the federally prescribed progressive American race story that the Cold War had 
dictated as a foreign policy imperative. Instead, the fact that African Americans were being sent 
abroad to represent the United States and its culture was quickly dismissed, in the same vein as 
foreign aid, as wasteful spending that undermined American sovereignty. Senator Ellender in 
1957 boasted to a constituent that he had received negative press for his criticism of USIA, 
specifically its use of Dizzy Gillespie as a “jazz ambassador.” Ellender wrote, “I agree with you 
that it is difficult to see how such aggregation as the Dizzy Gillespie group could properly 
represent cultural aspects of American music, jazz or otherwise.”274 For Ellender, “American 
culture” and African American culture were not mutually compatible, and to spend money 
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promoting African American culture abroad was foolish and invited further critiques of the 
American race situation. Furthermore, since the jazz ambassadors did not follow the State 
Department’s message at all times, such a program did not advance American interests abroad.  
 Ever the fiscal conservative, Ellender also did not understand what benefit both USIA 
and foreign aid could have to the American economy. He lamented to a constituent that he did 
not see the purpose of spending millions of dollars to combat propaganda against the United 
States, especially when foreign aid was supposed to be securing allies for the nation. He was 
even irritated that Great Britain and France dared to level complaints against the United States 
after the amount of Marshall Plan funds they had received. Ellender was not necessarily against 
all forms of propaganda; he thought that the USIA’s Voice of America radio broadcast served an 
important purpose. But, Ellender’s disdain for most of USIA’s activities and foreign aid more 
generally was rooted in concerns about maintaining sovereignty. Ellender aversion to 
propaganda stemmed from his desire to avoid any sort of outside influence on American 
domestic politics, especially regarding the racial order. He therefore dismissed foreign aid and 
USIA as “extravagant” spending by “do-gooders” and “world planners.”.275 His charges that 
foreign aid did not work to gain allies and that USIA was wasteful suggested his alternative to 
Eisenhower’s foreign policy was more unilateral and nationalistic, one which would fortify the 
United States against “world planners” and other internationalists who allowed for outside 
influence while considering domestic and international politics.  
 Passman agreed with Ellender and attempted to discredit foreign aid appropriations based 
on the jazz tours. In 1958, he delivered a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives. In 
his efforts to refute the logic for foreign aid funding, Passman included jazz tours by the likes of 
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Louie Armstrong and Dizzy Gillespie among items that foreign aid contributed to that he found 
wasteful.276 Passman did not go into detail about what he thought was wasteful about the jazz 
tours, but he included them among other items that he deemed ridiculous. The list itself further 
highlighted how little he valued foreign aid recipients. For example, along with the jazz tours, he 
also included education subsidies to the Middle East.277 Still, Passman never made any direct 
racialized attacks on aid recipients, although he did accuse recipients of fraud. Yet, by suggesting 
that these activities were frivolous, Passman questioned the idea that the United States needed to 
endear itself to Third World nations. 
Importantly, political commentators used Passman’s critiques of foreign aid and 
propaganda to support and further disseminate his sentiments regarding the United States 
yielding to the rest of the world and the economic costs of such internationalism. One such 
person was a prominent foreign aid critic, Eugene Castle.278 In one of his pamphlets, Castle 
quoted from Passman’s February 1958 speech. Building on Passman’s critique he observed, “In 
the name of foreign aid we are spending $5 million annually to send warblers of arias to Western 
Europe, weigh-lifters to the Near East and high-priced jazz bands to the Far East!”279 In addition, 
Dan Smoot, an influential conservative media commentator, also quoted from Passman’s 1958 
congressional address.280 Thus, the segregationist critique of foreign aid and the propaganda 
campaigns that went along with it were supported and repeated to the public via conservative 
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commentators, helping reinforce the foundation for an emerging conservative internationalism 
that rested on nationalistic engagement with the world. 
Passman also attacked foreign aid and propaganda by suggesting that foreign aid in the 
1950s was itself a product of an internal propaganda campaign of sorts. He referred to efforts by 
the executive branch to push foreign aid as “Eisenhower Operation Brainwash.” He told the 
House of Representatives, “There has probably never been devised in our nation a more actively 
functioning propaganda machine than the one which is operated by the advocates of free-
spending with pressure groups pushing the program, seeking spending far in excess of the needs 
justifiable by the facts.”281 Passman did not name the “pressure groups” he spoke of, but in the 
context of his speech, it seems he likely that African Americas, Third World nationalists, and 
American liberals were among those that he had in mind. Passman was convinced that foreign 
aid policy was being influenced by foreign nations trying to get more funds sent to them. In 
Passman’s view, the result was that the United States was hoodwinked into “paying glorified 
blackmail to unfriendly regimes in many countries.”282 Passman therefore suggested that groups 
within the United States were misleading the American public, and that foreign nations took 
advantage of it. His attempts to present this argument represented an effort to cast a shadow on 
aid as little more than a vehicle for foreign meddling in American affairs. 
 Here, like Ellender’s dismissal of “do-gooders” and “world planners” and their policies, 
Passman suggested that it was propaganda spread by overly emotional policymakers that was 
leading Congress and the American people astray. In 1960, he directly called out the 
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humanitarian images and arguments that supporters of foreign aid often used when justifying 
their budgets. He wrote, “This stuff about starving people of other nations is unadulterated 
poppycock. A great majority of them are about as well fed as we are.” Passman believed that 
Third World recipients were opportunists that used the convergence of the Cold War and 
decolonization to squander the United States out of money. Passman feared the result was that 
the United States was losing ground in the world market to the very people that the nation was 
providing aid to, something southerners had feared happening at the onset of development aid.283 
He also attacked one of foreign aid’s other key selling points: its ability to win allies in the fight 
against the Soviet Union. He lamented, “That through this Frankenstein-like monstrosity we may 
have eventually been? brought to our knees economically, and with fewer friends than we ever 
had?”284 Yet, Passman did not directly attack liberal members of his party, because he held on to 
his southern Democratic Party devotion.   
He still did not completely reject the internationalism the Democrats established under 
Truman. He pointed out emotionalism and partisanship as the problem and should be avoided. 
However, he was becoming increasingly vocal about the role that pressure groups that were 
pushing for foreign aid.285 His attack on foreign aid and propaganda represented his resentment 
towards liberal policies, but not an abandonment of his political party. Although the Democrat 
Party had started to farcture in the post-World War II years, it was an ongoing process that did 
not reach its crescendo until the loss of the so-called “Solid South” in 1964. The political attack 
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signified how his opposition against foreign aid was not just about fiscal concerns, but also his 
worry over influence in American policies from abroad and at home. They rested on his desire to 
maintain national control over international and domestic affairs.  
By questioning the need for USIA’s propaganda, segregationists like Ellender and 
Passman sought to discredit an international influence on domestic affairs, especially regarding 
the southern segregated racial order. They responded to the federal government’s efforts to 
present a progressive American race story to potential allies in the Third World. Ellender and 
Passman argued that foreign aid and the propaganda associated with it were wasteful. They 
hinted that internationalists were to blame for misleading the American public and garnering 
support for foreign aid. They believed that internationalism had allowed outside influence that 
had eroded American power abroad and caused upheaval domestically. Their actions represented 
a segregationist desire to eliminate foreign influence and maintain sovereignty for their 
individual states as well as the nation. Realistically, though, they recognized that withdrawing 
from the world completely was impossible, especially in the context of the Cold War. Therefore, 
the foundation of a conservative internationalism that segregationists were building on ideas of 
sovereignty and nationalism was not akin to isolationism. Instead, they wanted world 
involvement on their terms. Specifically, segregationists sought international engagement that 
did not threaten their socio-racial standing at home and abroad. Therefore, in the 1950s, to 
counter liberal internationalist ideas, segregationists began to cultivate their own international 
network of likeminded allies. Here, not only did nationalism dictate their cause, but also strict 
anticommunism came into play.  
 
“Wilson had never contemplated self-determination except for homogenous peoples”: 
South Africa, Rhodesia, and the American South 
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 The support of segregationists for white rule in Africa illustrates the way in which a 
conservative internationalism was coalescing around race following the Brown decision and 
subsequent Little Rock school integration crisis in 1957. Segregationists felt increasingly 
attacked from domestic and international sources. Their response was to go on the offensive. 
This meant not only countering domestic liberalism, but also international liberalism, often 
identifying the two as one and the same. Internationally, this meant creating a global white 
supremacist alliance that rested on theories of racial superiority. Looking at how southern 
politicians discussed events in Africa highlights the key idea of racial nationalism and 
anticommunism, unilateralist foreign policy that buttressed the attempts of southerners to 
maintain the white superiority at home and abroad. The result was their intentional alignment 
with like-mind minority-rule governments in Africa, specifically South Africa and Rhodesia 
(modern-day Zimbabwe).  
Questions of race in Cold War politics (both directly and indirectly) has played a 
significant part in understanding the nature of American Cold War foreign relations with Africa, 
especially the civil rights movement at home and decolonization abroad converged. Thomas 
Borstelmann’s Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern African in the 
Early Cold War is one of the first studies of how the United States approached diplomatic 
relationships with Africa during the Cold War and its connection to these larger themes. 
Borstelmann’s scope is limited to the Truman era and politics as he sees this as a crucial time 
when American officials cemented the relationship between the United States and South Africa 
due to Cold War concerns in the region. Yet, this relationship posed many problems for the 
United States due to issues of race relations at home and abroad, bridging the gap between 
domestic and international policy concerns.   
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The hypocrisy of the United States regarding racial equality and the nation’s inability to 
live up to its self-proclaimed ideals invited the possibility of accusatory global outrage towards 
the United States. Segregationists resented internationalism for allowing outside influence to 
dictate American policies, so they began to cultivate their own white internationalism. The Jim 
Crow system in the southern United States and the apartheid regime of the Nationalist Party 
made natural, if uneasy allies.286 Although Cold War concerns often dominated the way that the 
United States interacted with the rest of the world, in the case of South Africa there was also a 
level of self-identification with South Africa. Southerners built on their previous attempts to use 
African nations as examples for black inferiority, as Ellender’s world trip diaries and reports 
have demonstrated, and renewed their support for the “the civilizing whites” in Africa, Rhodesia 
and South Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s.287 In doing so they were not just connecting 
domestic race perspectives with international ones in their effort to maintain racial hierarchies at 
home, but they actively were trying to cultivate a global network of white supremacists. This 
directly undermined the liberal internationalism in foreign aid programs, and fostered a southern 
internationalism on the basis on global white supremacy. 
After Brown in 1954 and Little Rock in 1957, segregationists continued their domestic 
attack on civil rights by claiming they were engineered by communists (both domestic and 
international) while at the same time denouncing the international pressure on the United States 
that they argued the United Nations and foreign aid allowed. The year 1960, or “the Year of 
Africa,” provided segregationists with an opportunity to utilize events in decolonization to 
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rollback segregation at home. This was compounded by increasing numbers of demonstrations 
such as the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee’s (SNCC) sit-in movement throughout 
the South.288 Thomas Noer argues, “To segregationists, African independence was a clear 
premonition of the calamity that would follow racial equality at home. Black rule in Africa was a 
model to be avoided, not duplicated.”289 People like Ellender, Wallace, and Passman all kept up 
to date on the news out of Rhodesia and South Africa, and often wrote and discussed it, siding 
with the white-rule governments for maintaining order in the region.290Again, the segregationists 
adhered to racial nationalism used international events as a way to critique racial reform within 
the borders of the nation.  
Noer, however, focuses his attention on conservative groups with political influence. But, 
when politicians are taken into account it because increasingly clear that the growth of 
conservative internationalism came in part from earlier attempts to connect foreign aid to civil 
rights. Ellender and others’ opposition to Point Four demonstrates how conservatives began to 
use the Third World as an example of racial inferiority that applied abroad and at home. Still, 
Ellender’s earlier critiques of Third World abilities were muted and indirect. After the events of 
decolonization abroad and the early civil rights episodes, Ellender and his allies more openly 
attacked Third World abilities and began to more aggressively support white supremacist 
regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa.  
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By the late 1950s, Ellender framed his critiques against foreign aid in racial terms by 
describing the inefficiencies and inabilities of Africans. Upheaval in the Congo and Angola in 
1960 and 1961 only reinforced segregationist fears that not only were blacks going to displace 
southern white power at home, but that it would lead to chaos. Although Ellender had been 
critiquing the ability of Africans to self-govern since Point Four in 1949, after the domestic racial 
upheaval in the South of the mid-to-late 1950s, his attacks became more pointed and combative. 
He said, “These people are entirely incapable of governing themselves and in my opinion it 
would be a waste of our taxpayer’s dollars to initiate a program of direct assistance there.”291 In 
Ellender’s vision, the United States should not give foreign aid to less than desirable candidates, 
whereas under the Marshall Plan some recipients were ungrateful, they were still considered 
capable. This was not the case in after the turmoil-filled independence of the Congo.  
Ellender’s fellow Louisianan in the House, agreed with Ellender’s assessment of the civic 
abilities of the Congolese following independence. On the situation in the Congo, Passman 
frequently received letters from constituents and others that decried the situation in the Congo. 
One such letter went so far as to compare the Congo to the American South. He wrote, “What is 
going on in the Congo now, mass raping of white women, murder of white men by Africans, has 
been going on all over the U.S. (especially in the South), ever since the depraved and 
Communist-minded U.S. Supreme Court issued its Un-Constitutional integration edict.”292 The 
letter reflected the same themes that Ellender, Wallace, and Passman had articulated regarding 
foreign policy in the Third World and its connection to domestic race relations. The letter-writer 
highlighted the character of Africans and how it was similar to what he perceived to be 
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lawlessness and violence of African Americans, he suggested that the federal government was 
responsible for a communist policy, and he implied that integration had put white-citizenship in a 
dangerous situation. Essentially, he used an international episode as a platform to critique 
domestic policies. He highlighted the key ideas that segregationists had been using to create a 
southern internationalism. Passman readily agreed with this interpretation of the events in the 
Congo and the American South.293 
By the late 1950s, Ellender concluded that Africans were unable to rule themselves and 
that African Americans were essentially in the same position in the United States. These attacks 
only served to further his efforts and those of other segregationists to stem the tide of antiracist 
liberalism at home and abroad. On the topic of the Congo, Ellender observed on one of his world 
tours that “I find that the negro here is not different in many respects than our own negroes. They 
are shiftless and most cunning in their efforts to get out of work.”294 In this statement, Ellender 
simply internationalized the contemporary prevailing stereotype that African Americans were 
lazy and needed white guidance to urge them to work and domesticated his views on Africans. 
He used his domestic perspective and projected it internationally, creating an international racial 
perspective that merely imposed his American southern understanding on the world stage.  
Southern white paternalism towards African Americans and Africans was always present 
as justifications for segregation in discussions on civil rights and foreign aid, but compared to his 
earlier statements on the subject, Ellender’s rhetoric had shifted to a more clearly articulated 
connection between African Americans and Africans. He articulated his southern racialized 
worldview time and time again on his “fact finding” trips for the Senate Appropriations 
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Committee. Despite taking these trips for official purposes, Ellender’s reports were always a 
strange mix of official matters, travel diary, personal observations, partisan interpretations, and 
guidebook. Speaking to the commonness of Ellender’s opinions at the time, his racist and 
personal observations that littered the reports he submitted to the Appropriations Committee 
never need to be official rebuked. It was only in 1962 when Ellender publically insulted African 
leaders that the federal government had to intervene and distant itself from Ellender’s remarks. 
Instead, during the 1950s his domestication of global racial hierarchies created little stir among 
his colleagues.  
In his 1953 world trip to evaluate foreign aid in Africa, Ellender was more tempered in 
his critiques, but he still clearly supported white-rule governments in Africa. In the Belgian 
Congo, Ellender described Leopoldville as a modern city in many ways, because of the large 
presence of the Belgium.295 He also wrote, “I find the natives here more polite than other 
colonies. They seem satisfied and most grateful for their advancement. I believe there are fewer 
agitators here than in any fewer agitators here than in any other territory I have visited.”296 
Ellender’s assessment of black South Africans was similar. He wrote, “Judging from what I have 
seen in this area, they get rough treatment, but they seem humble and not troublesome. All very 
polite and as in most of Africa they refer to the white man as ‘master.’”297 Ellender’s 
observations implied that black Africans under white rule were more complacent and less likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 “Senator Ellender’s Diary, South African Tour,” 9 August-2 October 1953, pg. 54, Box 1513, Allen J. Ellender 
Papers, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, LA.  
296 “Senator Ellender’s Diary, South African Tour,” 9 August-2 October 1953, pg. 62, Box 1513, Allen J. Ellender 
Papers, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, LA.  
297  “Senator Ellender’s Diary, South African Tour,” 9 August-2 October 1953, pg. 78, Box 1513, Allen J. Ellender 
Papers, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, LA.	  	  
	   135	  
to cause trouble. This mirrored his view of African Americans as content with segregation in the 
American South.298  
But, even in 1953, the connection between civil rights at home and foreign aid supporting 
antiracism and decolonization abroad was present in Ellender’s assessment and wrapped in 
praise for the white-rule governments in Africa. Ellender reported on the situation in Southern 
Rhodesia that he did not think that black Rhodesians would ever be able to support themselves 
without the “help and guidance of white men.”299 In doing so, Ellender suggested that African 
self-rule was not possible due to inferiority among blacks. Although he did not explicitly state 
them, the domestic parallels were clear to Ellender and his audience.  
Building on his conflated comparison of African Americans and Africans, Ellender 
continued to praise the South African system as an effective way to manage independence in 
South Africa and equated it to the American history of expansion and racial order. He observed 
that on his visits “the natives were cheerfully going about their business,” and that they were 
earning betters wages with the benefits of education, health, and housing than any other “black 
man in any other country of Africa.” He continued by praising the system that the South African 
government had set up. Stating, that the only result of a multiracial state would have been native 
political dominance, so apartheid was the only possible policy.300 Given that Ellender had 
already established that he believed non-white populations to be incapable of running their own 
affairs, Ellender’s dismissal of “native rule” as even a possibility was congruent with his own 
global racial views.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 Thomas A. Becnel, Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1995), 16.  
299 “Senator Ellender’s Diary, South African Tour,” 9 August-2 October 1953, pg. 92, Box 1513, Allen J. Ellender 
Papers, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, LA.  
300 Allen J. Ellender, “Republic of South Africa,” undated, Folder South Africa Misc, Box 1570, Allen J. Ellender 
Papers, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, LA.  
	   136	  
Ellender continued his positive assessment of the South African racial policy by drawing 
comparisons to the history of the United States and pointing out how the South African apartheid 
model was actually better than that of the United States’. He pointed out that the history of South 
Africa paralleled that of the settlement of the American West, except, because of the rapid 
industrialization and agricultural advancements that the white population brought to South 
Africa, the number of “natives” in South Africa actually increased instead of decreasing. He 
therefore reasoned that just like giving American land “back to the natives” was not going to 
happen in the United States, it was not going to happen in South Africa either. Finally, Ellender 
concluded, “Just as some groups in our own country have sought to break down customs through 
legislation and laws, the South African government has sought to make customs the law of the 
land.”301 Not only did Ellender praise the separate races system that South Africa had instituted, 
but also he suggested that it was the most effective way to control decolonization and an 
independent African state, thus reinforcing traditional racial hierarchies. Furthermore, in his 
thinly veiled attack on the American civil rights movement’s efforts at legal reform in contrast to 
the South African legal institutionalization of apartheid, he suggested an alternative development 
model that rested on white superiority and neocolonial relationships in the Third World.  
Ellender did not limit his racialized critique of foreign aid to the African continent; he 
also criticized the Korean recipients of aid in 1956, which demonstrates the way in which he 
extended his racist rhetoric to all non-white recipients of aid. In doing so, Ellender further 
entrenched his vision of a superior global white race, representing his efforts to maintain the 
global racial hierarchies of the pre-World War II imperial system. On the topic of foreign aid to 
Korea Ellender declared, “Look at Korea! Korea has done more construction than at any other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 Allen J. Ellender, “Republic of South Africa,” undated, Folder South Africa Misc, Box 1570, Allen J. Ellender 
Papers, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, LA. 
	   137	  
time in its history. When they get money, Koreans always want more. They are sucking your 
blood.”302 By calling Koreans “bloodsuckers,” Ellender had attacked the character of aid 
recipients. The New York Times was quick to pick up on the nuanced shift in Ellender’s 
declaration against aid. An editorial in the paper declared that Ellender was free to offer critiques 
on foreign aid policy. However he did not have the “freedom to slander in such a manner a 
nation which is a true friend of ours and a valiant ally of ours.” The Times concluded, “Mr. 
Ellender has only betrayed his own ignorance and bigotry by making a statement slandering 
Korea.”303 The Times recognized the way that Ellender’s domestic racial beliefs were influencing 
foreign aid discussions.  
Furthermore, Ellender’s comments about Korea and Africa demonstrate the way in which 
a foundation of a white international resistance had been developing among segregationists; 
white-rule in Africa had to be maintained if development was ever to occur. The domestic events 
of the late 1950s only renewed Southern efforts to build a global network of white supremacist. 
The Cold War only aided in these efforts, as South African and Rhodesia were anticommunist 
and pro-American. However, that the white-ruled African nations and the American South had 
shared socio-racial systems made it all the more easy for segregationists to identify with these 
colonies and nations.  
Rhodesia and South Africa also courted segregationists, which helped segregationists 
build their southern internationalism defined by white supremacy and global efforts to combat 
the changing racial hierarchies that decolonization sparked. South Africans monitored the racial 
situation in the United States not only because they were concerned with the gains of the civil 
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rights movement, but also because they used the events in the United States to demonstrate that 
white control was the most effective governance.304 Southern politicians and South African 
minority rule therefore had a self-reciprocating relationship. South Africans more quickly 
dismissed American internationalism than did segregationist congressmen. South African 
ambassador William Naude defiantly told President John F. Kennedy’s Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs, “Wilson had never contemplated self-determination except for 
homogenous peoples.”305 Naude’s comments against a key feature of internationalism, self-
determination, echoed the same rationale that Wallace and liked minded officials articulated after 
the Brown decision in 1954 that “racial integrity” was paramount to southern citizenship.306 The 
rejection of liberal internationalism by both American segregationists and white South Africans 
demonstrates that, by the early 1960s, the global white resistance to antiracist internationalism 
was firmly established.  
By 1963, segregationists had all but abandoned liberal internationalism and this was 
evident in foreign aid policy. Building on his previous remarks that dismissed the abilities of 
black Africans to govern themselves, Ellender, while on one of his many world trips in 1962, 
announced to the African press that he did not believe that any African nation was capable of 
self-government, and that he therefore opposed grants to them.307 He observed that Africans had 
not made “the least bit of progress on their own.”308 The fact that Ellender made these remarks in 
Rhodesia, a British colony whose white minority was fighting the tide of decolonization, 
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amplified the significance of his comments, which suggested that Africans could not advance 
without European intervention and that the United States supported the minority rule’s regime 
and ideology because they aligned with their own.309 Following those early battles of the civil 
rights movement, Ellender’s comment essentially solidified a conservative internationalism 
based on racial nationalism at home and white supremacist networks abroad. In terms of foreign 
aid policy, this meant that foreign aid was a “giveaway” or “handout” to people who could not 
effectively employ it. The message Ellender and others gave was that foreign aid was a failed 
internationalist “do-gooder” scheme that was bankrupting the United States and threatening 
white power on all fronts. Foreign aid was an example of how liberal antiracist policies were 
failing. 
 
Conclusion 
 Segregationist opposition to foreign aid continued to grow under the Eisenhower 
administration. This was despite the fact that Eisenhower had attempted to moderate the foreign 
aid budget and militarize it under the Mutual Security Act. However, when in combination with 
aid’s focus on the Third World and the beginning of the American civil rights movement, 
segregationists clung to a nationalistic, unilateral approach to foreign policy. The result was the 
foundation of a southern internationalism that rested on anticommunism, sovereignty, and racial 
nationalism. Especially when segregationists used foreign events as symbols and cautionary 
examples for domestic racial conflict. Furthermore, in an effort to discredit liberal foreign policy 
goals and to combat international influence in domestic race issues, segregationist discredited 
propaganda and its role in foreign aid. Ultimately the convergence of the nationalistic and 
anticommunist view of segregationists meant that liberalism and the federal government became 
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key targets in the opposition to foreign aid. The result of was that segregationists did not seek to 
withdraw from world affairs, rather they sought create international alliances with likeminded 
white supremacists in South Africa and Rhodesia in an effort to control the rapidly changing 
global racial hierarchies that World War II and the Cold War initiated.  
In response to the growth of foreign aid and the civil rights movement, segregationists 
not only took a defensive approach, but they also went on the offensive. In an effort to cultivate 
an alternative to liberal internationalism, they actively engaged in creating an international 
network of white supremacists with Rhodesia and South Africa. This was part of their effort to 
maintain white social, political, and economic power at home and global. “Racial integrity” was 
what segregationists held to define citizenship, and they carried this over to foreign affairs with 
their support of white-rule in Africa. With the election of John F. Kennedy, foreign aid would 
once again take on a more liberal and internationalist direction. Meanwhile, the civil rights 
movement entered its high-point of militant non-resistance. Segregationists and their allies 
responded by entrenching their power under the disguise of nationalistic, unilateral rhetoric 
regarding foreign policy, which resulted in imbuing foreign aid with racial symbolism, as the 
next chapter addresses.  
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Chapter III: 
 
“Then I’ll be Concerned about Their Attitude Towards Us”:  
 Segregationist Opposition to Foreign Aid and Internationalism, 1960-1964 
 
 In 1959, Eugene W. Castle, dismayed over the amount of foreign aid the United States 
government continued to approve, amended his 1957 book, The Great Giveaway: The Realities 
of Foreign Aid, by penning a postscript.310 Castle was a former San Francisco newspaper 
reporter, newsreel cameraman, founder of Castle Films, and investment banker. But, in addition 
to his accomplishments in the news media and the financial sector, Castle had also made his 
name as a “budget hawk,” who relentlessly critiqued American foreign aid policy, or as he 
labeled it, “Alice-in-Wonderland extravaganza.”311 Since the 1940s, he had derided government 
excess. He shifted his focus to foreign aid as the epitome of that excess in the 1950s, even 
appearing several times in front of congressional groups to present testimonies against aid 
programs.312 Throughout The Great Giveaway he frequently cited foreign aid as a symptom of 
ineffective government overreach that propagandists sold to the American people in place of an 
actual foreign policy. No matter how fantastical and hyperbolic his claims were in the 1957 
edition of his book, Castle largely based his arguments against aid in terms of practical matters 
such as economic and policy concerns. When ideology did enter his reasoning, it was in terms of 
an internationalist, communist-influenced conspiracy that he believed would bankrupt the United 
States. In 1959, however, a new urgency marked Castle’s pleas for the American people to take a 
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stand against foreign aid, and he found a receptive audience in southern politicians who had 
slowly been defecting from the ranks of foreign aid supporters since Truman introduced Point 
Four technical assistance. 
As Castle contemplated his 1959 postscript, the growth of aid in the previous two years 
weighed heavily on his mind and he feared his crusade would go unheard by the American 
public. The growing congressional opposition to foreign aid that occurred in 1957, especially in 
the southern states, emboldened Castle. Still, he did not see the results he hoped for as foreign 
aid authorizations continued to gain congressional approval. Although Eisenhower had expressed 
his desire to curb the growth of aid at the beginning of his administration, during his presidential 
terms appropriations for it began to rise steadily.313 Facing the election of a new president in 
1960 and observing the full results of Eisenhower’s attempts to cut foreign assistance, Castle 
lamented, “There have been no basic changes in the foreign aid story, only more and more of the 
same things—more waste, more extravagance, more corruption, more employees added to our 
free-spending bureaucracy.”314 In his zealous commitment to his cause, Castle had done 
everything he could to solidify an opposition bloc on foreign aid in the coming election. He 
continued to maintain communications with senators and representatives who opposed foreign 
aid. Commonly, these members of congress were from the South and had opposed foreign aid 
appropriations since the mid-1950s. They included Senator Allen J. Ellender and Representative 
Otto E. Passman.315 Castle both reflected congressional opposition and was influenced by it at 
the same time.  
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In an effort to rally even more support in Congress and endear the American public to his 
cause, Castle’s postscript echoed many of his previous complaints against assistance of any type, 
yet he also made a more direct appeal to the domestic policy sensibilities of the public and 
members of congress. Castle argued that the “suicidal” assistance program would cause 
detrimental harm to the “middle group” of Americans, “whose energy, purchasing power, and 
sacrifices made our country the envy of all peoples everywhere.”316 The result would be the 
breakdown of constitutional processes, the center of American governance, and would dethrone 
the United States as the world leader. Castle argued⎯with more fervor even than he had two 
years earlier⎯that foreign aid would lead to the failure of the American economy and politics by 
crushing the middle class. Such a result would truly signal the United States’ defeat in the Cold 
War on the basis of the collapse of republican democracy and capitalism at home.  
By including discussion of the domestic economic landscape of the United States, Castle 
began to introduce race into his argument against foreign aid and placed blame for the 
threatening foreign aid program at the feet of liberals. His reference to the “middle group” of 
Americans as those who had the purchasing power was the white, middle class. Money spent 
overseas in what Castle claimed were “corrupt” governments could better benefit the middle 
class in the United States in Castle’s vision, excluding others from active participation in 
American commerce and therefore civil governance.317  
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By 1959, he knew who should shoulder the blame for the destruction of the American 
way of life via foreign aid. Unlike the 1957 edition of the book, rather than simply relying on a 
generally mislead government as the primary instigator, in the 1959 postscript, Castle outright 
named “modernism” and “liberalism” as the “deceptive banners” deserving blame for the foreign 
aid policy that would destroy the middle-class and thus American global hegemony.318 More 
clearly than in his previous diatribe against foreign aid, Castle pointed to the connection between 
crumbling, old social structures like segregation at home at the hands of liberalism abroad. What 
had changed for Castle between 1957 and 1959 to lead him to more blatantly attack liberalism as 
a vast threat to America rather than just critique foreign aid policy? 
Linking foreign aid to what he thought was an overreaching vision of liberalism and its 
ideology of modernization?, Castle continued his line of logic and attacked liberalism’s domestic 
projects as one of the main reasons why the government allowed foreign aid to continue. The 
result, he believed, would herald the destruction of the social and economic foundation of the 
United States. In the presidential election, he argued that the candidates used foreign aid as a 
political proxy to gain votes from special interests. He wrote, “It is a shocking fact that all of the 
would-be candidates of both political parties for the next Presidential election are supporting 
foreign giveaways forever. They are using foreign aid as a device to win the support of 
misguided and ‘brainwashed’ Americans, of pressure groups and short sighted minorities whose 
self interest comes before our Nation’s solvency and security.”319 Castle highlighted the fact that 
foreign aid was more than just a policy; it was a political symbol that meant very different things 
to different groups. More importantly, he argued that foreign aid was merely a tool to curry 
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political support among minorities in the United States. By emphasizing the symbolism of 
foreign aid in the domestic context, Castle suggested that to support foreign aid was to inherently 
undermine American interests. Blaming liberals and minority groups further suggested that only 
certain people had a voice in the process of determining foreign policy.  
In his effort to blame liberals and their domestic interests for the expansion of foreign aid, 
Castle excluded all but white, middle class Americans from having any legitimate role to play in 
foreign and national politics.320 In doing so he was following a long tradition in American 
political history. As historian and theorist Nikhil Pal Singh observes, “For most of U.S. history 
this problem [the accommodation of racism in the U.S. constitution] was simply resolved by 
defining black people apart from any representation of the national interest. At the delicate 
intersection of public opinion formation and public policy formulation—national sovereignty and 
state institution building—was a broad racial consensus based on black exclusion.”321 American 
citizenship and participation in civic affairs was just as much about whom it excluded as 
included.  
Castle juxtaposed minority interests to American interests. In the context of an 
accelerating reorientation of global racial hierarchies due to the end of colonialism, Castle’s 
exclusion from and simultaneous blame of African Americans in the discussion of foreign aid 
represented a fight against the fluid remaking of race that was underway across the globe.322 The 
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growth of the civil rights movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s was a key domestic 
embodiment of this global contestation of prevailing social, political, and economic racial 
hierarchies.323 Often, white southerners led legal efforts to maintain the racial status quo. The 
evolution of Castle’s fiscal conservatism to envelop racist attitudes represented an important step 
in the development of a conservative internationalism that reached beyond outright declarations 
of racism and segregation. Castle’s congressional allies, including Ellender and Passman, 
mirrored his arguments and began to craft a rhetoric around foreign aid that alluded to 
segregationists’ racial fears. This chapter explores how the marriage between fiscal conservatism 
and segregation proved to be an important step in creating a conservative internationalism that 
carried appeal beyond the segregationist American South.  
Following the 1960 election the efforts to combat antiracial internationalist policies via 
domestic reference points, as Castle encouraged, faced an increasing challenge. As part of a 
larger, calculated shift in the geographic focus of the American efforts in the Cold War, 
President John F. Kennedy employed a flexible response to foreign policy in the Third World.324 
A key component of the Kennedy Doctrine was modernization theory accomplished through 
development aid. Although Kennedy was certainly not the progenitor of development as a key 
weapon in fighting the Cold War, development took on a renewed importance in his 
administration. Kennedy recognized foreign aid’s symbolic significance in the context of 
decolonization and its importance in fighting the Cold War against the Soviet Union in the 
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periphery. Kennedy and his team were aware that, in the late 1950s, the United States appeared 
as the “defenders of the status quo” in the Third World, which they feared would lead Third 
World nationalists to turn to the Soviet Union for support.325 Reforming foreign aid therefore 
presented an opportunity to redefine the American image from one of a colonial power by 
another name in the Third World to one of benevolent mentor. Kennedy’s efforts to shift the 
geographic terrain of the Cold War, and therefore its key weapons in fighting it, to the Third 
World--especially Latin American and Africa—represented, for segregationists, a real danger to 
the domestic and international racial order they were fighting to furiously to maintain. 
By choosing to target foreign aid, a key instrument in implementing modernization 
theory, racial conservatives attacked a core aspect of liberalism during the early 1960s. This 
ultimately unsuccessful assault on foreign aid illustrates that the political culture of the United 
States was more complicated during the 1960s than historians have previously suggested. Rather 
than a golden age of American liberalism from the 1930s to the 1970s, the opposition to foreign 
aid demonstrates that liberalism’s continued triumph was not inevitable or stable.326 In addition, 
it is only when the intersection between domestic and international spheres is examined that the 
roots of the conservative coalition that dominated post-1968 American politics is seen. 
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Specifically, those roots were planted in segregationists’ struggles to craft a message that 
maintained the existing racial order, yet might still resonate with a national demographic.  
Castle’s postscript begins to provide insight into the subtle shift in the opposition to 
foreign aid. His new concern in 1959 (just two years after the publication of the first edition) 
over the middle-class and the scourge of politicians catering to minority groups points to a 
deeper fear among segregationists of the shifting domestic and global racial hierarchies, a fear 
that could eventually be exploited by white politicians beyond the South. The fact that the region 
that most consistently voted against foreign aid starting in 1957 was the South (and that they 
were proud of it too) is significant to the history of race in foreign aid policy.327 Although more 
recent scholarship on the civil rights movement has expanded geographically beyond the South, 
the region has been a key battleground in which segregationists fought efforts to end white 
supremacy. 328 Simultaneously attacking foreign aid allowed segregationists to apply their 
domestic racial understandings to international politics. The result was the creation of racial 
symbolism surrounding foreign aid, which they could later refine and take to a national audience.  
Historians have attributed the growth of the New Right to the ability of conservatives to 
connect domestic concerns of communism, government growth, taxation, civil rights, and a 
perceived decay of morality to liberalism, a message that resonated in the ever-growing 
constellation of Sunbelt suburbs.329 However, when we look to the international activities of 
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people like Congressmen Allen J. Ellender and Otto E. Passman, and Governor George C. 
Wallace, we can see a conservative coalition that cohered not just over domestic concerns, but 
over the intersection between the domestic and international, in this case race and how it is 
connected to socio-economic status and global political participation. The language Castle and 
his congressional allies used hinted at the “color blind language” that conservatives would coopt 
in the late 1960s-1980s in which calls for racial equality and economic justice were met with 
claims of special interests and the “tyranny of the minority” at the cost of “the majority.” The 
inclusion of foreign aid in this discussion demonstrates that the attempts of conservatives to use 
“color blind language” to deny racially progressive policies happened far earlier than previously 
suggested.330 Segregationist efforts to maintain white supremacy were tied to an international 
vision that rested on nationalistic and unilateral strategies to exercise American hegemony 
around the world by opposing liberal internationalism and multilateralism on the basis of their 
antiracist ideals. Castle, Passman, Ellender, and Wallace attempted to forge this link between 
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international and domestic politics during the early 1960s. Their efforts represent the first 
iterations of a rhetoric that merged foreign aid with prevailing racial stereotypes, a rhetoric that 
would eventually resonated with a national audience. 
This chapter argues that southern Democrats feared the extent to which foreign aid and 
liberal development philosophy might become entrenched during the Kennedy administration, 
and that they began to graft domestic racial ideologies onto their demands for fiscal 
conservatism. Initially, the language that segregationists used to combat foreign aid spoke to 
their regional political culture. Segregationists thought the position of the United States abroad 
was weakening and catering to the demands of the Third World. Meanwhile, domestically, the 
civil rights movement farther eroded their racialized vision of American citizenship and society. 
Southern politicians such as Allen J. Ellender, Otto Passman, and George C. Wallace began to 
use foreign aid as a symbol of the same political philosophy that promoted civil rights at home: 
unchecked liberalism. As a key foreign policy item for liberals, development aid represented an 
easy target for segregationists to attach domestic racial meanings to as they faced increased 
attacks and militancy from African Americans and their allies on southern political and 
economic power. Furthermore, segregationists also recognized that many of the nationalist 
movements abroad, which threatened to undermine America’s Cold War superiority over the 
Soviet Union, inspired civil rights leaders in the United States.331 For segregationists, the civil 
rights movement and Third World nationalism were one and the same and both threatened 
American democracy at home and hegemony abroad.  
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For Castle and his ilk, foreign aid was a symbol of liberal efforts to accommodate and 
control rapidly changing racial hierarchies at home and abroad; therefore, for southern 
Democrats, fighting it represented an opportunity to entrench their power under the disguise of 
nationalistic, unilateral rhetoric regarding foreign policy, imbuing foreign aid with a proxy racial 
symbolism. We can see their response unfold by first examining the Kennedy administration’s 
foreign aid policy, studying the opposition of Louisiana Senator Allen Ellender’s to Kennedy’s 
foreign aid program, and moving beyond the halls of Congress to explore the amplified rhetoric 
of Alabama Governor George C. Wallace as he increasingly connected foreign aid to the civil 
rights standoffs of the early 1960s in the South. The chapter will then move on to a brief 
discussion of conservative media and the purchase foreign aid gained as a way to appeal to 
popular fears about liberalism. Finally, the chapter concluded with discussion of Representative 
Otto E. Passman and his crusade against foreign aid appropriations. The efforts of people like 
Ellender, Passman, and Wallace laid the foundation for a conservative internationalism that 
rested on segregationist efforts to maintain domestic and international power via unilateral, 
nationalistic, and white supremacist foreign policy.  
 
“The Civil and Economic Rights Essential to the Human Dignity of All Men”: The 
Kennedy Administration, Modernization, and the Restructuring of Foreign Aid 
 
Dying of a “long illness” on February 9, 1960 at the age of 62, Castle did not live to see 
the impact of his efforts in his 1959 postscript, the outcome of the 1960 presidential election, and 
future debates over foreign aid. He did not achieve his objectives, as one of President John F. 
Kennedy’s first priorities was to redesign foreign aid and orient it towards long-term 
commitments. Meanwhile, members of Congress who agreed with, encouraged, and listened to 
Castle’s arguments only grew more emboldened in their attempts to maintain social, economic, 
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and political racial meanings as they saw segregation attacked at home and modernization 
promoted abroad.332 In the context of what appeared to be a breakdown of an effective foreign 
policy in the waning days of the Eisenhower administration, Kennedy saw modernization as a 
way to close what he called the “economic gap” in developing countries while at the same time 
providing policymakers a method of containing the growing number of revolutionaries in former 
European colonies.333 
The 1960 presidential election was one of the closest in U.S. history. Senator John F. 
Kennedy from Massachusetts narrowly beat Vice President Richard M. Nixon by winning 303 
Electoral College votes to Nixon’s 219. Looking at the popular vote reveals a much closer 
election than the Electoral College initially suggests. Kennedy won 34,220,984 votes to Nixon’s 
34,108,157. Still, despite the close presidential election, Kennedy came into office with a 
favorable Democratic Congress, and he sought to capitalize on this by presenting an aggressive 
agenda that would establish his leadership and usher in the domestic and foreign policy vision of 
his “New Frontier.” Even more than domestic policy, Kennedy wanted to create a presidential 
legacy that revolved around foreign policy.  
Foreign aid, specifically to the Third World, was a crucial part of this agenda. During the 
1960 election he claimed that the there was an “economic gap” in “world development” that was 
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just as harmful for America’s global position as the “missile gap.”334 Kennedy feared falling 
behind the Soviet Union in developing the newly emerging nations. Yet, his support of 
development was not just political maneuvering to counter the Republicans, he and his advisors 
were truly concerned about the Soviet Union winning over the Third World due to the rapid pace 
of decolonization, the official establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, and a shift in Soviet 
policy.335 Kennedy’s concern over development was not a new phenomenon. As a Senator he 
was often most vocal on foreign aid issues.336 
Kennedy’s interest in developing the Third World was also connected to changing 
domestic dynamics as the civil rights movement accelerated. His increased focus on 
development aid represented an opportunity to win hearts at home and abroad. By most accounts, 
as Kennedy was running for president and later preparing to take the oath of office he did not 
have intentions of making civil rights reform a priority.337 Still, Kennedy recognized that the 
African American vote in the election was too important to ignore while at the same time he did 
not want to lose the southern Democratic votes. He therefore used his record of supporting 
African independence as a means to win African American votes without isolating 
southerners.338 
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In detailing his “New Frontier” vision, Kennedy connected domestic and international 
policies not only on the topic of African independence but in development aid. Although his 
1960 Democratic National Convention speech in which he accepted the Democratic nomination 
for president is mostly remembered for his declaration of the New Frontier where he called a 
new generation to mobilize as “pioneers,” he began his acceptance by expressing his approval of 
the Democratic platform. He stated, “‘The Rights of Man’—the civil and economic rights 
essential to the dignity of all men—are indeed our goal and our first principles. This is a Platform 
on which I can run with enthusiasm and conviction.”339 His connection of economic rights to 
civil rights highlighted a liberal agenda that moved beyond equality of all before the law and 
brought questions of economic justice into the equation, a strategy that liberal Democrats had 
used since Franklin D. Roosevelt. The fact that this message, as Kennedy presented it to the 
American public in 1960, spoke to universal rights highlighted that development abroad could be 
associated with the same agenda that promoted civil rights reform at home, providing fuel of 
segregationists to oppose foreign aid based on its connection to the expanding civil rights 
movement at home.  
As Kennedy prepared to take the oath of office, development seemed to take on new 
urgency as the Soviet Union launched an important aid endeavor. On January 6, 1961, Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave a decisive speech on the Soviet role in the Third World. He 
declared that it was the “historical mission” of world communism to aid “war of national 
liberation” and end colonialism.340 According to presidential historian Robert Dallek, Kennedy 
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took this speech quite seriously, often reading it to friends over dinner and, on occasion, by 
himself in the Oval Office.341  
On January 20, 1961 Kennedy had an opportunity to respond to Khrushchev’s declaration 
of support of Third World nationalists with his inaugural address. Regarding aid, he reaffirmed 
to “those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins” were shared with the United States that 
they would continue to receive aid. At the same time he pledged support for former colonies. 
Referencing the Soviet Union, he promised that colonialism would not be “replaced by a more 
iron tyranny.” He then assured the nations of the periphery that the United States would help 
“people in the huts and villages” around the world “help themselves.” He ambitiously stated the 
importance of development in asserting that the United States was poised to “move more than 
half the people of the less-developed nations into self-sustained growth.” Significantly, he 
promised to aid the Third World for “whatever period” was required. Lastly, he attached his 
domestic policy ambitions to an internationalist vision that put the United States on the same 
level as every other nation of the world by declaring, “Finally, whether you are citizens of 
America or citizens of the world ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice 
which we ask of you.”342 His address suggested a global equality of all people.  
Kennedy’s goal in proposing a new foreign aid program was to create better organization 
and combat instability within the bureaucracy of foreign aid. He proposed a “new set of basic 
concepts and principles to the foreign aid program.” Among the new basic concepts were: a 
multilateral approach that would complement efforts by other industrialized nations, a new 
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agency, and a separation of military assistance from social and economic development.343 The 
goal of this was to design a bureaucracy that could effectively carry out modernization. Along 
with reorganizing the way the government organized foreign aid, Kennedy eventually was able 
to launch a number of key aid ventures with the Alliance for Progress for Latin America, aid to 
independent African countries, and he put pressure on governments in Western European and 
Japan to also send aid abroad.344 
Modernization theory, which promised to universalize economic growth and political 
development, was important to how Kennedy wanted to restructure foreign aid around the 
concept of development. Aid under Kennedy was not just humanitarian or emergency aid. 
Instead, Kennedy listened to social scientists and advisors like Walt W. Rostow, who argued that 
modernization could be produced and controlled, which would lead to thriving economies and 
democracies. These social scientists claimed that certain sets of conditions would lead to these 
desired political and economic results, and those conditions could be replicated around the 
world.345 Such a theory was explicitly anti-racist in the sense that Kennedy and his advisors 
thought that the political and economic development was rooted not in innate abilities, but 
instead could be taught and even accelerated. Another influential social scientist, the Swedish 
anti-racist activist Gunnar Myrdal, described foreign aid as a type of international welfare system 
that would help redistribute opportunities for wealth and create equality.346 These were among 
the academic suggestions that help create the liberal development model with which Kennedy 
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and his administration hoped to remake the world. Liberal development under Kennedy became 
the goal of foreign aid and it reflected an effort by the administration to promote political, social, 
and economic equality at overseas and at home, all of which the administration believed would 
help fight the Cold War. In practice, race was never far from development, and its lofty antiracist 
objectives were rarely achieved.347 
 For the Kennedy administration, a key part of reforming foreign aid was to rehabilitate its 
image. Kennedy and his officials sought to control the message of foreign aid. Edwin R. Bayley, 
Director of the Information Staff sent from letters to newspaper editors offering to send “factual 
reports on the activities” of the programs. Including announcements of new loans, grants or 
technical assistance program, personnel appointments, official reports, among a number of other 
items.348 The information staff also monitored what types of pamphlets had been distributed by 
various agencies. In another report, Bayley prepared a guide to what various media outlets were 
saying about foreign aid.349  
The administration was facing an uphill battle, though, as the meaning of foreign aid had 
become so muddled. Bayley wrote to another staff member, “By now, you can’t make it clear 
what you’re talking about if you say anything but ‘foreign aid,’ although we try to steer clear of 
those words.”350 The staffer Bayley communicated with was particularly concerned with the 
disappearance of the name “Mutual Security.” He wrote, “Who the hell can try to defend foreign 
aid to the old folks waiting for medicare or the young folks who are going to foot the bill for 
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both? ...Words, words, words…..such important words.”351 By expanding foreign aid beyond 
simply fighting communism and turning it into a larger social project that attempted to remake 
racial hierarchies around the world, the Kennedy rebranding and repurposing of foreign aid made 
it easier to attach domestic political issues to it, turning it into a symbol of equality for some and 
resentment for others.  
Civil rights became one area that the administration saw an obvious international 
connection to development abroad. One example of how domestic and international development 
intersected was in the form of students coming to the United States to study. Although not a 
direct or official form of foreign aid, the administration tracked them and recognized the 
symbolism they had in a larger context of a rapidly changing global racial hierarchy at home and 
abroad.352 From the outset, the arrival of large numbers of African students became part of the 
political discourse of race, the Cold War, and African liberation. Kennedy saw it as an 
opportunity to win hearts and minds at home and abroad, tying issues of international and 
domestic race together with political symbolism. Much like he did in the campaign, Kennedy 
used foreign aid and decolonization as proxy topics to endear African Americans and other 
minorities to him politically.  
By tying civil rights, African liberation, the Cold War together under the premise of 
liberal development, Kennedy also helped provide the opposition with a political symbol they 
could attack. This was especially the case with southern segregationists who opposed civil rights 
and saw foreign aid as a global version of the civil rights platform at home. Yet, there was still 
an element of party loyalty for southern democrats, and they did not completely abandon support 
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of the Democratic Party’s policy initiatives. Charles Lerche observed, “The only year after 1957 
in which the South did not show its opposition to foreign aid in unequivocal terms was 1961. In 
that first year of the New Frontier, President Kennedy was in the first flush of his honeymoon 
with Congress and the people and was determined to establish the primacy of his leadership 
beyond question.”353 In an effort to counter the growing opposition to foreign aid that was 
coming from southern Democrats in the 1950s, Kennedy highlighted the bipartisan history of 
recent foreign aid programs under Truman and Eisenhower. It was only because of Kennedy’s 
effort to rally Congressional support that foreign aid appeared to regain popularity among 
southern segregationists in 1961 despite the liberalization of it under modernization theory and 
development aid. Already by 1962, the disappearing consensus around foreign aid returned with 
calls from the halls of Congress that the United States were not responsible for correcting the 
results of European colonialism and that aid had proven itself to be wasteful and unrealistic.354 
Still, this strategy also worked against Kennedy once he was in office in a way that 
historians have largely ignored. The manner in which Kennedy was able to win African 
American votes by exploiting foreign policy regarding African independence also allowed 
Southern segregationists to use foreign policy as part of the same fight against civil rights reform 
at home. As Kennedy saw civil rights and African independence connected, so too did 
segregationists, who started to break from the consensus around Cold War foreign policy that 
had existed during the early post-World War II years. Development aid in particular represented 
a terrain that both liberals and segregationist could project their competing domestic and 
international visions on.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1964), 62.   
354 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 71.  
	   160	  
 
“I Have Yet to See Any Part of Africa Where Africans are Ready for Self-Government:” 
Senator Ellender Goes to Africa 
 
 After the establishment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 one incident demonstrates 
the way in which domestic and foreign policy became intertwined at the site of foreign aid 
policy, making foreign aid a symbol of domestic civil rights. Much like his previous world tours, 
Senator Allen J. Ellender embarked in late 1962 as a member of the Senate’s Appropriations 
Committee to evaluate AID activities abroad for three months.355 During this particular trip, 
Ellender spent his time traveling and attending meetings throughout the African continent. On 
December 2, 1962, word came back to the United States via the press that Ellender had managed 
to insult newly independent African leaders, stating at a stop in Salisbury, Rhodesia, that he 
opposed grants to African nations because in the 23 African countries he visited he had not seen 
a competent government or one where capability for one existed.356 He observed that Africans 
had not made “the least bit of progress on their own.”357 He had essentially suggested that 
Africans could not advance without European intervention. The fact that he made these remarks 
in Rhodesia, a British colony whose white minority was fighting the tide of decolonization 
amplified the significance of his comments. 
Ellender’s remarks were not new or out of character for him. And, his statements were 
not front-page news in the United States. They echoed his previous sentiments regarding 
Africans and their ability to govern themselves, and reiterated his neocolonial scheme to have 
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Europe rebuild itself after World War II using Third World colonies as a resource bank.358 Still, 
the State Department, headed by Dean Rusk, immediately started damage control by distancing 
themselves from Ellender because the remarks undermined Kennedy’s domestic and 
international policies.359 Meanwhile, his diplomatic blunder was evident by the fact that his trip 
itself was put into flux, as the Ugandan government denounced him as a “prejudice 
segregationist” and “prohibited immigrant.” Tanganyika and Ethiopia also prohibited Ellender’s 
entry into their countries.360 
 Having gained admittance for a brief meeting with the American Consul General and 
other American officials in Nairobi, Kenya, Ellender issued a non-apology regarding his 
remarks. He said the African press had taken his words out of context to suggest that he did not 
approve of independence for African countries. Still his clarification did not necessarily acquit 
the implications of what he said. His statement explained, “I feel each independent nation should 
have an economic base strong enough in both natural and human resources to allow it to be 
genuinely free. Once again, I wish to emphasize that my statements are my own personal views 
and should not be considered to express the position of my Government.”361 Ellender’s focus on 
building a strong economic base in Africa reflected his tenuous support of technical assistance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 See chapters 1 and 2 for more on Ellender’s previous world tours and views on colonialism. “Ellender’s Blast At 
Africa Embarrassing But JFK Needs Him,” Chicago Defender, 8 December 1962, 5.  
359 Telegram to the Secretary of State, 3 December 1963, Box 3, Folder Africa, General (11/62-12/62), Papers of 
President Kennedy, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; Edward R. Murrow, 
Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, 5 December 1962, Box 3, Folder Africa, General (11/62-12/62), Papers of 
President Kennedy, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; State Department Telegram, 5 
December 1962, Box 3, Folder Africa, General (11-62-12/62), Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, 
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; “Press Statement to be distributed by White House,” Box 3, Folder Africa, 
General (11/62-12/62), Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, 
MA.  
360 “Louisiana Senator Barred From Uganda After Being Accused of Fanning Racial Hatred in Africa,” Atlanta 
Daily World, 4 December 1962, 1; “Sen. Ellender Refused Entry by Tanganyika,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 5 
December 1962, 7; “Ethiopia Bars Dixie Senator,” Chicago Daily Defender, 6 December 1962, 1.  
361 Allen J. Ellender, “Statement Made by U.S. Senator Allen Ellender Upon His Departure from Nairobi on 
December 8th, 1962,” Box 1572, Folder Unclassified Briefing Book—Trip to Africa 1962, Allen J. Ellender Papers, 
Nicholls State University Archives, Thibodaux, LA. 
	   162	  
His field notes reveal that he truly thought that if the United States was going to give aid to 
African nations it should not be in the form of direct funds but rather technical assistance or 
loans.362 Ellender’s insistence on technical assistance as opposed to direct loans aligned with his 
neocolonial vision for Africa.  
Furthermore, Ellender’s actual words also revealed his efforts to maintain some brand of 
colonial exploitation in Africa. Regarding the incident he wrote, “I did say that the average 
African leader (I mean among the blacks) is incapable of leadership except through the 
assistance of Europeans…I also stated that if there are any areas of Africa where the natives have 
built a community of their own by the use of mortar and brick, or where they have established a 
manufacturing community to build up an economy on their own, I have yet to find that 
community.” Ellender went on to cite the problems facing the Congo at the time, placing blame 
on the large “black” population, and named the Republic of South Africa as a place “where the 
Europeans have established as fine a community that exists in any part of Africa.” Ellender 
argued that turning South Africa over to majority rule would result in another Congo.363 His 
comments reinforced the opposition’s vision about foreign aid that those receiving the money 
were incapable of utilizing it properly for development. The key signifier of their incapability to 
Ellender was their non-European descent. 
 In his briefing notes on his trip, Ellender elaborated on the idea that African leaders were 
incapable of governing, building an even stronger case for his argument that foreign aid was 
going to corrupt and lesser governments. After trying to deflect attention away from his 
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comments without retracting them, Ellender infantilized African leaders. He accused African 
leaders of being overly sensitive. He suggested that they were politically inept due to their 
inability to accept the truth and take criticism, or as he put it, “their political skins are too 
tender.”364 Ellender’s allegation was that if the African governments could not handle criticism, 
they were too politically immature to properly spend and put to good use American loans and 
aid. Therefore, as a fiscal conservative, Ellender painted a picture of development aid as wasteful 
government spending, while simultaneously interweaving racist tropes into his opposition to 
foreign aid. Suggesting continued European intervention in the region reinforced old colonial 
state models and undermined liberal development theories that were a cornerstone of Kennedy’s 
foreign policy during these crucial years of the Cold War.  
He carried his line of argument further by tying it more directly to what he viewed as 
political inability among African leaders and corruption. Continued foreign aid would only feed 
that corruption if unchecked, Ellender reasoned. He reported that the new African nations were 
full of weak politicians and leaders who took advantage of the United States government’s 
foreign aid generosity. Ellender thought American generosity would result in the leaders of these 
new nations trying to get aid from whomever they could. The new nations would then blindly 
follow the donor nation no matter the principles involved. He even went so far as to suggest that 
certain leaders had created some of the new nations for the sole purpose of receiving “handouts,” 
all of which threatened and eroded the purpose of the United Nations because he thought African 
nations were essentially selling their voting in the organization to the highest bidder.365 Thus, in 
addition to being incapable of ruling themselves without European support, in accepting foreign 
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aid African leaders were morally weak and corrupt. Their corruption undermined the 
internationalist ideals of the UN. In his 1962 world tour, Ellender’s comments demonstrate the 
way he had redoubled his efforts in crafting an image of corruption and inability around foreign 
aid and refining his attack against internationalism.  
 Even though Ellender had not directly mentioned civil rights in his controversial remarks 
on the capabilities of African leadership, his record and previous comments on both foreign aid 
and civil rights made the implication clear to the larger American public, no matter his 
intentions. The American press, in particular, demonstrated one way in which the symbolism of 
foreign aid, that segregationists from the 1950s had laid the groundwork for, had taken hold 
domestically. Rather than simply ignoring the remarks that were not all that new from Ellender, 
the importance his comments had for Kennedy’s foreign affairs dubbed them newsworthy and all 
major newspapers carried the story. One paper, the liberal New York Post, did not hesitate to 
make a clear connection between the fallout for Ellender and domestic civil rights.366 In sarcastic 
commentary the Post reported, “We sympathize with Senator Ellender (Democrat-Louisiana) in 
his hours of exclusion from African territory. He is clearly the victim of discrimination. Perhaps 
he should demand a rider to the foreign aid bill requiring recipient African nations to accept their 
quota of visiting segregationist Southern Senators.”367  
Ellender’s reaction to the newspaper’s comments demonstrates how deeply he clung to 
segregation as an accepted and benign way of life that should be devoid of federal government 
interference. The Senator took great offense to this and accused the author of being an “ardent 
integrationist.” He defended himself and the American South, arguing that southerners would not 
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hesitate to help African Americans when in need. In a futile attempt to disconnect his views on 
foreign aid and civil rights he lamented, “It is a great tragedy that the Negro issue has become so 
involved in politics.”368 To Ellender, segregation was a matter decided by individual states, and 
the Supreme Court, Congress, and the President were politicizing the issue and overstepping 
their jurisdiction. The fact that international influence now also dictated domestic policies 
regarding segregation only further reinforced Ellender’s fear of eroding racial social structures at 
the hands of internationalist political ambitions.    
 Ellender’s comments aligned with a vision of American exceptionalism and citizenship 
wherein people with a common skin color defined the nation’s character and had the right to 
participate in politics. Ellender and his segregationist colleagues shared in this belief that fitness 
for self-government was a uniquely American characteristic that was inherited from an Anglo-
Saxon lineage.369 Ellender’s repeated critiques of African self-government emphasized that race 
and ability were linked when it came to governance. Development and modernization--as laid 
out by Rostow and his colleagues and put into practice by the Kennedy State Department--were 
ineffective and wasteful because the nations the United States attempted to help did not have the 
American “capacity” for self-government.  
The mainstream African American press also picked up Ellender’s remarks regarding 
Africans and their ability to self-govern, making it clear to the African American public sphere 
that the by insulting Africans he had essentially mounted the same critiques against African 
Americans and their ability to govern and overcome socioeconomic class barriers in the United 
States. In fact, Ellender had essentially grafted his domestic perceptions of African Americans 
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onto Africans, shoring up his southern internationalist vision of the Third World. Jackie 
Robinson wrote in a column in the Chicago Defender that Senator Ellender was wrong for the 
task of evaluating foreign operations in Africa and Asia due to his stance on civil rights.370 The 
Chicago Defender also referred to Ellender in their headlines as the “Dixie Senator,” evoking 
historical memories of the Civil War, or even less ambiguously, the “Racist Senator.”371 The 
Defender also urged Congress to censure Ellender and Kennedy to denounce him.372 In addition, 
the Baltimore Afro-American published a piece that stated that Mississippi Governor Ross 
Barnett’s racist fears over the “mongrelization” of races in the United States were akin to 
Ellender’s discussion of African self-government, despite the fact that Barnett’s statements did 
not mention Africa.373 Major African American presses clearly connected Ellender’s 
segregationists attitudes to his critique of Africans’ inability to effectively self-govern. All of 
which undermined delicate balance between civil rights policy and foreign affairs Kennedy had 
cultivated during his campaign and first years in office.  
 Having successfully pushed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 through Congress with a 
significant amount of support from the south, marking a key moment when a geographic shift in 
the battlegrounds of the Cold War moved to the Third World, Kennedy did not need a setback 
like the publicity that Ellender’s remarks received at home and abroad.374 The State Department 
reported that extremist wings would use Ellender’s statements as a sign of American imperialism 
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and as representative of the Kennedy’s administration’s views.375 Despite an official statement 
from the State Department that made clear that Ellender’s views did not represent official 
American policy towards African nations, the White House continued to receive pressure from 
government officials, senators, and the press to make an official statement. Much of the pressure 
to issue a formal statement came from the fear that Ellender’s comments were harming American 
prestige and trust of America in Africa.376 In addition to reaching out and reassuring individual 
African allies that Ellender’s stance did not represent theirs, the White House drafted a press 
statement. The statement reiterated that Ellender did not speak for the administration, 
emphasizing a shared history of colonial rule between the United States and former African 
colonies.377 Still, the damage Ellender’s comments did to the image of foreign aid abroad was 
done, and were firmly rooted in domestic concerns over racial hierarchies as well as global ones. 
 In addition to causing alarm in the Kennedy administration, Ellender’s comments 
exacerbated the regionalism inherent in domestic and international politics. Increasingly, 
Southerners like Ellender felt that the South was unfairly singled out for segregation. 
Cooperating with the State Department’s larger effort to disavow Ellender’s statement, 
Representative Barratt O’Hara, a Democrat from Illinois, held a press conference. Given his 
African American constituency, political necessity dictated that O’Hara publically disavow his 
Democratic colleague. O’ Hara declared, “What the senator said has hurt us very much in 
Africa...The senator was expressing a personal, regional feeling. He was expressing the 
sentiment of his constituency…If a man comes from Louisiana, where there is a race question, 
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he may not be as careful of what he says as he would if he came from somewhere else.”378 
O’Hara unmistakably saw Ellender and his constituency as connecting African aid to civil rights 
in the United States, causing harm to American foreign policy. O’Hara interpreted that to 
criticize African leadership stemmed directly from Ellender’s domestic and regional views. 
Ellender responded to this generalized critique of the South by suggesting that the South was 
capable of dealing with inequality on its own without interference from the federal 
government.379 Ellender’s defense of the South made it clear to his constituents that liberalism in 
the federal government was to blame for eroding race relations in the South and around the world 
because they interfered in Southern affairs.  
 Within a matter of weeks the press forgot Ellender’s diplomatic misstep and Kennedy 
and his administration moved on. Ellender and other segregationists, however, had laid the 
groundwork for a perception of foreign aid among the general public that proved strangely 
durable. His constituents read his remarks within their domestic context, relating them to civil 
rights. Responding to Ellender’s repeated utterances of the inability of Africans to self-govern 
and the events of the civil rights movement in the spring of 1963 one constituent, Clarence 
Yancey, wrote to Ellender to commend him for his stance concerning “negro nations.” The letter 
continued by blaming “liberal do-gooders” and the government for “pouring money into Africa. 
Meanwhile, regarding events at home Yancey argued that civil rights demonstrations were doing 
more harm for African Americans than good. In his worldview African Americans were not a 
part of the “American life” and they had to collectively earn their way by developing their own 
businesses and industry as opposed to “trying to be like the white man and stop trying to force 
himself upon the whites.” Yancey concluded that African Americans were better off than others 
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“of his race in the world” because they had inherited the white-American civilization.380 
Yancey’s belief in the benefits of white civilization reflected Ellender’s own opinions regarding 
the benefits of European rule in Africa.381 
Recognizing the precarious position resistance to civil rights had on American image 
around the world, Yancey suggested the solution was for African Americans to leave for Africa 
rather than continue to raise attention regarding discrimination in the United States. He reasoned 
that African Americans would not leave though because they wanted to “continue to enjoy the 
fruits of the ingenuity of the white man.”382 Yancey made it quite clear that African Americans 
were not part American citizens in the same sense that whites were and connected his domestic 
opinion to the question of global racial hierarchies in suggesting they should return to Africa. For 
Yancey, foreign aid to Africa and civil rights at home were one and the same.  
 Ellender only reinforced and fed the connection that there was a liberal agenda at home 
and abroad that threatened traditional social structures in the South in his form letter response he 
sent to Yancey and other concerned constituents. First, he sent Yancey a broadcast that detailed 
his views on African self-government and echoed his 1962 world trip comments. He continued 
by addressing “this thing which the liberals continue to refer to as ‘civil rights’ battles.” He 
reassured Yancey that he thought the “pendulum” would swing in the opposite direction soon 
and that “the threats of violence to white people by irresponsible Negro leaders will, in my 
judgment, strengthen our cause.”383 The accusation of African American violence against the 
southern white population echoed his report from his 1962 trip regarding the Congo in which he 
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accused the majority black population of being violent towards the Belgians, proving that the 
United States government officials were “saps” for continuing to finance development programs 
in the Congo due to the inability of the Congolese to self-govern.384 His comments regarding 
violence at home and abroad foreshadowed his growing obsession with African American crime 
across the South, which other conservatives would also adopt as a surrogate for attacking civil 
rights during the 1970s and 1980s.  
Ellender’s preoccupation with crime at home and violence abroad against white 
populations emboldened his desire for maintaining the global racial status quo due to the chaos 
segregationists like him saw it bringing.  Another constituent did not need Elllender to make any 
direct comparisons between civil rights and events in the Congo for them. A constituent, W. M. 
Hallack wrote to Ellender, “The Kennedy dynasty and their cohorts are prodding, agitating and 
financing the American negro to rape the United States as the Congo negroes raped the Province 
of Katanga…The majority of American people are tired of the Kennedy clan and their New 
Frontier of socialism and communism and exploitation of the negro race for their vote.”385 The 
political story Ellender had been telling regarding foreign aid had filtered down to his 
constituents who related violence in Africa to their shifting racial landscape at home. For many 
the blame belonged to Kennedy. Like Ellender’s defense of his remarks in Rhodesia where he 
suggested race was just a political scheme, Hallack saw civil rights as nothing more than a liberal 
political ploy that threatened to turn the United States into another Congo by inciting racial 
tensions. 
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Even more significantly, in the form letter, Ellender accused his fellow members of 
Congress of being unconcerned with what he labeled “super-citizenship by certain Negro 
groups.”386 Ellender did not elaborate on what exactly he meant by “super-citizenship.” 
However, given the context of the letter to Yancey and others who received similar responses 
from Ellender, super-citizenship indicates that Ellender thought civil rights groups were 
positioning themselves above the law and that his liberal colleagues were allowing it to happen. 
In terms of the growing civil rights movement and revolutions abroad, Ellender’s concern over 
super-citizenship demonstrates the way in which segregationists clung to the status quo and 
feared a rapidly evolving racial landscape at home and abroad by continuing to deny citizenship 
and a voice to racial minorities in their regions. Although Ellender did not directly reference 
foreign aid when discussing the idea that civil rights groups were practicing “super-citizenship,” 
the letter focused on opposition to both foreign aid and civil rights. In addition, when 
contextualized within the historical period of civil rights and decolonization abroad, a 
constituent--especially one like Yancey who excluded African Americans from the politics and 
history of the country-- could have interpreted Ellender’s usage of “super-citizenship” as a 
critique of African Americans who saw their civil rights struggle as part of the same 
revolutionary movement against colonialism and exploitation in the Third World.387 
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In 1963, as foreign aid increased abroad and the civil rights movement accelerated at 
home Ellender did not censor himself, rather he seemed to reiterate and highlight the connection 
he saw between civil rights at home and foreign aid even more. In a television debate in mid-
June 1963, following the Birmingham campaign in the spring, Ellender echoed the same remarks 
that also frequently found their way into the form letters he sent to constituents who had written 
to him concerning both civil rights and foreign aid. In the debate he declared that Liberia, 
Ethiopia, and Haiti were all “black” nations that had failed at governance. Ellender continued to 
reinforce his perception of African nations and implied that African Americans had similar 
ineffectiveness for political representation with a form letter he frequently replied to inquiries 
regarding solely the topic of civil rights. He began his letter by pointing out that he grew up with 
African Americans and never had a problem with them, but now many were following the civil 
rights leaders who wanted integration. The results of integration, Ellender argued would be inter-
marrying and “social equality in every respect,” clearly emphasizing his efforts to maintain white 
social and economic power.388 He continued in the letter to argue against integration at home by 
citing foreign operations as evidence.  
Ellender implied, without directly stating it, that African misgovernment and American 
foreign aid support of it was an example of the inability of African Americans to fully participate 
in American governance and seek social equality. In his civil rights form letter, having made the 
case that integration would lead to intermarriage and crime, he continued by establishing that the 
South was not the only part of the country with segregation and discrimination laws. Then, he 
claimed that African Americans in D.C. obtained their jobs, in many instances, because of their 
race rather than their abilities. Without making a clear transition, Ellender then abruptly writes, 
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“I have visited every country in this world except Albania. Of all countries in the world only 
Ethiopia, Haiti and Liberia have been governed for many years by Negroes—Ethiopia for over 
two thousand years, Liberia and Haiti for well over a hundred years—and those three countries 
are, in my opinion, the most ineptly governed in the world. Again I ask, why?”389 Ellender does 
not answer his own question, but the rhetorical nature of it when coupled with the previous 
statements of unfair preference given to minorities in the nation’s capital, the message to his 
constituents regarding civil rights and foreign affairs was that they were one in the same in 
propping up (as opposed to developing) undeserving people.  
Several months later, in September 1963, Ellender made his argument more clearly by 
continuing to connect African Americans and Africans “self-government” capabilities. He stated 
on a D.C. area TV program that African Americans “in the past [have learned] to depend on the 
whites and not themselves,” adding that they “are somewhat like their ancestors.” At which point 
he continued to repeat his remarks from December about Africans and their inability to self-
govern.390 These were the same views that he had used in his form letters and earlier in the 
summer of 1963 when he described what African American governance would looked like. 
Using Washington D.C. as an example, Ellender also suggested once again that violence 
and crime were markers of African Americans and their inability to govern and participate in the 
politics, all in the context of repeating his remarks regarding Africa from December. In a TV 
debate with Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York, Ellender professed, “This great city is a 
cesspool, as far as crime is concerned.” He continued saying that 56 percent of the population of 
D.C. was African American and that they controlled the schools. He said that 85 percent of 
schools were occupied by African Americans and had awful conditions. Ellender reasoned, “To 
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me that simply shows their inability to govern.” He then proceeded to reiterate his December 
world tour comments about African self-government, effectively tying the lack of success 
regarding civil rights and foreign aid together.391 During the early years of the 1960s Ellender 
continued to use similar remarks in the press and when composing responses to constituents’ 
concerns over civil rights and foreign aid.392  
Ellender connected the two and used them interchangeably as a way to attack liberalism 
and maintain racial hierarchies at home and abroad. Conservatives would easily adopt Ellender’s 
fascination with crime rates and relation to African Americans in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
looking to its connection to international politics during these early years provides a broader 
understanding of the origins of the coded racism of the 1980s with regards to urban crime rates.  
Ellender’s repeated comments on TV in mid-1963 resulted in the Kennedy State 
Department having to once again deal with the fallout both domestically and internationally. 
Ellender’s comments resulted in a delegation of African diplomats calling for Kennedy to 
disavow Ellender’s statements.393 A State Department memo detailed the message the protesting 
diplomats had over Ellender’s comments in June of 1963. They referred to his words as 
“deliberate and repeated attacks…on the peoples, and Governments of Africa” and were 
concerned over the lack of action taken by the Executive Branch over the remarks. Significantly, 
they saw no useful purpose to the attacks since all of the nations protesting were on friendly 
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terms with the United States. They therefore concluded, “It seems that the distinguished Senator 
is launching such unfortunate attacks on Africa in order to help justify his support of racial 
discrimination.”394 The African diplomats could not ignore the domestic context of Ellender’s 
remarks, and they recognized the symbolism that Africa, and therefore foreign aid policy 
towards Africa, had in the context of the South in the early 1960s. Still, despite the renewed 
diplomatic problems that Ellender’s comments once again sparked, Kennedy and the State 
Department choose not to directly address them. Instead, they focused their public relations on 
the larger connection between civil rights and American prestige and foreign policy, rather than 
dealing with Ellender directly.  
For his part, Ellender did not back down and continued to reinforce a vision of America 
that largely excluded African Americans from participating in civic life and that fought the 
liberal agenda. Throughout June and July of 1963, Ellender exchanged letters with Dr. Walker 
Percy. The debate between the two involved Ellender’s comments about Africans and African 
Americans. Percy wrote to inform Ellender that the Senator was wrong to filibuster the civil 
rights bill that was before the legislature. Ellender responded with his standard reasoning of 
African American violence and crime, government meddling in local affairs, and of course his 
unprovoked observations about leadership in Ethiopia, Liberia, and Haiti.395 Unlike other 
constituents who had written to Ellender, Percy was baffled by the inclusion of Ethiopia, Liberia, 
and Haiti as rationale for gradualism in civil rights legislation. He replied to the senator, “It is 
just that I cannot understand the main premise of your position. Whatever the Negro’s 
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performance in Liberia or Haiti, the fact is that the Negro is in our country, through no doing of 
his own, but because his ancestors were brought here as slaves. He is now an American citizen 
like you and me, and entitled to the rights and privileges guaranteed him under the 
Constitution.”396 Once again Ellender’s only response was to reiterate his previous arguments 
and send Percy his field reports from his world tour to Africa.397 In all of these exchanges, 
Ellender never clearly articulated why he cited his observations about Africa in the context of 
engaging in a debate over domestic civil rights, but the inclusion of the comments as evidence 
implied that Ellender saw foreign aid to Africa and civil rights legislation as one part of the same 
policy that was eroding the white middle class at home and American power abroad. Ellender 
argued and attacked liberal internationalism as embodied in development aid as the instigator.  
Senator Ellender’s repetitive attacks on foreign aid to Africa and his segregationist views 
at home in 1963 were exceptionally problematic due to the events of the civil rights movement 
that were happening simultaneously. Along with Ellender’s form letters and repetition of his 
remarks regarding Africans and African Americans ability to effectively govern themselves or 
participate in governance, as the civil rights movement accelerated past the Montgomery bus 
boycotts, the sit-ins, and freedom riders foreign aid became more pronounced in the civil rights 
battle and garnered more attention through the charismatic mouthpiece for segregationists, 
George Wallace. The events in Alabama in 1963 became both a domestic and international 
flashpoint in the efforts of activists and the federal government to combat the hypocrisy between 
the declared American ideals and those practiced. George Wallace’s brand of segregation in 
Alabama therefore provides a window into the way foreign aid became a symbol for 
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segregationists to attack, and therefore an important step in building a conservative 
internationalist counter to internationalism.  
 
“The Washington Do-Gooders are always telling us that everything we do will affect our 
‘image’ overseas”: George C. Wallace, Segregationists, and the Co-Opting of Foreign Aid 
to Combat Civil Rights  
 
In the spring of 1963, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s (SCLC) campaign 
to challenge and publicize segregation in Birmingham, Alabama culminated with Bull Connor’s 
police force brutally attacking African American youth. The stories and images of the “children’s 
campaign” made their way into the press around the world. The Soviet paper, Pravda, published 
a cartoon of police intimidating a black child, and “the Birmingham story was told in many 
languages.”398 Federal officials worried such publicity would harm America’s image in the midst 
of tension with the Soviet Union. The United States promoted itself as the leader of the free 
world, but racial tensions at home made many around the globe question the American definition 
of freedom and equality. As a response, the federal government engaged in a sustained public 
relations campaign to tell a specific story about race and American democracy. Government 
officials acknowledged that the American racial situation was not perfect, but had improved. The 
official position held that democracy, not communism, provided the vehicle through which social 
justice could be achieved, no matter how gradual.399  
In the spring and into the summer months of 1963, President Kennedy, Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk, and officials at USIA solidified their efforts to control the message about American 
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race relations that was being sent abroad.400 While simultaneously running damage control 
regarding Ellender’s diplomatic blunders, the State Department also dealt with broader issues 
relating to the connection between civil rights and foreign policy during the Cold War. They 
reaffirmed the importance of the progressive race story being told.401 A telegram from USIA in 
Africa to the State Department reported, “The most effective force in our favor in Africa is 
action by President Kennedy and [the] Federal government to promote and enforce equal rights.” 
Furthermore, USIA suggested avoiding over-optimism when discussing civil rights to Africans. 
Instead, civil rights developments should be “described as [the] beginning of [a] final great 
process.”402 The USIA’s suggestions to the State Department echoed the official message of the 
Kennedy administration on the issue of public relations with regards to civil rights.  
USIA also reported on the various reactions to Birmingham from around the world, 
demonstrating that newly independent nations were very much concerned about racial issues in 
the United States. One such example was an open letter composed to Kennedy by independent 
African states gathered at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference on May 21, 1963. The open 
letter connected the American situation to colonialism, stating that colonialism and race 
discrimination were “the fundamental issues for the future of civilization.” It also pointed out the 
basic paradox in the United States’ domestic situation and its global image. The foreign ministers 
at the conference had condemned places like South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia, 
while pointing out the United States had acted no differently in Birmingham. Recognizing the 
core issue the letter argued, “The only offences which these people have committed are that they 
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are black and that they have demanded the right to be free and to hold their heads up as equal 
citizens of the United States.”403 Diplomatically, because Kennedy and Rusk were concerned 
with disassociating the US from imperialism and the racial status quo, Birmingham undermined 
Kennedy’s efforts.  
In early June, Kennedy and his advisors were trying to determine how best to broach the 
topic of the American image abroad regarding civil rights. Among the suggestions was an all-out 
civil rights public relations campaign that would send summaries of Federal civil rights action 
and a message on civil rights from the President to the Ambassadors in Africa.404 The draft of the 
telegram that the administration sent to African posts gave detailed information of the imperfect 
racial tensions in the United States, but made it clear that the administration was working to 
rectify the situation.405 The administration also sent a list of accomplishments in civil rights to 
remind African leaders of the progress that the administration had made.406 To back up his 
message, Kennedy sent principal officers in Africa a summary of his civil rights message in June 
1963, explaining how he was asking Congress for new civil rights legislation.407 The efforts of 
the administration, State Department, and USIA in distributing a very particular message about 
civil rights speaks to the global significance that American racism had and its perceived 
connection to colonial exploitation in the Third World. 
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Kennedy’s civil rights speech delivered on June 11, 1963 signified a key turning point in 
civil rights at home and was couched in a global framework. Immediately in his speech, 
Kennedy articulated that the ability of any American to consume and attend school where they 
pleased was part of a “worldwide struggle to promote and protect the rights of all who wish to be 
free.” He declared, “We preach freedom around the world, and we mean it, and we cherish our 
freedom here at home, but are we to say to the world…that this is the land of the free except for 
the Negroes; that we have no second-class citizens except Negroes; that we have no class or 
caste system, no ghettoes, no master race except with respect to Negroes?” He emphasized that 
all of these rights along with voting were the rights of American citizenship, highlighting the 
effort to have equality before the law. Like segregationists did in regards to states’ rights, 
Kennedy too aligned his statement as a constitutional right granted to all American citizens. 
Even more threating to segregationists was not just the President’s stance on granting legal 
protection and equality, but that he said race also had no place in American life.408 Such a 
proclamation signaled the federal government’s effort to promote and support a new domestic 
racial dynamic, which segregationists found threatening as they tried to maintain their 
“traditional” American racial landscape.   
Adding insult to injury for segregationists was the global reaction to Kennedy’s civil 
rights address. A USIA report to the President highlighted the overwhelmingly positive reaction 
from key Cold War battlegrounds. The report detailed that Moscow Radio continued to issue 
proclamations against the American “racists and fascists,” whose actions called in the 
“advertised” American way of life and system of capitalism. However, USIA reported that the 
press of major nations in Africa, such as Ghana, Nigeria, Morocco, and others praised Kennedy’s 
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speech.  The press in countries across East Asia and Latin America also reported similar 
praise.409 Kennedy had successfully deflected a domestic and international racial crisis based on 
his speech. He followed his speech by asking Congress for a Civil Rights Bill, which would 
highlight further the official progressive racial story embraced by liberals in their Cold War 
fight. All of which threatened “traditional” American racial social structures, as well as global 
ones.   
 In addition to being representative of the use of symbolism surrounding foreign aid, 
Wallace was also a key figure in planting the roots of the New Right coalition that would come 
to dominate American politics in the 1980s. An important part of this political transformation in 
the United States was the creation of coded language to discuss race. Historian Dan Carter 
concludes that Wallace was the “most influential loser” in the 20th century American politics 
because of his skill in taking his southern segregationist message to the national scene.410 Part of 
this was the ability to tap into international fears as well as domestic ones, especially concerning 
race. He was skilled at turning international events into morality stories about what could happen 
at home if the liberal agenda was allowed to continue. 
Wallace was a key figure in planting the roots of the New Right coalition that came to 
dominate American politics in the 1980s. An important part of this political transformation in the 
United States was the creation of coded language to discuss race. Historian Dan Carter labels 
Wallace was the “most influential loser” in the 20th century American politics because of his skill 
in taking his southern segregationist message to the national scene.411 Part of this was his ability 
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to tap into international fears as well as domestic ones, especially concerning race. During his 
gubernatorial campaign of 1962, Wallace cultivated this technique. Carter argues that he 
“adopted a kind of soft-porn racism in which fear and hatred could be mobilized without 
mentioning race itself.”412 This “soft-porn racism” did not just apply to domestic issues, where 
historians often cite topics like education and busing. International concerns also fit into this 
framework.  
Segregationists clearly did not support the federal government’s progressive racial story 
and felt resentment over the amount of pressure that other nations were putting on the South. 
One way they began to combat attacks from abroad was by integrating foreign aid into the 
debate. When confronted at a press conference with these concerns of international ill-will 
towards the United States regarding the racial protests in Birmingham, Alabama Governor 
George C. Wallace defiantly proclaimed, “It seems that other parts of the world ought to be 
concerned about what we think of them instead of what they think of us. After all, we’re feeding 
most of them and whenever they start rejecting twenty-five cents of each dollar foreign aid 
money that we send to them then I’ll be concerned about their attitude towards us, but until they 
reject that twenty-five cents out of each dollar that southern taxpayers pay of foreign aid to these 
countries I will never be concerned about their attitude.” He continued, “In the first place, the 
average man in Africa and Asia doesn’t even know where he is, much less where Alabama is.”413  
Wallace’s declaration is illustrative of the way in which conservative politicians began to 
build a political fiction and conservative internationalism to counter liberal internationalism. He 
did not just employ isolationist rhetoric and redbaiting—tactics frequently used during the Cold 
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War to discredit civil rights reform—he also inserted foreign aid into the debate414 Echoing 
Ellender’s critiques of Africans and African Americans, he exploited the tense domestic civil 
rights standoff as a platform to attack American foreign policy, specifically the practice of 
foreign aid. In doing so, he not only attacked civil rights, but also the ability of people around the 
world to critique American society, one of the key rationales liberal activists had used since the 
end of World War II to justify legal reforms in civil rights. Wallace’s exaggerated claims of 
foreign aid allowed him to project his domestic stance onto international politics, thereby coding 
international politics with domestic meaning.  
Wallace’s comments over Africans and foreign aid in 1963 ran directly against the 
attitudes of development and internationalism and started to create an alternative vision of the 
role of the United States in the world. In November 1963, Birmingham continued to have 
international notoriety due to the September 15, 1963 Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing 
that killed four girls, leading to Wallace’s appearance on a Boston TV program to discuss civil 
rights with Governor Philip Hoff of Vermont. In the debate, Wallace used state sovereignty to 
justify segregation as he had since the Brown v. Board of Education decision. Wallace would 
take his state rights justification even further though now that the civil rights movement had 
accelerated. Critique of foreign aid offered a platform that Wallace could use to discredit foreign 
influence in American domestic affairs.  
Wallace used foreign aid as a way to draw connections between state and national 
sovereignty, which allowed him to present an alternative approach to foreign affairs based on 
segregationists’ domestic priorities. When Hoff brought up the importance that civil rights 
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played in combatting “totalitarian nations” and their global influence, Wallace reiterated his 
comments from the spring, saying that Americans’ “hard-earned money” was helping people all 
over the world without expecting them to change their local traditions and culture. He continued, 
“When we go into other parts of the world, we say obey local traditions and customs even though 
we do not agree with them…the average person in this place doesn’t know where he is, much 
less where Alabama or Mississippi is, and if he did, he wouldn’t care what is happening over 
here…I think we ought to quit caring about being petted like a little poodle dog by other parts of 
the world, we ought to be respected and whenever they start rejecting 25 per cent of foreign aid 
dollars on the ground that it comes from the old Confederacy and it is tainted, then I will worry 
about our image in the other parts of the world.”415 More so than his Birmingham news 
conference, this attack on foreign aid drew parallels between southern states’ rights and national 
sovereignty. His refined remarks condemned the President and State Department’s efforts to 
address the concerns of African nations regarding American civil rights. Instead, Wallace 
promoted a unilateral approach to foreign affairs with a nationalistic fervor.  
 Wallace’s January 14, 1963 Gubernatorial Inaugural Address highlighted his political 
methodology, especially in terms of how he connected international events to domestic ones. The 
speech was co-written by Asa Earl Carter. Since the 1950s, Carter had been a race-baiting 
pamphleteer and right-wing radio announcer. His targets were blacks, Jews, Yankees, and any 
other ethnicity that challenged the supremacy of Anglo-Saxons. He also was the founder of his 
own Ku Klux Klan organization that was responsible, among many other crimes, for assaulting 
Nat King Cole and beating civil rights activist Fred Shuttlesworth and stabbing Shuttlesworth’s 
wife. The Inaugural Address that Carter wrote was the political bargain that Wallace made. It 
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guaranteed him national attention while at the same time committing him to the political 
fringe.416  
Wallace’s justifications for segregation in his inaugural address drew on familiar 
defenses for segregation in the thinly veiled defenses of state’s rights, constitutional protection, 
and federal government overreach. The speech began with standard political fare. However, it 
quickly ramped up and Carter’s influence was visible as Wallace declared from, “the Great 
Anglo-Saxon Southland…I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of 
tyranny…and I say…segregation now…segregation tomorrow…segregation forever.” He 
continued by echoing Ellender’s concern over the safety of D.C. in light of the integration that 
was occurring there. Although by post-civil rights era standards segregation seems inherently 
racist, Wallace wrapped up his demand for continued segregation in constitutional questions 
about the central government’s reach.  
In the speech, Wallace acknowledged the southern regionalism in his argument, and 
attempted to expand it to a national level. He called on other regions of the United States to join 
the “Southern philosophy.”417 His inaugural speech alone was not enough to rally the rest of the 
nation to the “southern philosophy. It did suggest that he was thinking beyond the borders of 
Alabama, and intended to take his message to a national stage. Even though he had begun to 
place his domestic racial views into discussions of sovereignty and racial views. His message 
was still not one that resonated gained much traction beyond the American South. It did however 
represent an important step in creating a conservative vision to counter liberal internationalism.  
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 Wallace proceeded to make clear that the centralization of the government was a product 
of liberalism and that it was just as devastating globally as it was domestically. Secular, pseudo-
intellectual politicians were destroying “individual rights” in favor of “human rights” with their 
“propaganda.” He then continued to reason that globally it was actually the white populations 
who were the victims of racism. Wallace reasoned, “As the national racism of Hitler’s Germany 
persecuted a national minority…so the international racism of the liberals seek to persecute the 
international white minority to the whim of the international colored majority…so that we are 
footballed about according to the favor of the Afro-Asian bloc.” Wallace blamed liberal 
internationalism for advocating the overthrow of the global racial order that segregation and 
colonialism had made. Using a similar method as Ellender, Wallace detailed the consequences of 
what the world that liberalism reconstructed would look like by connecting international events 
to domestic images that the audience could easily relate to. He mused, “The Belgian survivors of 
the Congo cannot present their case to a war crimes commission…nor the Portuguese or 
Angola…nor the survivors of Castro…nor the citizens of Oxford, Mississippi.”418 Wallace’s 
dismay over and connection between the demise of colonialism abroad and collapsing 
segregation at home provided his white audience with a way to understand the dangers to their 
socio-economic position at home in the events happening in Africa.  
 Wallace continued, articulating that liberalism undermined the very identity of America, 
linking it to communism. He stated, “The true brotherhood of America, of respecting the 
separateness of others…and uniting in effort…has been so twisted and distorted from its original 
concept that there is small wonder that communism is winning the world.” Wallace argued in his 
inaugural address that communism was wining because it promoted “amalgamation,” which 
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would lead to the destruction of the American “system of government.” In making this argument 
he linked liberalism to communism and the piece that tied it all together was the liberal theory 
that “poverty, discrimination and lack of opportunity is the cause of communism.” Wallace 
argued that this was a false theory. Evoking images of the post-Civil War South, Wallace said 
the South would be the biggest communist bloc if the liberal theory were correct.  
In suggesting that liberal policies in and outside of the United States were allowing 
communism to win, Wallace directly attacked foreign aid. With his comments, Wallace had 
dismissed the rationale for both domestic and foreign aid. Foreign aid was “handouts” to help 
those who should be helping themselves, Wallace contended. Resentfully he claimed, “There 
were no government hand-outs, no Marshall Plan aid, no coddling to make sure that our people 
would not suffer…Not for one single instant did they ever consider the easy way of federal 
dictatorship and amalgamation in return for fat bellies.”419 In sum, Wallace’s Inaugural Address 
undermined the core development theories of liberalism and the foreign aid it promoted. Race 
was inherent in his critique, but it was also ensconced in his discussion that equated foreign aid 
to communism and amalgamation. To oppose integration and foreign aid served as a way to 
oppose the remaking of American social structures, specifically race. All the while, Wallace and 
his colleagues could claim they were simply protecting the nation against the threat of 
communism, a valid concern during the high Cold War years. 
 In a less diplomatic manner than Ellender, Wallace used Africa to justify segregation at 
home. Wallace’s fear of amalgamation carried into his comments regarding Africa and foreign 
aid and who was allowed to participate in the political conversation about these topics. 
Newsweek reported in 1964 that Wallace matter-of-factly stated, “All these countries with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 George C. Wallace, “The Inaugural Address of Governor George C. Wallace,” 14 January 1963, 
http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/cdm/singleitem/collection/voices/id/2952/rec/5 (accessed 7 July 2013), 9-10.  	  
	   188	  
niggers in ‘em have stayed the same for a thousand years. Tell me any place where white people 
and niggers mix.”420 Wallace’s remarks, even more clearly than Ellender’s in 1962 and 1963, 
suggested that maintaining segregation at home and some form of colonialism abroad was the 
appropriate governmental response to the inabilities of non-white populations. That Wallace said 
this is perhaps not all that surprising. When paired with comments made a year earlier in the 
midst of the racial upheavals in Birmingham, Wallace contributed to a vision that African 
Americans and Africans were the same, both of which were primitive and incapable of effective 
governance. He told a Mississippi crowd about a Ugandan leader that did not like what was 
occurring in Birmingham. Wallace told his audience, “I guess he was leaning on his spear when 
he said it.”421 Combined, these remarks demonstrate not only a stereotype of Africans as 
primitive and without history, but in the context of the African leadership’s concern over 
American domestic race issues, comments like Wallace’s and Ellender’s took away from 
Africans the ability to participate in international affairs based solely on racial categories. This 
allowed segregationists to maintain their vision of the United States as a unilateral superpower in 
the world system dominated by Anglo-Saxons.  
 One of the key techniques that Wallace and his segregationist contemporaries used to 
combat civil rights was to accuse activists as being communist agitators or anti-American, 
critiques which were easily transferrable to liberal advocates of foreign aid. Throughout the 
turbulent civil rights battles of 1962 and 1963 in Alabama, Wallace frequently employed the 
methods of red-baiting to attack both foreign aid and civil rights, resulting in the farther 
entrenchment of foreign aid in the discussion of civil rights at home. The outcome was that 
Wallace was able to tie liberal social projects, both domestic and global to a nefarious 
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communist conspiracy, echoing Castle’s concerns over foreign aid.422 For example, in a 1967 
oral history interview, Wallace still maintained that communists had infiltrated the civil rights 
movement and that they were attacking the “property ownership system,” making it impossible 
to negotiate with them.423 Wallace and his contemporaries expanded their domestic vision of 
racial equality being akin to communism to the international stage by claiming foreign aid was a 
socialist program. He articulated this not only in his inaugural address, but also frequently agreed 
with his constituents who characterized foreign aid as a socialist, “give-away” program.424 
Wallace therefore put foreign aid into a larger global critique of liberalism. To Wallace, it was a 
tool that promoted racial equality through hand-outs as opposed to the “American” meritocracy.  
 Known for his oratory ability and fiery speeches, Wallace brought many of his 
complaints against civil rights and foreign aid together a month after Kennedy’s June 11th civil 
rights address when he spoke before the South Carolina Broadcasters Association. He reiterated 
many of his previous complaints against liberalism and civil rights, particularly that Martin 
Luther King, Jr. was a communist agitator and the “demonstrators” were actually violent black 
mobs in American cities that proved the need for the “Southern philosophy” of government raise 
to power. Like Passman who attacked the social scientists for both their civil rights and 
development theories, Wallace condemned liberal theories as “sociological theories as 
expounded by foreign socialists.” Echoing Ellender, he argued that these “foreign socialists” 
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were using race and civil rights to farther their own political ends. Wallace said the result of this 
dangerous political philosophy was that “the lives of millions of our citizens has been 
endangered.” Of course, the citizens endangered in his argument were white citizens that risked 
losing their place in the social order, which Wallace argued would happen violently.425  
Foreign aid entered Wallace’s speech when he once again repeated his comments 
regarding the legitimacy of other countries’ ability to speak about racial conditions in the South 
due to the exaggerated amount of aid he claimed they received. Wallace placed the importance 
that foreigners had in dictating domestic and international policy squarely on the shoulders of 
“Washington Do-Gooders.” He repeated that the rest of the world should be concerned about 
what the United States thought of them, hinting at a racial rationale for unilateral foreign 
policy.426 
 While placing blame on “Washington Do-Gooders” for both international and domestic 
upheaval, Wallace also made clear that the minorities and liberals were both easily swayed into 
their political ideologies, which “traditional” Southern philosophy could save the nation from. 
Agreeing with Castle’s critique, he blamed the present violence and racial distress on the 
minority bloc being easily won with policies of appeasement. In doing so he articulated an early 
conservative critique of “interest politics” that would later be co-opted into so-called “color-
blind” politics as a reaction against multiculturalism.  
Wallace reinforced traditional socio-racial hierarchy at home by arguing that African 
Americans were reaching beyond what they should, and the centralized government was the 
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impetus for it. He reasoned, “We have already had the Courts of this country tell us that we can’t 
read the Bible and we can’t pray—now the Congress is trying to tell us that it is going to take our 
property away in order to appease Negroes who would still be in the African brush if the white 
people of this country had not raised their standards and helped them progress in an atmosphere 
of peace and harmony.”427 Wallace’s remarks implied that the federal government was abusing 
its power to try to create a new social order, all while making it clear that African Americans 
were only where they were due to white uplift. Now, with liberal interference things had turned 
violent in Wallace’s observations. Here, he also used religion to start building a foundation for 
future conservative movements. His ability to attached racial meaning to government, religion, 
and foreign policy proved to be bricks in the foundation of a conservative internationalism.  
 Wallace serves as a transitional figure in understanding how civil rights and foreign aid 
intersected. He helped build not just a new conservative coalition, but one that was rooted in 
international events as well as domestic. Historians of the New Right and the American 
conservative movement have long struggled with rectifying the way social conservatism and 
economic conservatism met on common ground. Even more than Ellender’s and Passman’s more 
economically-based complaints regarding foreign aid, Wallace’s remarks make visible the 
political move towards a coalition of economic and social conservatives, which echoed the 
transformation of Castle’s defense against foreign aid from 1957-1959. The marriage between 
fiscal conservatives and segregationists proved a useful political tool as the civil rights 
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movement progressed, and it became less politically viable for them to make outright racist 
proclamations. Foreign aid, based on the foundation they had built during the 1950s and early 
1960s, therefore had been imbued with racial symbolism. It could then be employed by the likes 
of Wallace, Passman, and Ellender to talk about race outside of the American South without 
outright discussing civil rights.  
Foreign aid also proved to be a point of intersection with religious conservatives and 
segregationists as well, which provided another pillar for the growing conservative coalition to 
build on. Wallace frequently brought up religion when critiquing foreign aid. For example, by 
pairing his comments about the courts refusing to allow public prayer in 1963 with the image of 
the federal government redistributing property to allow African Americans more socioeconomic 
equality, he implied that segregation was on the same level as protection of religion under the 
Constitution, a view that many of his supporters agreed with. This carried easily over to the 
debate on foreign aid where Wallace argued that the internationalism (that he dubbed 
“international racism”) promoted by liberals would lead to the persecution of an international 
white minority. The internationalism that liberals endorsed posed the same threat abroad as their 
policies did domestically to American traditions and the strength of the nation-state, Wallace 
contended.428  
The fact that Wallace called liberal internationalism “international racism,” is significant 
in understanding his move towards nationalizing southern internationalism via his efforts to 
remove race from the discussion. Meaning, in accusing liberal internationalists of subjugating the 
“global white minority,” Wallace started the process of co-opting civil rights liberalism. He 
suggested that the focus on race itself was racist. Wallace was therefore using the “color-blind 
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racism” that would allow him to take his southern message to a national audience.429 As Wallace 
frequently mentioned when deriding foreign aid and Third World influence in American 
domestic race concerns, the United States allowed aid countries to maintain their cultures and 
religions and segregation was the South’s culture and religion. Therefore, economic 
conservatives and social conservatives could find common ground in the opposition to foreign 
aid.  
In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy, the State Department, and USIA 
combatted the negative image of the United States throughout the Third World caused by civil 
right clashes throughout the South, such as Birmingham in 1963. Foreign aid abroad and civil 
rights legal reforms at home allowed Kennedy and USIA to control the image of the United 
States as one of progress in regards to racial equality, which could only be achieved through the 
vehicle of American democracy. This liberal, progressive race story when paired with 
development aid abroad challenged segregationists’ domestic and global socio-economic 
hierarchies. Segregationists thus set out to discredit liberalism antiracial (in theory) programs at 
home in abroad. In doing so, they grafted domestic racial meaning to foreign aid, discrediting 
both. Instead they offered an alternative vision for America’s role in the world that rested on 
unilateral and nationalist policies in an effort to maintain the status quo in racial hierarchies at 
home and abroad.  
Governor George C. Wallace’s rise to political prominence in Alabama offers a window 
into understanding how segregationists crafted an opposition surrounding foreign aid that was 
rife with domestic civil rights reference points. The result was that not only was Wallace and his 
segregationists allies able to attack civil rights, they were also able to discredit liberal 
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development aid. Wallace had therefore created a foundation in which foreign aid had domestic 
racial significance. This was an important step in creating a conservative internationalism that 
countered liberal internationalism because it allowed segregationists to take their crusade to a 
national level in the second-half of the 1960s. Wallace and his allies were able to use foreign aid 
as a proxy to discuss their opposition to civil rights with a national audience when and where 
outright racist declarations were not palatable and a political liability due to the racial symbolism 
they had attached to their opposition to foreign aid. During the early 1960s though, this rhetoric 
surrounding foreign aid was largely isolated to the American South where like-minded 
segregationists dominated politics. The beginnings of how the racial symbolism surrounding 
foreign aid worked on a national scale can be seen in the growing conservative media.  
 
“The world must learn to help itself:” Reverend Wayne Poucher and Foreign Aid in 
Conservative Media  
 
 The extremism of Wallace, and to a lesser degree Ellender and Passman, over race and 
foreign aid, filtered into the media in a more palatable form for the nation. Life Line began as a 
15-minute radio program in 1958 and by 1964 the program was also producing newsletters and 
over three hundred radio stations carried it. H. L. Hunt, a conservative media mogul, created the 
program as an educational and religious effort. Hunt hired Reverend Wayne Poucher to be the 
program’s announcer. Like other conservative commentators and politicians at the time, Poucher 
feared the erosion of the “American spirit,” which he defined as “initiative and self-reliance.” 
Although Poucher echoed his contemporary conservatives’ fear of the decay of patriotism and 
Americanism (much like Ellender and Wallace) he never went as far as the politicians. 
According to media scholar Heather Hendershot, Poucher frequently pointed out that Life Line 
did not “attack minority groups, disparage labor unions, or directly accuse people or 
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organizations of being communist.” The problem with this was it did not leave Poucher a whole 
lot to discuss with his right-wing listeners except capitalism and attacking excess government 
spending. As a result, one of Poucher’s favorite topics was foreign aid.  
Like other critics of foreign aid, Poucher argued that the world had to learn to help itself, 
but despite his efforts to avoid attacking minority groups, the racial meaning behind his words 
was never far away for the astute listener. In 1963, while Birmingham and other civil rights 
battles ignited across the South, Poucher remained silent on the topic. Instead he bemoaned that 
American tax money was being spent ineffectively on things like “teaching monkeys arithmetic, 
storing duck and goose feathers, and buying the wrong cloth for uniform pants pockets.”430 This 
largely served as an attack on liberal inefficient spending without naming it as such. However, 
due to the conservative connection of civil rights to foreign aid in the 1950s and early 1960s and 
the context of Birmingham in 1963, Poucher’s listeners had a basis to regard foreign aid critiques 
as a larger critique of liberalism and civil rights reform. 
 In addition, Poucher’s dry radio program was religious in nature and often connected 
liberal programs (without actually naming them) to moral and spiritual decay in the United 
States. Poucher claimed that the “American spirit” was being surrendered to “social and 
economic mess of pottage.” Furthermore, in an effort to be productive Poucher attempted to offer 
solutions. His attempt to solve the ills of American society without government programs 
involved church and community volunteerism. Poucher told his listeners “there would be 
possibility of America ever becoming a welfare state,” if they loved their neighbors like they 
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loved themselves.431 Without actually identifying them, Poucher had effectively discredited 
liberal and government programs to like-minded listeners as not only wasteful, but immoral.  
Like Wallace, Poucher participated in an attack on liberal domestic and international 
programs that bridged the gap between fiscal and social conservatives. In his effort to not 
directly name any of the usual suspects, such as communists and minorities, for the ills he saw 
eroding his vision of American society, Poucher relied heavily on symbolism and hidden 
meanings in his critiques of government programs. Poucher therefore participated in the 
historical process of building a conservative coalition. His national audience represented an 
early, if small, example of how the symbolism surrounding conservative attacks on liberal 
domestic and international programs provided a means for racial messages to carry weight and 
influence beyond segregationists and the American South.  
 
“We are the ‘drunken sailor’ of world finance:” Otto E. Passman and the Southern Fight 
against Foreign Aid  
 
 Unlike Wallace and the conservative media’s move to build a national message in which 
debate about foreign aid could speak to changing domestic race issues, Representative Otto E. 
Passman of Northeast Louisiana continued to hone his fiscal conservatism for his southern 
audience. In doing so he continued to deride government spending habits on liberal political 
programs, especially foreign aid. Simultaneously, Passman continued to fight against legal 
desegregation. Although racist claims entered Passman’s discussions of foreign aid, they in 
themselves were not exceptional. Instead, what connected his critiques of both foreign aid and 
civil rights was that of a large central government overstepping its mandate. Like any good 
southern democrat, Passman buttressed his arguments against government interference in claims 
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of sovereignty and states’ rights. With the passage of the Civil Rights Bill of 1964 though, 
Passman used his fiscal conservative values to connect his opposition to foreign aid and civil 
rights to each other more explicitly. He did so by emphasizing the size and level of interference 
of the federal government, which further helped establish a way that conservatives could talk 
about race without directly referencing race, a key foundation in the formation of a conservative 
internationalism.   
 Passman’s fiscal conservatism meant that he initially used aid to attack liberal 
internationalist spending. In February of 1960, in response to a high school student’s question 
regarding his stance on foreign aid, he summarized, “Stated briefly, our foreign aid program, on 
the whole is a wasteful package for the schemers, the dreamers, and the one-worlders.”432 
Passman’s blame of “one-worlders” and essentially international idealists, easily aligned with 
those of his colleagues who also opposed foreign aid, like Senator Ellender. Furthermore, 
Passman specifically echoed Castle, by accusing foreign aid supporters of catering to special 
interests and pressure groups to fund a “Frankenstein-like monstrosity.”433 However, unlike 
Castle, Passman did not directly reference minority groups. Still, his attack against development 
aid steeped his argument in the size of the federal government, and constituents easily interpreted 
his fiscal conservatism as having domestic racial meaning as well.  
 C.C. Starr wrote Passman about his concern over what interest groups demanding foreign 
aid meant for the United States and tied it to domestic racial issues. He warned Passman that he 
would face pressure from “every minority group, and pro-any country-but-the-USA, to increase 
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foreign aid.”434 Starr implied that minority groups were the ones pushing for aid, and more 
importantly, that their demands were un-American. Here, Starr employed a similar line of logic 
as Castle. The ability of Passman, his allies, and constituents to paint foreign aid as un-American 
and derived from minority demands with or without directly stating it was a powerful rhetorical 
tool. More specifically, it aided in crafting a conservative internationalism that rested on 
nationalistic ideals by dismissing an internationalist program (foreign aid) as un-American. In 
part, this made it easy for Passman and his allies to remove racist language from their opposition 
because they were able to attack the growth of the central government under the likes of 
Kennedy and his predecessors, which would prove palatable to audiences beyond the American 
South.  
 Even if Passman choose to attack liberals and the growth of the central government in his 
critiques against foreign aid, his constituents interpreted his message through a domestic lens. 
Some constituents wrote to Passman to express their concern over what his opposition meant for 
the United States abroad. One worried about the “disastrous effects” that cutting foreign aid 
would have to the “nation’s prestige,” repeating one of the many arguments that supporters used 
to rally others to the cause of development aid.435 Two others wrote to Passman, and specifically 
noted that cutting aid would shake the confidence that “millions of Asians and Africans” had in 
the United States and its ability to support them against communist threats.436 Whereas these 
constituents were vague in naming exactly how foreign aid cuts harmed American image abroad, 
others more explicitly interpreted Passman’s opposition in racial terms.  
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 Despite the fact that Passman crafted his attacks against foreign aid in terms of 
government waste, voters were quick to pick up on implicit racial meanings behind his words. 
Those who supported foreign aid leveled criticism against his opposition to it. Mrs. Herbert N. 
Cohn wrote to Passman and accused him of maintaining colonial structures in the Third World 
by purposefully denying development funding which would help build schools in Africa below 
the Sahara. Mrs. Cohn went on to accuse Passman of being “narrow” and “parochial.”437 
Significantly, she wrote to Passman from New York. Even though Passman framed his public 
addresses largely for a southern audience, foreign aid and its symbolism assured that a small 
national audience took notice of what his opposition meant in terms of global racial hierarchies. 
This further demonstrates that the foundation for a nationally appealing (or in this case 
unappealing) rhetoric surrounding foreign aid and its global racial symbolism was emerging.  
On the topic of segregation, Representative Otto E. Passman was hopeful that 1960 and a 
new presidential election would return the United States to its “traditional” political and social 
landscape. In a December 1960 speech on the Constitution and school desegregation he began, 
“If the 1950’s were a decade of woolly thinking and loss of national purpose, the year 1960 has 
produced a bumper crop of national soul-searching. Over and over again, Americans have been 
told that they must reject the false and the fatuous aspects of their national life, and return to the 
basic American ideals. The era of cant and claptrap has been declared dead…Our Nation can 
survive only by being true to its heritage.” He continued by pointing blame towards “every 
current political or sociological fad.”438 These sociological and political trends he spoke of was a 
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not so subtle attack on the New Deal liberalism and “cult of expertise” that had dominated 
American politics as well as the sociological justifications cited in the majority decision of 
1954’s Brown v. Board of Education that paved the way for federal school desegregation. 
Passman’s attack on the “sociological fad” in government alluded to the Kennedy 
administration’s enthusiastic use of social scientists in implementing his agenda.  
Passman’s critiques represented political attempts to fight against liberalism promoted by 
shoring up a more nationalistic, traditional perception of the country. In the same speech on 
school desegregation he continued, “By the same sort of peculiar ‘newthink,’ a group of men 
who unquestionably accepted racial segregation as a way of life are now discovered to have 
written a document that prohibits segregated schools!” Here, Passman was referring to the 
Supreme Court reinterpreting the Constitution to overturn separate but equal facilities. He argued 
secular, intellectual liberals were to blame. He lamented, “If it [the Supreme Court] can be 
adjusted to conform to sociology today, it can be perverted to conform to the finding of astrology 
tomorrow. If this trend continues unchecked, our Constitutional Federal Republic is doomed to 
be replaced by an amorphous society, without law, without continuity, without framework. I do 
not believe that Americans whether Northern, Southern, or Western, will let that happen.”439 By 
attacking the intellectual justifications behind desegregation, Passman also implied that those 
who supported it were ushering un-American policies that would destroy America.  
 Constituents in favor of segregation also found parallels between the shifting 
international racial hierarchies and the events at home, and took the opportunity to inform 
Passman of the lessons the United States could learn from international incidents. Dr. B. E. 
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Masters wrote to Passman, “What is going in the Congo now, mass raping of white women, 
murder of white men by Africans, has been going on all over the U.S. (especially in the South), 
ever since the depraved and Communist-minded U.S. Supreme Court issued its Un-
Constitutional integration edict.”440 Masters’ comments parroted those of Ellender regarding the 
Congo and the warning it held for the American South. That Passman had not publically made 
the same connection, but his supporters were still able to, demonstrates the growing power that 
the segregationist interpretations of international involvement had. This helped take the 
segregationist message to a national audience due to its ability to carry racial meaning without 
out right mentioning race.  
 Passman’s separate discussion of segregation and civil rights echoes his critiques of 
foreign aid spending without directly connecting the two. Passman argued that the question of 
integration was a “whipping boy” to “disguise an all-out attack upon constitutional guaranteed 
freedoms of the American people.” He continued by framing it specifically as an attack against 
the “Southland” where he made the cause that civil liberties did not equate to “social equality.” 
The “result” was the Federal government subjected the South to “tyranny” out of a “misguided 
sense of compassion for racial minorities.” Passman concluded that “something called 
‘liberalism’” was the key instigator in the tyranny being inflicted upon the South.441  
The common denominator in his attack on civil rights and foreign aid was federal 
government run amok in the hands of “liberals” or “one-worlders” and undermining the 
Constitution. Passman acknowledged the connection he was making between the central 
government and civil rights. In 1960, he told the Citizens Council in Monroe that American 
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southerners live with racial problems and therefore truly understood them. In doing so, he 
continued to reinforce the regionalism inherent in his remarks. Yet, he also made it clear that 
race was not the true issue. He reasoned, “Really, the race problem is secondary. It actually pales 
into insignificance, if fact, in comparison with the real issue, which is one of individual freedom 
as opposed to an all-powerful central government.”442  Passman, like Ellender and Wallace, 
presented a message to his southern constituents that the true reason legislation and legal rulings 
were attacking southern social structures was rooted in the growth of the government at the cost 
of state and individual liberties. This echoed his critiques of foreign aid as government 
overreach. As civil rights accelerated at home, Passman moved to a more direct connection 
between civil rights and foreign aid. Resulting in a more coherent political rhetoric against 
liberal internationalism.  
Passman elaborated that special interests and minority groups fueled the growth of the 
government that was impeding the “southern way of life”. In form letters to respond to 
constituents opposed to racial desegregation he echoed his own and Castle’s critique of foreign 
aid, by suggesting that civil rights were also simply an interest-group generated political scheme. 
He wrote, “It is a real inspiration to know that so many of our fine citizens like you are watching 
some of the stupid blunders our ambitious politicians are making. It is to be regretted that so 
many will resort to political expediency to further their own interests.”443 The similarity in 
language and whom Passman assigned blame to later proved to be a useful rhetorical device that 
he and fellow conservatives could use to discuss race on a national scale without appearing 
outright racist. This language and symbolism surrounding foreign aid was serve as a key tool in 
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building a conservative internationalism that was nationalistic and unilateral so that 
segregationists could attempt to control or stop the changing global racial hierarchies.  
By the time the civil rights bill passed Congress in 1964, Passman had more clearly 
connected his domestic racial beliefs to his opposition to development aid. He did so by 
continuing to use his fiscal conservatism to attack liberalism’s government program “overreach” 
both at home and abroad. The Civil Rights Bill of 1964 passed Congress in early July in part due 
to President Kennedy’s assassination. The bill was originally introduced to Congress after 
Kennedy’s landmark civil rights speech on June 11, 1963, a speech that occurred amid the 
domestic racial upheaval of Birmingham and American concern over the United States’ image 
abroad. After the 1964 passage of the Civil Rights Bill, the civil rights movement started to enter 
another phase, turning towards the North and shifting focus from legal protection to socio-
economic justice. Conservatives therefore continued to make a strong connection between 
foreign aid and civil rights. In a speech given in Raleigh, North Carolina in late September 1964, 
Passman highlighted the ways in which foreign aid and domestic welfare programs to the poor 
were destroying American capitalism and democracy. He declared, “The myth of government 
paternalism and irresponsible welfarism must be exposed. Most of the federal handouts are 
intended to control the people for voting and political purposes. We are dissipating our wealth, 
forming a socialistic government in America that supports socialistic governments all over the 
world.”444 Here, Passman echoed comments made by Castle in his 1959 postscript and Ellender 
in 1962 regarding the politicization of foreign aid and its use as a symbolism by certain groups to 
win votes.  
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 More than Poucher, Castle, Wallace, and Ellender, Passman leaned heavily on fiscal 
conservatism in his speech and started to connect foreign aid to the growing welfare programs as 
coming from the same political ideology, which he believed threatened traditional American 
values and economy. In his 1964 speech Passman went on a tangent about domestic aid 
programs. He pointed out that these were not programs reminiscent of the TVA New Deal aid 
that developed rivers, harbors, flood control, and soil conservation. Instead, the “super-duper, 
socialistic programs planned” that concerned Passman were the hallmarks of President Johnson’s 
proposed Great Society such as, “accelerated public works program, mass transit, war on 
poverty, Appalachian aid, medicare, the food-stamp plan and Federal aid to education.” He then 
proceeded to transition back into the topic of his talk, foreign aid, by connecting the two as 
“rivers of waste occasioned by the extravagance and inefficiency of our domestic and global aid 
program.” He accused recipients of aid as wanting guns and bullets instead of bread and butter. 
This reinforced the image of aid handed out by liberals going to thugs and corrupt governments 
abroad and racial violence at home. In Passman’s depiction of foreign aid, it was American 
citizens “bleeding” to give money to corrupt nations.445  
 Passman also critiqued aid as a multilateral endeavor, highlighting the growing 
resentment among segregationists for liberal internationalism and its multilateral, United Nations 
approach. Passman argued that if aid must continue, the United States needed to keep control of 
it rather than sending it through international organizations. To send it through the United 
Nations did little to benefit American security, Passman argued.446 This criticism aligned with 
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Ellender’s 1962 world tour remarks, in which he had suggested that new member nations from 
the Third World essentially sold their UN vote to the highest bidder. In his study of the American 
South in foreign affairs, Joseph Fry argues that southern democrats originally supported the 
United Nations because they saw it as the realization of Wilsonian internationalism. However, he 
observes, “The South’s low opinion of nonwhites and developing nations and its increasing 
refusal to support internationalist projects were also apparent in the region’s growing opposition 
to foreign aid.”447 This growing opposition to foreign aid and the United Nations as a vehicle of 
it, as Passman and Ellender’s remarks reveal, occurred as civil rights activism increased at home 
and decolonization abroad. Looking at the international context of conservative domestic 
concerns reveals that segregationists struggled to maintain the socioeconomic world order based 
on racial categories in the face of a liberal political ideology that aimed to do just the opposite.  
 By tying civil rights to foreign aid, segregationists like Passman, Ellender, and Wallace 
had turned foreign aid into a symbol of race revolutions at home and abroad. The symbolism 
took on a political fiction of corrupt, violent, and ineffective leaders that wasted American tax 
dollars. Using this language surrounding foreign aid, segregationists opposed to foreign aid were 
able to create a foundation for a conservative internationalism that was rooted in nationalism and 
unilateral approaches to foreign affairs that in part sought to maintain existing racial hierarchies 
around the world. This worldview allowed them to attach domestic racial meaning to foreign aid. 
The result would be that foreign aid’s domestic racial symbolism allowed segregationists to 
present their conservative internationalism and backlash to domestic policies to an audience 
outside of the American South.  
Conclusion: 
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 As Kennedy entered the White House, he wanted to focus on foreign policy. 
Development and modernization theory provided him a way to do so while still addressing the 
most pressing domestic concern of the early 1960s, the civil rights movement. Thus, foreign aid 
was a symbol for not just global development but also changing domestic racial landscapes. 
Segregationists such as Ellender, Passman, and Wallace responded by attacking foreign aid and 
civil rights as symptoms of the liberalism and internationalism out of control. The conservative 
vision they countered with was nationalistic and unilateral in an effort to maintain domestic and 
global socioeconomic hierarchies defined by race.  
The history of foreign aid from 1961 to 1964 provides a window into how segregationists 
started to solidify an internationalist vision of their own to counter the prevailing liberal 
internationalism. This conservative internationalism was a response to the collapse of racial 
segregation at home as the civil rights movement began to gain momentum. The conservative 
internationalism therefore relied on a nationalistic and unilateral approach to reject both federal 
and international influence in state affairs based on claims of sovereignty. Over the course of just 
a few years the face of both foreign aid and domestic racial hierarchies rapidly began to 
transform. The result was that segregationists felt as though they were losing social, economic, 
and political control. In an effort to hold on to the status quo, segregationists integrated domestic 
racial discussions into their fiscal conservative arguments against foreign aid spending. The 
result of efforts such as Wallace, Passman, and Ellender laid the foundation for a rhetoric 
surrounding foreign aid that offered a way to discuss race with a national audience by 
eliminating outright racist declarations.  
Entering the presidential election in 1964, Governor George C. Wallace had to find a way 
to tap into the white resentment that had made him a charismatic and vocal leader in the South 
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and to have his message resonate in the North and West. Foreign aid became one way to support 
existing racial hierarchies both at home and abroad without advocating for racism or segregation. 
Instead, the creation of a political fiction in the 1950s and 1960s by overwhelming southern 
members of Congress, such as Allen Ellender and Otto Passman, allowed conservatives to utilize 
foreign aid debates as a proxy for discussing race. Furthermore, Johnson’s Great Society 
programs and War on Poverty allowed conservatives to connect foreign aid and domestic aid all 
within the context of what they characterized as “wasteful handouts.” The next chapter explores 
how Wallace embraced this methodology and carried it onto the national political scene. What 
had largely been a southern discussion about liberal internationalism would become the standard 
way for the opposition to attack foreign aid, imbuing such attacks with domestic racial 
implications and spreading misunderstanding about American foreign aid programs. 
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Chapter IV: 
 
“To Persecute the Intentional White Minority to the Whim of the International Colored 
Majority”:  
Foreign Aid in the Era of White Backlash, 1964-1973 
 
In mid-July 1963, just over a month since the Birmingham demonstrations and his 
subsequent “Stand in the Schoolhouse Door” speech that had catapulted him to national fame, 
Governor George C. Wallace stood before the Senate Committee on Commerce giving his 
testimony against Senate Bill 1732 or what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As part 
of his lengthy defense of segregation, Wallace reiterated many of the same themes about the role 
of race in internationalism that he had begun to cultivate in Alabama. In taking the same message 
to the Senate, Wallace was beginning the process of expanding and refining the southern 
internationalist message for a national audience. This meant not only shoring up white political, 
social, and economic power at home, but also internationally. Emphasizing the symbolic 
connection between foreign aid and domestic civil rights in order to discredit both, was a key 
element of Wallace’s southern internationalism that he made part of the national political scene 
in 1963.  
Like his contemporaries, Wallace leaned heavily on the idea of racially imbued 
citizenship, coded in terms of sovereignty (both in terms of state and internationally). He 
emphasized to Congress that he was a governor of a “sovereign state” and that liberal overreach 
had interfered with that state sovereignty, which was especially offensive to Wallace because he 
argued it dismissed the very premise of America’s legal foundations. Wallace was sure to remind 
the Senate that those legal foundations were Anglo-Saxon in nature. He further connected 
civilization and limited government that he saw as the part of the America’s legal heritage to 
white conquest, “The primary reason our forefathers came from Europe to carve this nation out 
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of a raw and savage wilderness was for the purpose of using, controlling and enjoying their 
private property and to pursue their chosen professions without fear of interference from kings, 
tyrants, despots, and I might add, Presidents.”448 In making this statement, Wallace not only 
reemphasized his belief in American exceptionalism, but also defined it in terms of “state 
sovereignty” that scoffed at centralized government. His categorization of “presidents” among 
the ranks of “kings, tyrants, and despots” drove home the point that the liberal presidents since 
World War II were the ones threatening the basic principles of American law.  
In Wallace’s estimation, the erosion of state sovereignty and the erosion of the principles 
of American law occurring at the hands of liberals, was the result of yielding American 
democracy to minorities. Wallace articulated to the committee that the “spectacle” and “guerrilla 
warfare” of the civil rights movement had emboldened African Americans to demand even more 
government intervention. The result, Wallace concluded, was that they no longer just wanted 
equal treatment. Instead, to the determent of the majority of citizens, African Americans 
demanded “preferential treatment.” Wallace was sure to equate these minority threats in terms of 
mob rule and violence that endangered “the majority” of American citizens. He cited letters from 
his constituents as his evidence, saying, “People who write me want their elected representatives 
to start representing them and not the minority bloc voting mobsters.”449 In this sense, Wallace 
tried to reinforce an image of American citizenship in which the white population controlled 
political power. To do so, he depicted African Americans as violent and working against 
American democracy via corruption, as his use of “mobsters” as a descriptor implies. To give 
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into civil rights demands in Wallace’s view was to sidestep American democracy in favor of 
lawlessness at the hands of a demographic that wanted preferential treatment from a willing 
central government. 
In refining his message for the Congressional audience, Wallace made sure to remind the 
larger American public that not only did foreign influence drive civil rights, but that liberals 
extended preferential treatment internationally too, at the expense of American pocketbooks. At 
the Senate hearing, Wallace reiterated the same message that he had declared just over a month 
earlier in Birmingham. He dismissed the idea that the United States had to worry about its image 
abroad. Then, he again made sure to shore up his argument in nationalistic rhetoric that denied 
that the Third World nations had any right to comment on United States domestic affairs, 
bringing foreign aid into the conversation. Wallace declared to the Senate Committee, “I will 
worry about our image in the rest of the world when these foreign countries begin to return 25 
per cent of the foreign aid we are sending them because it comes from the South. In my 
judgment, the rest of the world should be more concerned with what we think of them since we 
feel bound and determined to provide their support.” He concluded, “And while we are speaking 
of an image, the federal government should worry about the image it is creating in the South and 
to freedom-loving people everywhere.”450 Here, Wallace had retreated to the South as the 
wronged party at the hands of the federal government. But, he did so in an effort to highlight that 
the Southern ideals were in fact, the true American ideals. His critique of foreign aid aligned 
easily with the themes in his critique of civil rights as un-American, and in part instigated by a 
borderline tyrannical central government.  
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Wallace continued to refine a southern internationalism to combat the anti-racist ideals of 
liberal internationalism by reiterating his words about foreign aid in his defense of segregation. 
That he chose to include his attack on foreign aid as part of his message to a national audience 
indicates that he thought turning foreign aid into a symbol of the excesses of liberalism resonated 
with the larger public. This chapter therefore illustrates how domestic civil rights debates 
influenced the opposition to American foreign aid policy by tracing the ways in which 
segregationists refined southern internationalism to build a national conservative coalition. It 
argues that facing an increasingly militant civil rights movement and a failing war in Vietnam, 
segregationists employed the political fiction of Third World aid recipients as corrupt beggars to 
attack the liberal agenda at home and abroad. That political fiction encapsulated a shared 
understanding amongst diverse political interests, helping build a conservative alternative to 
liberal internationalism. This conservative alternative was coalition based and allowed for an 
approach to foreign affairs that sought to maintain traditional racial hierarchies at home and 
abroad via unilateral and nationalistic approaches all without any actual mention of race. They 
used foreign aid as a symbol for antiracist, liberal policies.  
In taking his message of the tyranny of the minority to the Senate, Wallace took an 
important step in presenting a racialized message that spoke to those outside of the American 
South. This was a key part of what race theorist Howard Winant describes as the adaptation of 
old racial hierarchies in the era of civil rights and decolonization.451 In suggesting that African 
Americans were demanding preferential treatment, Wallace was beginning the process that 
Nikhil Pal Singh described as the “discourse of civil rights liberalism” that was being adopted by 
conservatives, in which they equated “ending racism with eliminating racial reference within 
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juridical discourse and public policy.”452 Wallace’s claim that civil rights had moved to calls for 
preferential treatment and that criminal minorities were controlling American politics, suggested 
that racial designations were undermining American democracy, which made white resistance to 
civil rights a national issue, as opposed to a southern one.  
In 1965, Wallace further refined his message for the larger-white American population 
making southern white resistance a national issue and deemphasizing efforts by the government 
and activists to level the playing field. He declared, “We see today a foreign philosophy that says 
to the people, ‘You need not bother to work and meet the qualifications of a free man.’ All you 
must do, is demonstrate and cause chaos, and create a situation whereby our propagandists, 
masquerading as newsmen, may destroy faith in local law enforcement and may impugn the 
decency of local law enforcement so that we may take all police powers unto central 
government.”453 Wallace thus connected fears of a large central government (at the cost of state 
sovereignty), propaganda, and foreign influence on American politics to opposition to the civil 
rights movement--echoing the themes that foreign aid opponents cultivated in the 1950s. This 
message of civil rights activists trying to undermine the American system of proclaimed equality 
appealed to Americans outside the South. Wallace and his contemporaries’ message became that 
liberal policies to correct legal, economic, and social inequalities for minorities were un-
American, since citizens had the same opportunities and just had to work for it.  
Increasingly in the 1960s, as civil rights began to achieve legal goals, the rhetoric 
surrounding race in the United States changed to one where derogatory terms and support of 
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segregation became less acceptable in political discourse.454 Due to segregationists’ careful 
crafting of a political fiction around foreign aid, by 1964 foreign aid was a symbol for the 
wayward influence of liberal internationalists who had sold the nation to the whims of the Third 
World. Therefore, foreign aid became a way to attack liberal policies that sought to correct racial 
injustices at home as the larger American public increasingly flinched at outright bombastic 
declarations of “segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.”455 The result was 
that foreign aid was a key element in segregationist’s efforts to take their southern 
internationalist message to a national audience and help to lay the foundation for a conservative 
coalition that would come to dominate American politics after 1968.  
By looking at how segregationists used foreign aid in their efforts to adapt old racial 
hierarchies to the changing ones of the decolonization age, we can see that the basis for the rise 
of the New American Right had earlier roots that went beyond domestic concerns. Historians 
have attributed the growth of the conservative coalition to the right’s ability to connect domestic 
concerns of communism, government growth, taxation, civil rights, and perceived decay of 
morality to liberalism, a message that resonated in the sunbelt suburbs.456 However, when we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 For example in a 1965 letter that Wallace kept for reference, Henry E. Garratt suggested that segregation had 
become a hated word. See: Henry E. Garrett (Professor Emeritus of Psychology, Columbia University) to Cecil 
Jackson (assistant to George C. Wallace), 1 April 1965, Box SGO22384, Folder Civil Right (1 October 1964-13 
April 1965), Administrative Files 1963-1979, George C. Wallace Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and 
History, Montgomery, AL. 
455 George C. Wallace, “The Inaugural Address of Governor George C. Wallace,” 14 January 1963, 
http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/cdm/singleitem/collection/voices/id/2952/rec/5 (accessed 7 July 2013). 
456 Historians initially interpreted the rise of conservatism in American political history as reactionary response to 
civil rights based in the South. Since these initial histories, historians have argued for a more nuanced account of the 
rise of the right, taking into account grassroots movements, socio-economic factors, and the importance of the 
Sunbelt suburbs. For more on the evolution of the historiography of American conservatism in the twentieth century 
see: Michael Kazin, “The Grass-Roots Right: New Histories of U.S. Conservatism in the Twentieth Century,” The 
American Historical Review 97, no. 1 (1992): 136-155; Thomas J. Sugrue, “Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race, Rights, 
and the Reaction against Liberalism in the North, 1940-1964,” The Journal of American History 82, no. 2 (1995): 
551-578; Daniel Bell, ed. The New American Right (New York: Criterion Books, 1955); Dan T. Carter, The Politics 
of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1995); Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative 
Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996); Alan Crawford, Thunder on 
the Right: The ‘New Right’ and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Pantheon, 1980); Thomas Byrne Edsall and 
	   215	  
look to international politics, we can see a conservative coalition that happened not just over 
domestic concerns, but also over the intersection between the domestic and international. 
Segregationists Historian Dan Carter, describes George Wallace as succeeding in using his 
southern view to shape “crabgrass” campaigns over issues like education, neighborhood 
preservation, busing, taxation, and public safety throughout the North and West to create a 
national political movement.457 However, there was an international message to Wallace’s and 
his contemporaries’ methodology as well. Their refinement of foreign aid as a symbol for liberal 
antiracism run amok at home and abroad allowed them to attack racial justice on a national scale 
and deflect claims that they were racist by suggesting that using government money, at home or 
abroad based on racial opportunities was un-democratic and offered preferential treatment. Thus, 
the opposition to foreign aid used it in national debates as a proxy issue for domestic civil rights 
that carried appeal beyond the South.  
The mid-to-late 1960s represented a dynamic change in the civil rights and foreign aid 
policies in the United States, as well as other economic, social, and political shifts in American 
life. After the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the civil 
rights movement of 1966 fragmented, with a large number of activists leaving behind the civic 
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nationalistic and non-violence of the mainstream movement.458 In the prevalent popular narrative 
of the civil rights era, Black Power emerges in 1966 at the Meredith March with Stokley 
Carmichael’s defiant speech demanding “Black Power.” Armed resistance, therefore, became the 
defining characteristic of Black Power. The narrative then portrays Black Power as essentially 
antithetical to the more mainstream nonviolent tactics of the civil rights movement, and thus 
Black Power plays the role of a tragic coda to the civil rights movement’s legacy.459 Still, as the 
recent historiography has demonstrated, Black Power did not suddenly burst forth from Stokley 
Carmichael’s speech in 1966.460 It had more complicated origins that had roots in early self-
defense and nationalist ideologies, and therefore developed before 1966 around issues of class, 
tactics, masculinity, anticolonialism, and revolutionary worldviews. Following Simon Wendt’s 
characterization though, this chapter sees 1966 as a key turning point in the civil rights 
movement and Black Power because despite its earlier origins, the levels of organization in the 
Black Power movement were not present before 1966.461  
The more revolutionary turn in the civil rights movement that occurred with the 
emergence of Black Power created a more favorable environment for Wallace and others to take 
their segregationist message to the national stage. Black Power activists demanded socio-
economic equality, not just equality before the law. Considering that the civil rights movement 
also expanded to the North and West after 1965, the conditions for widespread white backlash 
against civil rights were present for Wallace and others to exploit, in their efforts to combat 
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liberalism on a national political level.462 Furthermore, Black Power activists were more explicit 
than previous manifestations of the black freedom struggle in linking the racial issue at home to 
neocolonialism and exploitation of the Third World.463 Johnson’s Great Society programs that 
sought to mitigate years of socio-economic inequality threatened de facto segregation in the 
northern cities and the racial privilege that came with white supremacy that both northern and 
southern white American citizens clung to.464 Thus, Wallace and his contemporaries’ ability to 
discuss race without talking about race via issues like busing, housing, and welfare programs 
allowed them to attack American liberal programs and build a national base around racial issues. 
The result was an important step in the process of adapting old racial hierarchies to liberal 
attempts to refashion the world in nonracial terms. 
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Domestic issues were not the only ones that segregationists used to attack liberal 
antiracist policies to gain a national base during the mid-to-late 1960s. Development and foreign 
aid policies also lent themselves to the production of a southern internationalism counterpart to 
liberal internationalism. Southern internationalism centered on preserving eroding white global 
power expressed in segregation and colonial policies. Building on the previous connections 
segregationists had made between civil rights and foreign aid during the 1950s, segregationists 
were able to employ foreign aid as a symbol of liberalism gone too far in part because of the 
shifts in domestic policies, but also because of the changes in international affairs at the time. 
Due to Vietnam, by the end of Johnson’s presidency, foreign aid was firmly associated with 
controversy. Not only did southerners continue to vote against foreign aid, but now former 
supporters also joined them in opposing foreign aid.465 Segregationists built on their southern 
internationalism and employed their political fiction surrounding foreign aid alongside other 
racially coded domestic issues to help create a base for a conservative coaltion that had 
international and domestic roots.  
Building on their previous work of connecting foreign aid to domestic civil rights, 
segregationists were able to benefit from the upheaval of these years and take their message to a 
national level. In 1965, Johnson even feared that foreign aid would be the undoing of his 
accomplishments. According to Nick Cullather, Johnson worried that foreign aid would be the 
lynchpin that unraveled his programs in Vietnam, civil rights, voting rights, Medicare, and 
Medicaid. Cullather observes, “For Johnson, politics was a process; seemingly unrelated issues 
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were linked through personalities and timing.”466 As the previous chapters have demonstrated, 
Johnson was not wrong in his concern over political issues being connected.  
The process of building an southern internationalism defined by opposition to 
development aid and domestic racial reform allowed segregationists to talk about race on a 
national scale, without really bringing up race, due to the racial symbolism they had attached to 
foreign aid in the previous decade. This chapter demonstrates this process by first focusing on 
Ellender’s continued methods of dissuading support for civil rights and foreign aid by using the 
symbolism of race in foreign aid, concluding with an examination of George Wallace’s national 
presidential campaigns to demonstrate the way the segregationists’ political fiction surrounding 
foreign aid was presented to the national public, resulting in the normalization of racial coding in 
foreign aid. All of which marked the beginning of the ascendency of conservative 
internationalism to counter liberal internationalism. 
 
“We ought to run that man for President; he talks like an AMERICAN!”: Ellender and the 
Continued Opposition to Foreign Aid 
 
The growing opposition to foreign and domestic aid programs, as articulated by Ellender, 
easily lent itself to the southern ideal of state sovereignty and abhorrence for a strong, central 
government. One of Ellender’s supporters demanded that the “southern senators and 
congressmen” put an end to “pork barrel” spending by eliminating all aid programs and welfare. 
The author of the letter believed that such programs were leading the United States into 
socialism. Furthermore, the letter echoed Ellender’s comments from 1962 and employed the 
political fiction surrounding foreign aid. He wrote that he was sick of his money going to corrupt 
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and greedy politicians overseas, who did not even know what to do with the money.467 The 
message repeated earlier declarations by Ellender and his contemporaries that connected 
ineptitude in the Third World to liberal fool-heartedness of oversized government under 
liberalism. Furthermore, aid to the Third World came from the same political ideology as 
domestic aid programs. Ellender’s supporters repeating the connections between domestic and 
international aid, as well as the racial implications of the connection demonstrates the rhetoric 
and methods that other politicians—like George Wallace—could use as proxies for talking about 
domestic and global racial hierarchies without directly mentioning them.  
As George Wallace utilized foreign aid as a symbol to fight civil rights in 1963, Senator 
Allen J. Ellender also continued his crusade to cut foreign aid. In doing so, he repeatedly 
reiterated his words from his 1962 African Tour that questioned the abilities of Africans to self-
govern and effectively use the money that the United States was sending abroad. On a radio 
program in November 1963, Ellender discussed military aid to Africa. Ellender first 
acknowledged that some military aid might have been justifiable due to concerns for internal 
security. However, he also believed that the result was that military aid, like its cousin foreign 
aid, had been politicized. He especially thought this to be true of military aid to Africa, so he 
believed that the aid to Africa was indefensible.468  
 At the root of Ellender’s opposition to military aid to Africa in 1963 was his concern for 
maintaining colonial rule in Africa. Ellender said, “There is also the fact that any military 
assistance we give may come to be used against the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique and 
against the whites of South Africa…And if the whites are ever driven out of Southern Africa, as I 
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said in my report, the Belgian Congo situation will seem to be a picnic by comparison.”469 
Ellender made sure to reference his controversial 1962 trip comments that suggested that 
Africans were incapable of self-governance. He further reinforced his sentiments that self-rule in 
Africa would lead to chaos by referencing the still-fresh images of the Belgian Congo after the 
assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The result was not only an indictment against home rule in 
Africa, but also a subtle reminder of what black protest had wrought in the United States.  
The fact that Ellender choose to use the Congo to illustrate what he believed to be the 
anarchy of home rule in Africa highlighted the connection between domestic and international 
racial upheaval. The coverage of the Congo crisis in the United States had offered alarmist 
accounts about the dangers to the Belgians in the Congo following independence. Meanwhile, 
the Congo crisis helped solidify a global pan-Africanist vision of American imperialism in the 
postcolonial world. This view included the idea of a “domestic colonial” or “internal colonial” 
within the United States regarding the nonwhite population. The assassination of Patrice 
Lumumba with the involvement of the CIA while the UN stood by led to African American 
protests at the UN in New York City. In the 1960s the American press portrayed these protesters 
as radical, communist-influenced individuals.470 Thus, in reminding his listeners of the anarchy 
that African independence brought abroad, Ellender subtly alluded to the ways in which African 
and African American liberation movements were connected and the so-called anarchy such 
movements could cause at home.  
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By 1963 Ellender’s supporters had embraced his political fiction about foreign aid and 
started to also articulate their frustrations over liberal policies at home and abroad. One such 
constituent told Ellender, “I’m sure many people feel as I do when I say I’m tired of us trying to 
support the whole world. Lets take care of our own people first (and I don’t mean the people who 
live off the welfare programs…).”471 The fact that the author wanted the money to come back 
home, but not spent on certain citizens, indicated that Ellender’s constituents saw a connection 
between domestic and foreign aid programs. Even more significantly, for the present study, that 
they believed that the recipients of aid from the United States government, domestic or 
international, were freeloaders of at the expense of the American people, or rather, the southern 
American people.  
Ellender’s constituents were now repeating his interpretation of foreign aid and 
internationalism that he had crafted during the previous decade. One letter in 1963 essentially 
reiterated the conservative international critiques of the previous decade. Caroline Dormon wrote 
to Ellender to commend him on his continued opposition to foreign aid. The foundation of her 
support rested in what she perceived to be the lesser qualities of the recipients. Less diplomatic 
in her wording than Ellender had been, she wrote, “You were absolutely right in your statement 
that the savage, illiterate African nations could not rule themselves without assistance from 
Whites—but you were torn asunder for it! For my part, I think the U.N. is a total failure…The 
very idea of those African savages having a vote equal to that of the U.S.!”472 Although Dormon 
never explicitly spelled out a clear connection between civil rights and foreign aid, years later 
she again wrote to Ellender, but this time on the topic of the War on Poverty. Her second letter 
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emphasized that the recipients of domestic aid as lazy and violent.473 In doing so, Dormon not 
only emphasized the connection between race and poverty relief in the United States, but also 
used similar language to what Ellender had used to discredit aid. 
The fact that Ellender himself supported technical assistance to a degree and therefore did 
not go as far as Dormon in condemning all aid to Africa demonstrates the power that the 
segregationist racial symbolism had regarding foreign aid.474 As civil rights were accelerating 
within the United States, the public’s adoption of the political fiction that presented foreign aid 
as threatening American power at the hands of incapable Africans was not accidental, but rather 
the result of segregationist efforts to maintain white power at home and abroad.475 As Dormon’s 
1968 letter demonstrates that political fiction took on increasing significance as the civil rights 
movement moved north and demanded socio-economic (not just legal) justice. The result was 
that segregationists’ racial attitudes and rhetoric were easily adapted to foreign aid and domestic 
poverty relief, specifically the discrediting of the capabilities of the recipients. Segregationists 
had created an image of foreign aid that represented what they perceived to be the dangers of 
antiracist liberal international ideals, which also extended to domestic programs.  
Ellender’s constituents were quick to pick up on the implication that Ellender and others 
had made regarding the connection between the domestic programs of President Johnson’s Great 
Society and sending foreign aid abroad. To many who had listened to Ellender’s and others’ 
rhetoric regarding foreign aid, Johnson’s War against Poverty was nothing more than a domestic 
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version of foreign aid. By 1968, Ellender’s constituents articulated the connection clearly. One 
letter stated, “It would appear that this Foreign ‘give-away’ program in conjunction with our 
domestic ‘give-away’ program has just about bankrupted our country.”476 The letter’s use of the 
disparaging term “give-away” for both programs implied that to the author, they were one and 
the same. In addition, other letters Ellender received regarding both foreign aid and poverty relief 
programs echoed earlier ones that suggested that the money was needed at home and not abroad. 
Yet, that money was not to be spent in poverty programs for fear of entrenching communist 
ideologies that would incite African Americans to violence and idleness.477  
The themes imbedded in conservative internationalism to combat the programs of its 
liberal counterpart intersected with each other when segregationists discussed their opposition of 
poverty relief programs. First, the distrust of federal government intrusion took center stage. One 
letter from a constituent, Erwin Engert, Sr., on the topic of “open housing” vehemently criticized 
the federal government’s interference in “a man’s castle,” or home. Second, Engert echoed 
Ellender’s 1962 remarks on African self-rule aboutthe chaos that black rule—at home or 
abroad—brought by highlighting violent rioting. Furthermore, he reinforced the idea that the 
demands of African Americans were to have everything the “white man has worked for all his 
life” without working. Engert finally concluded his letter stating, “The Negro has never, 
throughout history, been able to establish a civilization let alone maintain one.”478 In including 
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his last indictment against foreign aid Engert had employed Ellender’s political fiction about aid 
recipients in Africa as a means to further his argument against poverty relief to the urban poor. 
The common thread running through the critiques was a desire to avoid American government 
spending that tried to correct socio-economic inequalities at home and abroad, in part, due to the 
rapidly changing socio-historical processes that civil rights and decolonization initiated. Ellender 
made this theme of conservative internationalism clear when he defended the international white 
rule.  
As part of his attack against shifting domestic and international racial dynamics, Ellender 
also used ineffective foreign aid as an attack on independent Africa. As civil rights continued to 
expand in the United States through the 1960s, and international human rights took on increasing 
significance in foreign policy, Ellender did not back away from the political fiction he created 
surrounding foreign aid. In fact, he doubled-down on his dismissive 1962 remarks regarding the 
ability of Africans to self-govern when it looked like liberal internationalism was threatening 
white power abroad. Already witnessing white power and segregation under legal and de facto 
attack in the United States, Ellender was quick to defend the international white conservative 
alliance he had helped forge in the 1950s when the United Nations issued sanctions against the 
white-rule minority UDI government in Rhodesia in 1967. Specifically, he once again fell back 
on his critique of the inability of black Africans to govern themselves.  
Ellender believed the events that had occurred internationally since his original 1962 
remarks served as evidence that his assessment of American money being wasted on independent 
Africa was correct. In 1967, he wrote regarding his 1962 trip, “At that time, I stated that darkness 
would fall on every country in Africa if the Europeans were driven out and the control of 
government functions were placed in the hands of those incompetent to govern…I believe that 
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subsequent events have amply demonstrated the correctness of my views.”479  Essentially, 
Ellender had once again voiced his support of western colonial control of Africa—a view he had 
been refining since suggesting Great Britain move its population to the former colonies of the 
Commonwealth. The result was both politicians and the public alike could easily project the 
same image of chaos and inability back on the United States in the late 1960s. Ellender had laid 
the rhetorical foundation where discussion of race could be diverted through disparaging remarks 
about government aid, domestic or international, as being communist and going to those who 
were corrupt, violent, lazy, and as antithetical to the American work ethic.  
That Ellender’s constituents used the same political fiction he had built around foreign 
aid demonstrates the growing influence of that political fiction. In part this influence was due to 
the growth of the civil rights movement towards a more explicitly socio-economic justice 
orientation that focused on northern urban centers. The changing domestic context made 
Ellender’s condemnation of foreign aid recipients in Africa more significant, and constituents 
readily agreed with his view of foreign aid and used it as an attack against the domestic poverty 
relief programs of Johnson’s Great Society. The result was that just as liberal internationalists 
carried global antiracist ideologies to the home front, so too did conservative internationalists 
create a racial vision of domestic programs. Although Ellender’s message demonstrates the way 
that political fiction was adopted by the general public and used to attack civil rights programs, 
his message was still regionally contained. George Wallace’s presidential campaign in the 1960s 
demonstrate how the segregationist political fiction surrounding foreign aid went national, and 
was used to discuss race without directly referencing race and segregation.  
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“‘Racist’ is a term brought into prominence by communist propaganda”: George C. 
Wallace’s Presidential Campaigns, Racial Coding, and Southern Segregationists Go 
National 
 
In 1963 as Alabama Governor George C. Wallace was preparing for a Meet the Press 
interview he feared he would be asked questions about foreign affairs since he was thinking 
about running for president in 1964. After his appearance he told an aide, “I don’t need a foreign 
policy! All they wanted to know about was niggers, and I’m the expert!”480 In his 1964 
presidential campaign he proceeded to build his foreign policy plank by imbuing his critiques of 
Democratic foreign policy with domestic racial fears. This was not a new strategy though for 
Wallace, and instead drew from his political repertoire. He had used foreign policy as a way of 
attacking domestic civil rights earlier in his career.481 The result was that in Wallace’s political 
rhetoric involving foreign policy, foreign aid became a symbol of the same political ideology 
that was threatening the southern socio-racial order. 
Wallace’s 1964 and 1968 presidential campaigns represent the strongest efforts to shift 
integration from a Southern issue to a national one.482 As his 1963 statements to the press and 
Congress demonstrate, Wallace used foreign aid as an attack point to change segregation into a 
national issue. The result was to discredit liberal internationalism and the outside influence it 
brought on American domestic policy. In his presidential campaigns Wallace left no doubt about 
who he thought was to blame for American international and domestic failings. He claimed that 
the out-of-touch, intellectual bureaucrats that forced integration at home were the same ones 
leading the United States astray in foreign policy. Leaning heavily on nationalistic, unilateral 
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arguments, Wallace argued that the liberal internationalists were financing radical, anti-
American governments around the world, and certainly not making any friends.483 Already in 
1963, foreign aid was a key element in Wallace’s efforts to displace liberal internationalism and 
make segregation a national issue.  
In Alabama, George Wallace had successfully cultivated a political message where civil 
rights and foreign aid were connected by liberal internationalism. He had even gone so far in his 
1962 inaugural address to suggest that globally it was the white population that was suffering 
under racism. Wallace reasoned, “As the national racism of Hitler’s Germany persecuted a 
national minority…so the international racism of the liberals seek to persecute the international 
white minority to the whim of the international colored majority…so that we are footballed 
about according to the favor of the Afro-Asian bloc.” Wallace blamed liberal internationalism for 
advocating the overthrow of the global racial order that segregation and colonialism had made. 
Using a similar method as Ellender, Wallace detailed the consequences of what the world that 
liberalism reconstructed would look like by connecting international events to domestic images 
that the audience could easily relate to. He mused, “The Belgian survivors of the Congo cannot 
present their case to a war crimes commission…nor the Portuguese or Angola…nor the survivors 
of Castro…nor the citizens of Oxford, Mississippi.”484 This message easily transferred over to 
national politics, and Wallace further crafted the international events and foreign aid into 
symbols that could readily be used to discuss domestic racial issues.  
Even before his presidential campaigns, Wallace was encouraged by the support he had 
gotten from elsewhere in the United States. The theme of propagandists forcing antiracist policy 
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on the public was one of the arguments that attracted non-Southerners to Wallace. For example, 
in 1962, Charles McWilliams wrote to Wallace. He claimed to be a northerner who was forced 
out of the Midwest because racial conditions had deteriorated so much. McWilliams told 
Wallace that he believed most Northerners were with them, but that African Americans had 
taken over mass media. One of the things that McWilliams’ conspiracy theory entailed was that 
African Americans were hiding violent crimes from the public with their control of media. The 
solution was to create a network of independent radio stations that could become a “Radio Free 
America” network. McWilliams identified liberals as the guilty party in allowing African 
Americans to spread their so-called propaganda, yet themselves not sending their children to 
integrated schools and neighborhoods.485 The message echoed the earlier efforts of 
segregationists to claim that liberal propaganda manipulated the image of segregation. 
Also repeating earlier efforts to discredit liberal policies, Wallace received support on the 
topic of foreign aid and his perception of the abilities of its recipients. In 1962, Tom Gibson sent 
Wallace two of his articles from the Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph. In one, he derided 
recipients of the “give-away program” as lazy, incompetent, and inefficient. Gibson concluded, 
“Their [aid recipients] own failure to order their natural lives so as to exploit efficiently what 
nature had given them. They lack honesty, competence and organization and to give them 
finances to develop their nation by taking away from the taxpayers shows lack of intelligence on 
our part.”486 Of course Gibson’s comments were racist, but moreover, he connected it to the 
themes of the segregationist opposition to foreign aid by emphasizing a nationalistic and 
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unilateral sentiment. Furthermore, he repeated Senator Ellender’s earlier comments and 
obsession with maintaining Western control over the resources of the former colonies. Wallace 
wholeheartedly agreed with Gibson. He replied, “I feel that this is a matter that concerns people 
not only in the South but all over the United States and I hope that you and I can be successful in 
rallying people from other sections to the cause of constitutional government.”487 Wallace 
therefore not only received early national support for his cause, but he acknowledged seeking a 
national audience to support “constitutional government.” Foreign aid played an important role 
in his ability to discuss national politics due to what it meant beyond finances to the public. In 
this case that significance was attached to maintaining colonial racial socio-racial hierarchies.  
 Another key element of Wallace’s attempt to make segregation a national issue and 
combat liberal internationalism was his efforts to maintain and expand the segregationist, white 
global alliance that Ellender and others had started to cultivate during the 1950s and which 
defined southern internationalism. Thomas Noer argues that 1968 represents the last resistance of 
organized white resistance in American politics. He concludes that after 1968, segregationists 
learned from their counterparts in the civil rights movement and started to stress white, 
international unity. He states, “It is paradoxical that a movement that was occasionally jingoistic, 
often isolationist, and always scornful of the rest of the world now proclaims global solidarity 
and international white unity.”488 Noer, however, choose to focus on nongovernment entities, and 
characterizes isolationism as completely withdrawn from the world. When we consider 
segregationist politicians, we see that segregationists had been building an international white 
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supremacy alliance since the 1950s and would continue to throughout the 1960s. Furthermore, 
conservative internationalism did not encourage withdrawing from the world, but rather wanted 
unilateral, nationalistic control over foreign policy.  
Wallace did not necessarily have to try hard to court white supremacist regimes abroad as 
they were often searching for allies in the West. He did, however, make sure to use his national 
platform to plainly spell out where he stood on the issue of Rhodesia and South Africa. In 1968, 
while running for President, he stated that he strongly disagreed with then-current economic 
sanctions on Rhodesia and South Africa. He promised the public that he would do everything in 
his abilities to get the sanctions lifted. Most importantly, Wallace made sure to highlight that the 
sanctions should be lifted because South Africa and Rhodesia were “good friends and allies.”489 
Not only did such a statement emphasize the Cold War importance of anticommunist allies 
abroad, but also the use of friendship stressed a familiarity between the two countries that was 
not purely strategic. Rather, without directly addressing it, Wallace hinted at shared socio-racial 
models that the United States shared with minority-ruled nations in southern Africa, which 
helped to build an international white supremacist alliance.  
Wallace received praise from his white supremacist allies in Rhodesia and South Africa, 
further embedding the alliance into part of conservative internationalism. Douglas Garner, 
writing for the under-secretary of external services in Rhodesia, sent a letter to Wallace thanking 
him for his support against Great Britain’s sanctions in 1966. Garner made sure to emphasis that 
they were fighting the “Afro-Asian and Communist blocs of the United Nations.”490 Using the 
threat of communist expansion to maintain white rule mirrored the communist-infiltrated civil 
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rights argument of segregationists.491 In addition, Garner’s denouncement of the UN paralleled 
the South’s own rejection of internationalism. Rhodesia and the American South therefore made 
easy allies, and utilized the same rhetoric to discuss racial hierarchies without directly 
mentioning them. Instead, they steeped their nationalistic declarations in claims of sovereignty 
and anti-communism. 
Aware of segregationists’ efforts to maintain international and domestic racial 
hierarchies, the white rule minority in southern Africa also tried to build up a white supremacist 
alliance and garner support in the United States. In early 1966 the Prime Minister of Rhodesia’s 
UDI government, Ian D. Smith sent a message to America. Smith emphasized the communist 
influence and results of African nationalistic movements. He wrote, “Astoundingly the 
philosophy of the West seems to be: ‘If violence and mayhem are visited by black Africans, that 
is as it should be. But if a white African presumes to protect his heritage against the black 
instruments of communism then nothing suffices but his complete extinction.’”492 Deflecting the 
issue to communism and the Cold War framework made it appear as if race was not the factor in 
white-rule of Africa. Rather, his claim that they were only protecting their heritage against black 
communist encroachment in the face of “extinction” repeated the same theme of a persecuted 
international white minority that Wallace had declared in early 1963. This was no coincident as 
Smith intentionally courted the American South for support based on shared racial ideologies.  
Smith also tried to emphasize that the United States and Rhodesia shared a similar 
history, one that referenced the United States’ racial national citizenship. Smith believed that 
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they had made a unique stand against communism in Africa and could not understand why the 
United States would not support them, since he reasoned that they were following in America’s 
footsteps. Smith wrote, “It is a source of amazement to us therefore that the great United States 
should align itself with Britain in the imposition of sanctions and embargoes upon us in Rhodesia 
whose only apparent offense in our determination to uphold yours and our way of life against 
growing communist pressures.”493 Smith played to the conservative international rhetoric by 
frame “way of life” in terms of defending against communist encroachment. However, “yours 
and our way of life” could also have racial meanings, especially since he had previously tied 
black African politics to communism. The language of defending a certain way of life easily 
appealed to southern segregationists who felt that their socio-historical racial order was under 
attack by liberal internationalists at home and in the UN. The result was Wallace was able to use 
support for South Africa and Rhodesia as a way to talk about race and garner international 
support for the South.494  
By 1967 domestic and global events had also given Wallace support in the growing 
conservative media, which helped further entrench the segregationists’ cause as a national issue. 
Dan Smoot was a former FBI agent that had made his career in the media as a conservative 
commentator. Even when his first program, Facts Forum, when he attempted to maintain 
neutrality, Smoot’s conservative leanings often were present, especially in issues like foreign aid, 
which he called “quixotic stupidity” and argued that as a policy it sacrificed security in the name 
of internationalism.495 Smoot also published a weekly newsletter, The Dan Smoot Report, which 
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found its way to not only many homes across America, but also to the desks of members of 
congress, governors, and other politicians. Allen Ellender, Otto Passman, and George Wallace 
were among those subscribers. Wallace often collected Smoot’s newsletters for speech reference 
materials. Furthermore, constituents would often send copies of the Smoot Report to Wallace and 
others to point out and agree with something he had written.496 Therefore, Smoot and 
conservatives had a mutually influencing relationship on each other.  
The Smoot Report from March 6, 1967 clearly articulated an attack against liberal 
internationalism while at the same time shoring up support for a global white unity. First, Smoot 
argued that the Republic of South Africa was a target of a “liberal-communist-UN” attack—
fought with propaganda—against “white civilization” in southern Africa. He suggested that 
African and Asian countries had wanted to go to war with South Africa, but they lacked the 
means, strength, and leadership to do so. Therefore, they sought out “white western nations to do 
their dirty work.” In describing the situation in South Africa as such Smoot highlighted other 
elements of southern internationalism that had been articulated in the previous decade, including: 
dismissing liberal internationalism as communist propaganda, placing “white civilization” at the 
top of a global racial hierarchy, discrediting the inability of African and Asian nations to self-
govern, and the Third World’s manipulation of “white” nations. Thus, Smoot had attacked liberal 
internationalism in the same way Ellender, Passman, Wallace, and their colleagues had. In 
addition, he also tried to reinforce the alliance between white supremacist states by the United 
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States and Great Britain did not intervene because of the strong “cultural, economic and 
traditional ties” between the people of the three nations.497    
Smoot also used his platform in the conservative media to discuss foreign aid directly 
where he leaned heavily on how other conservatives had classified foreign aid and its recipients. 
He accused foreign aid money going to communists or pro-communist governments. The money 
was only contributing to anti-American attitudes abroad, Smoot suggested. Significantly, Smoot 
wrote, “Our high officials practically grovel before African politicians who demand U.S. aid 
while insulting us publicly and increasing their own people’s hatred of America.”498 Without 
directly using racist attacks, Smoot painted an image in which western countries were bowing to 
African and Asians. This image aligned with Wallace’s inaugural declaration that a global white 
minority was bending to the will of an international black majority, something he referred to as 
the “international racism of liberals.”499 By arguing that the United States was only fueling 
communists in Africa, Smoot illustrated an important aspect of how segregationists’ methods of 
denouncing foreign aid, due to its domestic significance, could be adapted for the national 
audience. To critique foreign aid segregationists could attack it as communist and driving anti-
American attitudes. The result was that race was implied, but ultimately Smoot and his political 
allies relied on nationalistic declarations to carry their message. 
With an international white supremacist global alliance encouraging him and a growing 
conservative media that echoed many of the foundations of a conservative internationalism, 
Wallace entered the 1968 presidential election armed with a political fiction about foreign aid 
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that allowed him to take the segregationist message to the national level. Unlike when he ran in 
the 1964 Democratic primaries Wallace did not run on the Democratic ticket. Instead, he ran as a 
candidate for the American Independent Party. Despite all of his declarations stating otherwise, 
Wallace did not believe he could win in 1968. His goal was to build on the small, but growing, 
national base that he gained in 1964 and during the following years as he fought civil rights with 
hopes of setting himself up for a 1972 run. In addition, the best outcome he hoped for was to 
draw enough voters away from the mainstream candidates to hopefully throw the election to the 
House of Representatives. Everywhere Wallace went in the country on his campaign he pedaled 
a segregationist message while rarely mentioning it. He preferred to stick to domestic issues 
whenever possible, but when foreign policy did come up, Wallace stuck to the themes of 
southern internationalism focusing on American interests, militaristic and unilateral 
interventions, and anticommunism, all of which reinforced his unspoken belief in global white 
superiority. The result was that his support grew steadily in the spring and summer of 1968.500  
The racial meaning embedded in the political fiction of foreign aid, played a role in 
Wallace’s ability to discuss race in international politics that resonated with the population 
outside of the South. Historian Dan Carter argues, “Wallace skillfully pulled from the American 
political fabric that strands of xenophobia, racism, and a ‘plain folk’ cultural outlook that equated 
the cosmopolitan currents of the 1960s with moral corruption and weakness. His genius was his 
ability to voice his listeners’ sense of betrayal—of victimhood—and to refocus their anger.”501 
The issues that Carter cites that Wallace used are focused on domestic concerns, but Wallace 
could not ignore foreign policy either. The racial implications of Wallace’s rhetoric surrounding 
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foreign aid played into not only American’s domestic feelings of victimhood, but also their fears 
about American power abroad. In tapping into these fears, Wallace clearly placed the blame at 
the feet of liberals.  
Wallace refined his message regarding foreign aid that he had been using since 
Birmingham, but the message still made it clear that liberals were to blame for leading the nation 
astray domestically and internationally due to the international influence their policies allowed in 
American affairs. In a press release regarding Vietnam, Wallace’s Presidential Campaign 
reiterated his words, “We can have the liberal trend in our country that says that we must please 
folks 10,000 miles away by changing some traditions in this country and I am getting sick and 
tired of that. Since they are spending our money, I think we ought to let them worry about what 
we think of them sometimes instead of us always worrying about what they think of us.”502 The 
“them” Wallace referred to were Africans and Asians, but he did not mention inability of the aid 
recipients like he had in earlier iterations of the critique of liberal foreign aid policy.  
Instead, he let the fact that liberals had apparently sold the United States to the whims of 
lesser nations—as he implied when he suggested recipients should be worried about their image 
in the United States—appeal to resentment in the general public over what they perceived to be 
failing American values at home and power abroad. This echoed his more blatant racist 
declaration from his 1963 inaugural address where he stated, the international colored majority 
as prosecuting the international white minority and Afro-Asian communist bloc was dictating 
global politics.503 Gone now, on the national stage, was reference to international racism of 
liberals and an international white minority that liberals and the Third World persecuted. Left in 
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Wallace’s rhetoric though was the fact that foreign aid continued to allow outsiders from Africa 
and Asia to dictate American policy and that the central government enable it to happen and 
welcomed it. Wallace’s efforts to reform foreign aid policy were therefore, in part, an effort to 
stop the decay of old racial hierarchies at home and abroad.  
 Although Wallace adamantly maintained that his 1968 campaign declaration had nothing 
to do with race, but rather was about states’ rights and local control of politics he all but admitted 
that local government and the issues he associated with it were racial issues. In a 1968 interview 
with Sam Donaldson, Wallace stated, “Well, if you want to equate race questions with local 
government, then we can equate it. But I say that being for local government, being for law and 
order has today been equated by some of those in the news media with being a race question. It is 
a sad day in our country when we can't talk about local government in New York and California 
without being charged as being a racist.”504 By associating the local government question and 
what it meant in racial terms with New York and California, Wallace intentionally set out to 
emphasize a message that was not based in the South and (at least on the surface) not racist. The 
result was rather than talking about race, he talked about busing, states’ rights, and the growth of 
the federal government.  
 When pushed on the matter though, Wallace revealed that racism was a part of his 
message. In the 1968 interview, Donaldson repeated Wallace’s remarks from his inaugural 
address regarding the prosecution a white international minority at the hands of a tyrannical 
black international majority. Donaldson continued by asking, “Now isn't that equating it with 
race?” Wallace’s answer was frank and expressed nostalgia for the days of the colonial powers in 
the world. He placed blame at the feet of liberals, replying,  
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Yes, sir…that is true. We have found that policy in this country on colonial questions 
were dictated by votes in this country and not in what we consider the best interests of the 
United States. We know that the liberals in this country helped to destroy the colonial 
possession of the great powers of the world before it was time to destroy colonial 
positions, and before it was time to give them their freedom and as a consequence, the 
vacuum, we find that communism and every other sort of disorder has moved into these 
places.505 
 
He response expressed key elements of conservative internationalism including nationalistic 
foreign policy, communist encroachment in the Third World, and inability of self-governance in 
the Third World. Wallace’s defense of colonial rule of the former-colonies suggested that he 
supported the maintenance of old socio-racial hierarchies at home and abroad, which allowed 
him to talk about race at home through the window of American foreign policy.  
Importantly though, Wallace did not acknowledge racism in the domestic context. He 
deflected to the international sphere and conservative internationalism when Donaldson pushed 
him on where race stood in his campaign. Specifically he used support of the global white 
supremacist alliance as an example of how domestic civil rights had threatened the United States 
and global stability. He argued that Rhodesia and South Africa were the two nations in Africa 
with the highest standard of living, and they were key allies in the Vietnam War, yet the Untied 
States had endorsed sanctions against them. He told Donaldson, “Our whole basic foreign policy 
on the question of stripping countries like England and other of their colonial possessions, prior 
to the time those people were able to acquire independence, was to satisfy voting elements in this 
country of the United States. Today, Rhodesia and South Africa, two of the finest little countries 
in the world, are being sanctioned by this country, for what reason? Because of voting blocs in 
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this country.”506 Wallace dismissed the anticolonial rhetoric of internationalism and accused 
minority bloc voters in the United States of harming American foreign policy abroad. Without 
directly mentioning which “voting elements” had led the United States astray abroad, Wallace 
implied that the black international freedom struggle had led to chaos abroad, and granted too 
much power to minorities in the United States. Foreign aid was one manifestation of liberal 
internationalism that allowed this to happen, and thus a way to attack shifting global racial 
hierarchies.  
That is not to say that Wallace was impractical. He did not believe that foreign aid could 
be eliminated completely, and instead provided a nationalistic, unilateral approach that appealed 
to a public that was weary of the Vietnam War and liberal international policies. In a statement 
that was devoid of Wallace’s typical hyperbolic rhetoric, he argued that aid should be granted on 
purely national interest-based assessments. Any nation that opposed U.S. actions around the 
world would not be eligible for foreign aid under Wallace’s plan. Foreign aid, Wallace insisted, 
had to be earned by the nations requesting it. He concluded, “We will eliminate waste and 
corruption from these programs and we will use foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy in 
such a manner as to further the interest of our own nation.” Wallace’s suggestion for foreign aid 
was to use it domestically instead of abroad where it benefited “no Americans.” In addition he 
believed that foreign aid, when granted should be solely for American interests and national 
security via military aid.507 This nationalistic version of foreign aid that Wallace advocated for 
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was an effort to eliminate any voice that non-western countries had in international politics, 
which ran counter to the ideals of liberal internationalism.  
Wallace also tapped into the political fiction surrounding foreign aid that Ellender and 
others had built that emphasized corruption and lack of abilities among aid recipients. In 
suggesting that aid recipients, under his watch, would not be corrupt or incapable of using 
assistance for “the good of their people,” Wallace reinforced the image of African and Asian aid 
recipients as simultaneously helpless and corrupt, power-hungry thugs.508 This image was one 
that the public could easily apply to domestic policy too, as welfare and aid programs attempted 
to help correct social injustices that were in part rooted in socio-historical racial inequalities. In 
his TV campaign ads, Wallace declared that he was going to stop the “give away” to anti-
Americans abroad, along with promising to end forced busing and restore law and order to the 
country by protecting citizens’ safety and property.509 The fact that Wallace listed foreign aid in 
his campaign ad amongst other racially coded topics is significant. Importantly, he used the 
language of the political fiction—in which the money was a handout that went to corrupt, anti-
Americanists—to present a unilateral, nationalistic argument against liberal development 
policies. Wallace presented an argument to the public in which foreign aid stemmed from liberal 
policies, which were endangering women and children (busing and crime) while at the same time 
threatening the nation by leaving it vulnerable to the will of anti-Americanist elements abroad.  
In his campaign Wallace was able to then bring foreign aid back to the domestic front and 
use it as a symbol for federal government interference in the daily lives of Americans, which 
included civil rights. During his California campaign, Wallace attacked the mainstays of 
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liberalism including “pseudo-intellectuals” who argued that “society’s to blame” for the decay of 
law and order in the United States. Without outright making any racist statements, Wallace 
argued that liberals had led the country astray, and government control needed to be returned to 
the local levels. He argued that the federal government dictated how domestic institutions could 
spend tax revenue, yet when foreign aid was sent abroad it went “without any strings attached.” 
He proceeded to connect taxing to busing issues, and argued that American wanted the “freedom 
of choice.”510 The implication that Wallace made was that liberal internationalism allowed 
Africans and Asians abroad more control and freedom than Americans at home who were 
opposed to busing. Such an argument easily spoke to the white resentment over the changing 
landscape of racial and socio-economic hierarchies in the United States as well as abroad.  
Wallace was unsuccessful in his 1968 presidential bid, but the political fiction and 
rhetorical style he used to discuss race without directly referencing it was a lasting legacy of his 
campaign. Dan Carter argues, “It was clear that George Wallace had been the first politician to 
sense and then to exploit the changes America came to know by many names: white backlash, 
the silent majority, the alienated voters…but as George Wallace neared the limits of his political 
popularity, he opened the door for his successors to manipulate and exploit the politics of 
anger.”511 Still the politics of anger he used were not solely rooted in domestic issues. Instead, 
they were part of a growing conservative internationalism that advocated for nationalistic foreign 
policy. Wallace used international issues to gain national support for the opposition to civil rights 
by exploiting foreign aid as a way to discuss civil rights without directly mentioning them.512 In 
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doing so, Wallace had built on a foundation of political fiction surrounding foreign aid that 
revolved around denouncing liberal internationalism and its policies as communist and anti-
American, as well as criticizing aid recipients as corrupt despots who were incapable of using the 
aid. Wallace also simultaneously helped reinforce a global white supremacist network and used 
that network to shore up domestic support of maintaining global racial hierarchies inherent in 
segregation and colonialism. Wallace’s campaigns represent the moment when the political 
fiction and racial symbolism of foreign aid entered the national political conversation.  
 
Conclusion:  
 Increasingly in the 1960s civil rights gains had made outright racism less socially 
acceptable, yet the message of segregationists did not go away. Just like the civil rights 
movement shifted to a more national, socio-economic justice platform, so too did the backlash 
against it. Building on the previous decade’s groundwork, segregationists turned to the political 
fiction and global white supremacist alliance as a way to attack the misguided antiracist 
ideologies of liberal internationalists. Segregationists like Wallace and Ellender argued that 
liberal internationalists had sold the nation out to Third World radicals and communists in 
exchange for minority friends abroad and votes at home. Foreign aid, therefore, became a key 
element in segregationist’s efforts to take their message to a national audience. The result of their 
efforts was an important step in the process of adapting old racial hierarchies to liberal attempts 
to refashion the world in nonracial terms. 
 Looking at both Ellender’s and Wallace’s continued connecting of domestic civil rights 
and foreign aid to racial terms demonstrates the way that segregationists were able to use the 
political fiction surrounding foreign aid in a national context. They received support from the 
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general public by emphasizing the communist, corrupt, and ineffective perception of foreign aid 
as heralded by the federal government. Instead, they offered an alternative where aid was to be 
granted on a unilateral basis to like-minded nations. The results marked the beginning of the 
ascendency of conservative internationalism to counter liberal internationalism.  
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Conclusion: 
	  
	   Having charted the development of what I have termed southern internationalism around 
the issue of foreign aid, and having shown the importance that the role of that alternative 
southern vision for American international engagement had on political development during the 
post-World War II era, it is important to take a moment to contemplate the significance of that 
history and its continued legacy. In the proceeding four chapters I have used foreign aid as an 
entry point into understanding how the liberal internationalist programs of the Cold War faced 
opposition from representatives in the American South. The chapters build the argument that 
southern representatives, such as Otto E. Passman and Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, were not 
merely parochial segregationists that were only concerned with what was happening in their 
“own backyard.” Rather by using foreign aid as a window into their worldview and stances on 
foreign policy and national security issues, this dissertation shows that they opposed foreign aid 
because they had an alternative vision for controlling decolonization. That vision was connected 
to their efforts to maintain white supremacist racial hierarchies around the world. To these 
segregationists, a threat to imperial or neocolonial control in the Third World was just as much 
as a threat to segregation in the American South.  
Forming throughout the 1950s and 1960s, this southern internationalism attempted to 
combat the connection between the American civil rights and Third World nationalist 
movements. Nationalism, anticommunism, sovereignty (both state and national), militarism and 
unilateralism defined southern internationalism. Most importantly though, southern 
internationalists adhered to a global white supremacist racial hierarchy that segregation and 
imperialism upheld. The belief in the superiority of whiteness manifested itself in the other key 
characteristics and foreign policy ideals of southern internationalism. Their faith in a global 
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white supremacist racial hierarchy was the underlining ideology and anticommunism and 
militaristic unilateralism were the manifestations of that political ideology. Liberal 
internationalism, expressed in foreign aid endeavors, represented a threat to Western control in 
the Third World and segregation at home due to the antiracist ideologies it sought to achieve. 
The antiracist aspirations of liberal internationalism took on domestic significance in the Cold 
War context, which made domestic civil rights reform a diplomatic imperative due to the harm it 
caused to American attempts to win allies in the Third World to contain the spread of 
communism.513  
Southern internationalists therefore combatted liberal internationalism by crafting a 
political rhetoric and message that attached racial meaning and symbolism to foreign aid with the 
goal to discredit international aid and its recipients based on their racist worldview. Throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s, segregationists refined their message against foreign aid and eliminated 
direct mention of race during the 1960s. The result was that in the public sphere the racial 
symbolism and political fiction of aid recipients as inefficient, corrupt beggars became more 
powerful than the reality of foreign aid.  
The prevalence of the racial symbolism that segregationist attached to foreign aid proved 
to be an important piece of a conservative coalition in the 1960s, and more specifically a 
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conservative internationalist conception of national security policy. Segregationists, therefore, 
crafted foreign aid into a symbol and example for both domestic and international racial disorder, 
and used it to demonstrate the chaos non-white socio-political power could create at home if 
liberal internationalists’ antiracial goals had gone unchecked. Due to this racial symbolism that 
segregationists created, foreign aid was one way to take their regionalist international agenda to a 
national audience. George C. Wallace’s presidential campaigns especially demonstrate the 
transition from a southern internationalism to its alignment to a national based conservative 
coalition. In speaking about the failings of foreign aid, Wallace was able to evoke imagines of 
racial upheaval at home and abroad while implying non-white inferiority, all while avoiding any 
direct mention of race.514 Once direct mention of race was eliminated from the conversation, 
other political causes, such as the religious right and fiscal conservatives could find common 
ground regarding shared objectives and means.515 The result was a conservative coalition that 
partly rested on southern internationalism.  
In the early 1970s, with the conservative political ascendency occurring, foreign aid, 
conservative politics, and civil rights had all undergone changes, securing the longevity of the 
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southern internationalist foreign aid political fiction in the public discussions of foreign aid. In 
large part because of the Vietnam War, the reorientation of foreign aid with the New Direction 
policies under Carter represented a larger shift in foreign policy and the role that Congress 
played in it. Rather than the focus that Kennedy had placed on economic development, the New 
Direction policies in the 1970s focused on human needs and later, in the 1980s, the focus shifted 
once again to environmental issues. This continued shifting nature of foreign aid resulted in 
increasing opposition to foreign aid from both the political left and the political right.516 The 
result was that the rhetoric and discourse surrounding the debate over foreign aid shifted as well, 
but since southern internationalists had developed a racially code political fiction surrounding 
foreign aid, the meanings of the earlier debates remained embedded in the way the public and 
politicians discussed foreign aid.  
In civil rights history the 1970s and conservative ascendency represented a shift from 
legal-based sustained action towards demands for socio-economic justice in the Black Power 
movement. Stokley Carmichael’s 1966 demand for “Black Power,” often marks the beginnings 
of the Black Power ideology’s prevalence, but it had more complicated origins that had roots in 
early self-defense and nationalist ideologies, and therefore developed before 1966 around issues 
of class, tactics, masculinity, anticolonialism, and revolutionary worldviews.517 The role of 
internationalism and anticolonial solidarity as a defining ideology of Black Power distinguished 
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Black Power from other manifestations of the black freedom struggle.518 However, with the 
entrenchment of racial coding that came with the conservative ascendency in the 1970s, the 
internationalist, Black Power demands for socio-economic justice were often met with white 
backlash.  
My dissertation sheds light on the rise of American conservatism in the postwar period. 
Exploring the connection in the histories of foreign aid with civil rights opposition, I challenge 
the assumption that southerners were parochial and isolationists. Instead, it reveals that 
segregationists had their own desires to control what they saw to be the disorder of 
decolonization, and they made attempts to institutionalize their alternative foreign policy 
ideology. That alternative vision was firmly rooted in their domestic view of how the world 
should be arranged. Segregationists therefore constructed a political fiction surrounding 
American foreign aid and turning it into a symbol of the excesses of liberal internationalism at 
home and abroad. The political fiction allowed political ideologues to connect foreign aid with 
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the civil rights movement and attach racial symbolism to those agendas, coding foreign aid in the 
language of white backlash. This southern internationalism formed one of the political traditions 
of the later conservative internationalism in which segregationists presented foreign aid as an 
international version of welfare. The inherent racial meanings in these critiques of liberal 
spending at home and abroad laid the foundation for the political paradigm to shift towards new 
conservatism in the early 1970s.  
It was the New Right political discourse that stemmed from the ability of southern 
internationalism to harness white backlash while eliminating direct mention of race that remains 
hegemonic today. As a result, racism remains an “artifact of the past,” while still being ever 
present.519 Meaning, in eliminating all reference to race with “color-blind” racial political 
rhetoric, both internationally and domestically, southern internationalists and their conservative 
coalition allies created what Howard Winant has dubbed a “neoconservative project” that in 
addition to racial issues, is a “quasi-imperial defense” of political and cultural Western tenets.520 
Thus, not only were the southern internationalists’ efforts to discuss race without mentioning 
race directly successful, but their political tactics have contributed to the entrenchment of such 
“color-blind” racism and even helped to recreate informal imperial relationships on a global 
scale. Considering the relevancy to understanding the continued role global racial hierarchies 
play and the prevailing “color-blind” racism that dominates American political discourse on race, 
my dissertation provides an important part of the story of how racial language has become 
embedded in the rhetoric surrounding foreign aid.  
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 Understanding that segregationists had an alternative vision for controlling 
decolonization has importance for us in understanding how that vision contributed to the 
conservative internationalism that came to dominate American foreign affairs after the Vietnam 
War and continues to influence the direction of American foreign policy. In addition, it 
illuminates how, especially regarding foreign aid, that southern internationalist vision entrenched 
an image of foreign aid as international welfare--along with all the racial meanings attached to it-
-to foreign aid today. For example, in a recent article arguing against foreign aid, the 
conservative magazine of the John Birch Society, The New American published an online article, 
titled, “Exporting Welfare.” The author of the article, Laurence M. Vance, fervently reminds 
readers, that even after the 1979 restructuring of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare into the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services, 
that the programs that have become “income security” and “public assistance” programs are still 
“welfare,” even if the term has “fallen into disuse.” Laurence’s affirmation reminding readers 
that these programs are “welfare” implies that there is a specific meaning to the readers and 
himself that conveys a certain set of meaning and symbolism embedded in that rhetoric.521 Given 
the pejorative that conservatives have turned welfare into in American political rhetoric, Vance’s 
insistence on using the term suggests he intentionally wants to remind his reader of the 
derogatory images associated with the term.   
Echoing the southern internationalists, Vance continues by reinforcing the tired troupe 
that “welfare” programs are communist in nature and thus un-American. He writes, “All federal 
welfare programs are clearly illegitimate and unconstitutional functions of the federal 
government. They are socialistic, they are collectivist…they are social-engineering schemes, 
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they shift responsibility from the individual to society and from facilities to the state, they 
contribute to class warfare, they crowd out genuine charity, and they are the means by which the 
government takes $2 trillion a year from some Americans and gives it to other Americans.”522 
Vance’s attack against “welfare” programs repeats many of the same attacks southern 
internationalist used against foreign aid in the 1950s and 1960s. The reliance on derogatory 
symbolism wrapped up in fears of socialist and communist encroachment, uses the same political 
strategy that southern internationalists used in their attacks on foreign aid, especially once those 
attacks were taken to a national audience. 
Even more to the point, Vance’s article is actually about foreign aid, but he sees no 
difference between domestic and international aid programs. For Vance it is a given that foreign 
aid is simply an international version of welfare. He writes, “There is another euphemism for a 
welfare scheme that is far worse than any of those mentioned above: foreign aid.” He concludes 
that it is bad enough that the United States has welfare programs, but it is worse when “welfare is 
exported.”523 Demonstrating the longevity and continued legacy of southern internationalism on 
how foreign aid is discussed in today’s political discourse, Vance--channeling what could have 
easily been taken straight from Wallace’s presidential campaign playbook--reasons that foreign 
aid is also harmful because it sends money “courtesy of U.S. taxpayers, to countries that most 
Americans couldn’t find on a map and in some cases have never even heard of.”524 Vance’s 
rationale that American ignorance of world geography as a reason to not give what he suggests is 
just an international form of welfare, demonstrates how southern internationalism shaped the 
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way that foreign aid is discussed today. Much like domestic welfare programs have attached 
racial and socio-economic meanings, so too does foreign aid thanks to the careful calculations of 
segregationists and their efforts to build an alternative foreign policy agenda in the face of 
changing global racial hierarchies.   
Furthermore, foreign aid continues to hold symbolism as a battleground for domestic 
social and cultural wars to play out on internationally. In a similar manner to how southern 
internationalists attached racial issues to foreign aid, today, American “culture wars” regarding 
sexuality and gender are also debated on an international scale via foreign aid. In 2012, when the 
Republican Party presented their party platform at their convention, they directly addressed 
foreign aid. Under a section fittingly titled, “American Exceptionalism,” the platform stated, 
“Foreign aid should serve our national interest, an essential part of which is the peaceful 
development of less advanced and vulnerable societies in critical parts of the world…In short, 
aid money should follow positive outcomes, not pleas for more cash in the same corrupt official 
pockets…The effectiveness of our foreign aid has been limited by the cultural agenda of the 
current Administration, attempting to impose on foreign countries, especially the peoples of 
Africa, legalized abortion and the homosexual rights agenda.”525 Much like foreign aid in the 
1950s and 1960s took on importance for domestic racial issues for liberals and conservatives 
alike, foreign aid today still serves as an important symbolic battleground for domestic issues, as 
well as liberal and conservative efforts to control and shape the world in their vision. In addition, 
conservatives then connect those domestic issues to foreign policy methods. In this case, the 
Republican Party suggests that foreign aid should be given only with national interest in mind, 
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echoing the earlier nationalistic foreign policy of southern and conservative internationalism. In 
insisting on a national interest orientated foreign policy, the Republican Party is also combatting 
the inclusion of birth control and LGBTQ rights as part of foreign aid conditions.  
The influence of southern internationalism remains today in the way the public and 
politicians discuss foreign aid, with regards to the characterization of aid recipients and how 
racial coding continues to prevail in the discussion surrounding foreign assistance. At the same 
time, the symbolism and domestic significance of liberal and conservative efforts to engage with 
the world with their different visions of internationalism continues to evolve and take on new 
meanings.  
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